Piggott and Lindsay, JJ.
1. This is a first appeal against an order of the District Judge of Agra passed under the following circumstances. It appears that liquidation proceedings in the matter of the Indian Exchange Bank were pending in the court of the Additional Judge of Lahore under the old Companies Act (Act VI of 1882). The Additional Judge of Lahore passed an order directing one Lachmi Narain as a contributory to pay a sum of Rs. 2,475 towards the funds of the Bank in liquidation. This order was sent down to be executed in the court of the District Judge of Agra. In the liquidation proceedings and in the order which was issued from the court at Lahore, Lachmi Narain was described as being the proprietor of a firm styled Nand Lal Santi Lal. Certain goods were attached by the District Judge of Agra in execution of the order received by him, and on this having been done the present appellant Santi Lal filed an objection in which he stated that he and not Lachmi Narain was the sole proprietor of the firm in question. The learned District Judge was of opinion that he had no power to entertain a petition of this kind. The order was issued from the Lahore court with an express statement that Lachmi Narain was proprietor of the firm. The Judge therefore refrained from inquiry as to whether Santi Lal was or was not the proprietor of the firm.
2. We may note here that the petition of objection which was filed by Santi Lal purported to be under Order XXI, Rule 58, of the Code of Civil Procedure, and that being so the order passed by the learned District Judge must be taken to be an order under Order XXI, Rule 63. A preliminary objection has been raised that no appeal lies, and we think that the objection must prevail. If the order of the Agra Court is treated as having been made under Rule 63 of Order XXI the matter is clear enough.
3. The only remedy of a person whose objection has been dismissed is by bringing a suit for a declaration. Moreover, it is clear that an order of this kind is not appealable under Order XLIII of the Code of Civil Procedure. The learned vakil for the appellant has drawn our attention to the provisions of Sections 166, 167 and 169 of the Companies Act, VI of 1882. He relies upon the provisions of Section 169, for the purpose of showing that an appeal lies in the present case. But we are unable to entertain this argument. It appears to us that Section 169 of the Companies Act (Act VI of 1882), merely provides for a right of appeal in the case of orders which would have been appealable had they been passed by the court in the exercise of its ordinary jurisdiction. This brings us back again to the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, which regulates cases in which appeals from orders in Civil Courts lie. It appears to us quite clear therefore that the right of appeal under the provisions of Section 169 of the old Companies Act, is coextensive with the right of appeal conferred by the Code of Civil Procedure; and, as we have already mentioned, an appeal in a case of this sort would not lie under the Code. We are satisfied that the preliminary objection is sound and must prevail. We dismiss the appeal with costs.