1. The plaintiff, Ram Ugrah Singh, is a graduate of the Benares Hindu University. In the month of July, 1924, he presented himself at an examination held under the authority of the said University, described as the 'Previous LL. B. Examination.' The results were publish-on the 11th of August, 1924, and the plaintiff's name did not appear in the list of candidates who had passed the examination. On the 30th of August, 1924 the plaintiff addressed to the Vice-Chancellor of the Benares Hindu University a petition (Exhibit 5), in which he protested that, under the regulations of the University in force at the time when he sat for the examination and which continued in force until after the results of the said examination had been published, he (the petitioner) had in fact passed the examination in the third class. He, therefore, requested the Vice-Chancellor to re-consider the whale situation, to adjudge the petitioner to have passed the Previous LL. B. Examination and to promote him to the Final LL. B. class, alleging these things to be his right by virtue of the declarations and pronouncements of the University. The answer returned was to the effect that the matter was under consideration. On the 8th of September, 1924 Ram Ugrah Singh instituted the present suit in the Court of the Subordinate Judge of Benares. The defendant was the Benares Hindu University. The reliefs sought were by way of declaration and of injunction. The declaration sought was to the effect that the plaintiff is entitled to have been declared as passed in the Previous Law Examination of the Benares Hindu University held in July, 1924 and promoted to the Final LL. B. class. The relief sought by way of injunction was that the defendant-University be compelled to pass and promote the plaintiff to the Final LL. B. class. There was an alternative prayer that, if for any reason the plaintiff be held disentitled to the other reliefs claimed, he should be given a decree for Rs. 5,250 by way of damages. The plaint was not rejected by the trial Court on the ground that on the face of it, it disclosed no cause of action; but summons having been issued to the Benares Hindu University through its Vice-Chancellor, the case was set down for settlement of issues; and after one adjournment, granted for the convenience of the defendant, the trial Court, on the 9th of October, 1924, settled eight issues which it proposed to try. At this stage this Court intervened, and the suit was transferred from the jurisdiction of the Subordinate Judge of Benares to that of this Court and directed to be tried as an original suit in this Court.
2. As soon as the case came up before me for hearing, Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru, appearing for the defendant, pointed out; that certain pleas in the written statement were of the nature known in English law as 'demurrer,' and went to the question whether this Court, or any other Court of civil jurisdiction in this province, could entertain a plaint of the nature now before me. I have recorded a memorandum of the proceedings which took place before me yesterday, which were largely directed to ascertaining from the learned Counsel representing both parties whether they were at isssue upon any definite question of fact and what wag the precise meaning and effect of the pleadings entered by the respective parties. Having done this, I passed an order superseding altogether the issues fixed by the Subordinate Judge of Benares, and in their place I fixed the three following issues:
1. On the facts alleged and the pleadings of the parties, has the plaintiff any cause of action?
2. In the event of an affirmative finding on issue No. 1, to what relief is the plaintiff entitled, either,
(i) by way of declaration, or
(ii) by way of mandatory injunction, or
(iii) by way of a decree for damages?
3. If it be held that the plaintiff is entitled to relief by way of a decree for damages, then at what sum should the said damages be fixed?
3. I then intimated my intention of hearing both parties on the first two issues before I proceeded to consider the third. No oral evidence has been taken on either side, the matter being treated by both parties as one falling within the scope of Order XIV, Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, that is to say, as being a case in which issues of law were raised which went to the root of the whole matter and the determination of which in a certain sense might make it unnecessary for the Court to take oral evidence, or to proceed to the determination of any issue of fact. In the course of argument, however, certain documents were put in, which I have admitted in evidence, and I must, therefore, take it that evidence has been offered in respect of the two preliminary issues of law. Whether or not this course was strictly regular, it is certain that no injustice has been done to the plaintiff in the matter, as the documents before me are documents produced at his instance. A printed booklet, described as the 'Prospectus of Studies' issued by the Benares Hindu University for the examinations of 1923, and containing the regulations of the University, was put in and admitted by both sides to be an authoritative publication. This book or pamphlet was already on the record when the case came before this Court, and I have now marked it as Exhibit 6. The other exhibits, to which I need not necessarily refer in numerical order, are the following:
Exhibit 5 is the petition addressed by the plaintiff, Ram Ugrah Singh, to the Vice-Chancellor of the Benares Hindu University, dated August 30, 1924, and Exhibit 6 is the reply to the said petition. Exhibit 4 is a copy of the minutes of a meeting of the Senate of the Benares Hindu University held on the 18th of August, 1924. Exhibit 1 is a copy of what are described as the minutes of an emergency meeting of the Syndicate of the same University, held on the 16th of November, 1923. Exhibit 2 is a letter signed by the Registrar of the Benares Hindu University, specifying the papers taken by the plaintiff in the course of the Previous LL. B. Examination of 1924, with a statement of the maximum marks allowed for each paper and of the marks awarded in each to the plaintiff. Exhibit 3 is a copy of a letter, addressed by the Registrar of the Benares Hindu University to the Secretary to Government of the United Provinces, Education Department, dated the 8th of September, 1924. The authenticity and admissibility in evidence of these exhibits has been conceded on both sides. It will be noticed that I have admitted copies to be put in evidence in certain cases, and I have done so without concerning myself to enquire too curiously into the question whether copies were technically admissible in evidence. The documents in question were called for by the plaintiff from the defendant, and the copies produced by the latter have been accepted by consent of both parties as the most convenient method of placing upon the record the evidence which the plaintiff desired to have there.
4. The examination of July 1924 was the first examination in Law held under the auspices of the Benares Hindu University, the Law class at the said University having only been opened in the course of the previous year. It was at one time suggested that a question of fact requiring determination might be whether the plaintiff joined the aforesaid Law class in the month of November, or in the month of December 1923; but I do not think that anything turns upon this. It has been admitted that the plaintiff's attendance, for the purpose of certain rules relating thereto, was reckoned from the 1st of December, 1923, and that he paid the required fees for the entire Session reckoned to have commenced in the month of July, 1923. Nothing really turns upon the question whether or not the plaintiff had already joined the Law class when the Syndicate held its meeting of November 16, 1923.
5. Having opened a class in Law and determined to institute examinations leading up to the decree of Bachelor of Laws, it became the duty of the University to frame proper regulations for the conduct of such examinations. The Syndicate entered upon the performance of this duty, in so far as it was within the competence of that body, on the 16th of November 1923 as aforesaid. A resolution was passed, the meaning and effect of which is perhaps the principal matter in controversy now before me. For the present I am content to say that the intention of that resolution in the minds of the persons who passed it seems to me to be beyond question. In order to pass the examination a candidate was to be required to fulfil two conditions : in each of the papers set for the examination he was to obtain at least 30 per cent, of the marks; but over and above this, in order to pass the examination at all, he was to obtain 50 per cent, of the total marks in all the papers added together. What the plaintiff actually did obtain is shown in the document Exhibit 2. He did obtain over 30 per cent, of the marks in each of the five papers set and taken by him, but his aggregate of marks in all the papers came to 225 out of 500, which is 45 per cent, instead of the prescribed minimum of 50 par cent. This is the reason why the plaintiffs name did cot appear in the published list of candidates who had passed the examination.
6. It may be useful to pause at this point in order to remark that the suit now before me is not one to which relief is sought, by way of damages or otherwise, upon an alleged breach of a contract, or quasi-contract, between the parties. There are passages in the petition Exhibit 5, and also in the plaint itself, which suggest a contrary intention on the part of the plaintiff; but, as put to me in argument, this was certainly not the plaintiff's case - and rightly so - because a suit on this basis could not possibly have succeeded. There is no document on the record of which it could be said, by any stretch of reasoning, that the defendant University had thereby hold out assurance, either to the plaintiff or to any other person, that, if he obtained 45 per cent, of the marks in certain papers set at an examination described as the Previous LL. B., Examination, he would be held to have passed the same, provided he had obtained at least 30 per cent, of the marks in each paper separately.
7. What the plaintiff's case really is I now proceed to consider. The foundation of it is to be found in Regulation 10 of Chapter XXVI of the Regulations of the Benares Hindu University. These are the original regulations of the University which, in accordance with Section 18(2) of the Act XVI of 1915, by which the said Univer-No. sity was constituted, were framed under the direction of the Governor-General in Council, received the approval of the Governor-General in Council and were to remain in force unless and until added to, amended, or repealed by the Senate of the University. The rule in question runs ass follows:
Candidates passing any University-examination will ba placed in three classes, namely, the first, second and third. The Syndicate shall from time to time prescribe conditions under which candidates; will be placed in each of these classes.
8. Now, by its resolution of November 16, 1923, the Syndicate proposed to divide candidates who had passed the examination into two classes, and not into three. I have already spoken of the 'intention' of the framers of this resolution, and ins using that expression I did refer to Exhibit 4, the proceedings of the Senate at its meeting of the 18th of August, 1924, and to Exhibit 3, the letter addressed by the Registrar of the University, under the orders of the Vice-Chancellor and the Senate to the Secretary to Government, United Provinces. The plaintiff's contention, however, is that the Syndicate's resolution, if interpreted,
(a) according to its plain meaning and effect; or
(b) with reference more particularly to the provisions of Regulation 10 of Chapter XXVI already referred to, is to constitute,, not two classes of successful candidates, but three According to this interpretation, candidates obtaining 60 par cent, of the aggregate marks in all papers were to be adjudged to have passed the examination in the first class; candidates obtaining 50 per cant, were to be placed in the second class of passed candidates. There was to be a third class, consisting of those candidates who had obtained least 30 per cant, of the marks in each of the papers set; at the examination, bat whose aggregate fell short of 50 per cant, of the total. In so far as this is alleged to be the meaning of the resolution, considered by itself and independently of any documentary evidence as to the interpretation put upon the same by the persons who framed it, I am unable to accept the contention. The words in the resolution which run, 'Minimum pass marks in the total, 50 par cent.' exclude the interpretation contended for on behalf of the plaintiff. The resolution as it stands, considered according to its plain meaning and apart from any other document on the record, does lay down that in order to pass the examination a candidate must have obtained in the aggregate at least 50 par cent, of the total marks. It is, however, contended that the resolution must be interpreted in the light of the regulation by which the Syndicate was empowered to act in the matter. According to that regulation, candidates passing any University examination ware to be placed in three classes. The argument on this point was pressed upon ma in two different forms. It was contended that the Syndicate of the Banare3 Hindu University should be presumed to have acted in accordance with, and not in contravention of, the regulations by which it was bound, and that, therefore, any reasonable or possible interpretation of the terms of the resolution of the 16th of November, 1923, which brought it into conformity with the provisions of the regulation, must be preferred to any interpretation involving the assumption that the Syndicate was contravening the said regulation. In the second place, it was contended that, in any event, in view of the provisions of the regulation, the Syndicate must be deemed to have divided the candidates who had passed the examination into three classes, and that, if the resolution be considered in this light, than the only possible interpretation is that there was to be a third class of passed candidates as contended for by the plaintiff. the first of that arguments fails to my mind, not only on the broad ground that there is a limit beyond which a presumption such as that suggested by the plaintiff cannot be allowed to prevail against the plain meaning of the recorded resolution which shows what the Syndicate actually did; but also because, on a review of the entire situation, I do not find any real presumption in favour of the suggestion that the Syndicate was dividing the candidates who passed this particular examination into three classes. It is quite true that regulations could be altered only by the Senate; but under Clause (4) of Section 18 of Act No. XVI of 1915 the Syndicate had authority to draft and propose to the Senate regulations that should be made by the Senate. I do not say that on the 16th of November, 1923, the Syndicate of the Benares Hindu University was consciously preparing for the consideration of the Senate an amended regulation affecting the examinations to be held for the degree of Bachelor of Laws. What impresses me is that the Syndicate, in the exercise of its lawful power in respect of the fixing of standards for the said examinations, would not necessarily feel themselves bound to divide the successful candidates into three classes, because there was a regulation saying that this ought to be done in all University examinations. They would know that this provision was capable of amendment by the Senate, for adequate cause shown; and they were at full liberty to draft a proposal which should involve the classifying of successful candidates into two classes instead of three, in reliance on the fact that, if the Senate approved of the arrangement, it could easily amend the regulation. I am unable, therefore, to make any presumption with regard to the meaning of this resolution of the 16th November, 1923 contrary to what appears to me to be its plain and unambiguous terms. There remains the question whether, in spite of all this, the effect of the resolution actually passed was or was not something: other than what its framers intended and what the words themselves import. Where the Syndicate was empowered by the regulation itself, which is the foundation of the plaintiff's case, to prescribe conditions under which candidates would be placed in each of the three classes into which candidates passing the examination were to be placed, that body was a fortiori empowered to prescribe the conditions under which a candidate would be held to have passed the examination at all. Moreover, by Clause (22) of the first schedule appended to Act No. XVI of 1915, which, contains the statutes, of the University, it was the duty of the Syndicate, amongst other things, to declare the results of the various University examinations. The Syndicate was, therefore, within its statutory authority when, in the month of August, 1924, it caused to be published the result of this Previous examination for the degree of Bachelor of Laws, and excluded from the list of passed candidates those persons who had obtained less than 50 per cent, in the aggregate of the total marks, even though some of these persons, including the present plaintiff, had obtained the minimum of 30 per cent, of the marks allotted for each paper singly.
9. I cannot undertake to say why the question of amending regulation 10 of Chapter XXVI, so as to permit the successful candidates to be classified in two classes instead of in three, was not taken up by the responsible authorities of the defendant University at an earlier date. To this extent certainly there was an irregularity in the proceedings of the said authorities. The examination was over and the result had actually been published a full week, before the Senate met on the 18th of August, 1924 and took into consideration this matter, amongst others. The record of the proceedings shows clearly enough that the question of fixing a lower minimum than 50 per cent, of the aggregate marks, as a condition essential the passing of the examination, was never debated at all. That was treated, and in my opinion was rightly treated, as having been concluded by the resolution of the syndicate and the subsequent publication under authority of the Syndicate of the examination results. The learned gentlemen of the Senate had awakened, though rather late in the day, to the difficulty with which they were faced by reason of the fact that the regulations of the University, as they stood, did not permit of their classifying passed candidates into fewer than three classes. They could have met this difficulty by requiring a higher qualification than sixty per cent, of the marks from candidates aspiring to a place in the first class; but this they were reluctant to do. If the minimum qualification for the first class was to be fixed at 60 per cent, of the aggregate marks, it was obviously difficult to get in two more classes between that limit and the interior limit of 50 per cent. For this reason the Senate proposed and carried a formal amendment of regulation 10 of Chapter XXVI, permitting candidates passing any of the Law examinations to be placed in two classes only, a first class and a second. Now, this resolution required under the law the previous approval of the Visitor, that is to say, the Governor of the United Provinces, This approval had not been obtained when the Senate met to consider the matter on the 18th of August, 1924. Here, again, the anthorities of the University seem to have been either ill advised or dilatory, and a point has been made on behalf of the plaintiff, not altogether without reason, that it was only on the 8th of September, 1924, the very day on which the present suit was instituted in the Court of the Subordinate Judge, that the authorities so far bestirred themselves as to direct the Registrar of the University to submit the proposed amendment of the regulation for the approval of His Excellency, the Visitor. To the letter itself was appended a prayer that His Excellency would be further pleased to accord permission to give retrospective effect to this sanction, 'so that it may be applicable to the cases of candidates who appeared at the previous LL. B. examination held in July 1924.' There is a telegram on the record, marked Exhibit 7, which suggests that His Excellency the Visitor intended to comply, and did comply, with this prayer of the Senate. As to the legal effect of this subsequent sanction I am, more or less, in agreement with the argument pressed upon ma by the learned Counsel who represented the plaintiff. I doubt whether the restrospective effect of the sanction could be anything more than to give the resolution of the Senate the same effect as it would have had if the Visitor's approval bad been obtained beforehand, as required by Section 18, Clause (5) of the Act. The position, therefore, is virtually this : When the Syndicates of the defendant University published the list of candidates who had passed the Previous LL. B. examination held in July 1924, they did contravene an existing regulation requiring them to place those candidates who had passed the examination in three classes. The effect of the subsequent proceedings, as it seems to me, is that the regulation has now been amended by proper authority, and as regards future examinations no such question can arise. The resolution of the Senate of the 18th of August, 1924, and the sanction of His Excellency the Visitor, although they cannot, in my opinion, obliterate this fact that the Syndicate committed a breach of the existing regulation when they tabulated and published the result of this examination, are not however, wholly without effect oven as regards this past transaction. Under Section 6 of Act XVI of 1915 the Visitor of the University i3 empowered to sea that the proceedings are in conformity with the Act, the statutes and the regulations. It having been brought to the notice of His Excellency the Visitor that a particular regulation, now proposed to be amended, was sought to be applied to an examination already held and the results of which had already been tabulated and published, it would have been open to the Visitor to annul the published list of passed candidates, as not being in conformity with the regulation in force at the time, and to require the University to publish a fresh list classifying the passed candidates in strict conformity with the regulation. He has not seen fit to do this, but, on the contrary, by purporting to grant the application of the Senate to give retrospactive effect to its resolution, he has condoned the breach o regulation of which the Syndicate has been guilty.
10. This being the state of affairs disclosed by the admitted facts of the case and the documentary evidence, I am now in a position to turn to the consideration of the questions of law involved in the first two issues settled by me. On behalf of the plaintiff reference was vary properly made to the general provisions of Section 9 of the Coda of Civil Procedure, on the basis of which it is contended that the present suit, being one of a Civil nature, is within the jurisdiction of the Court in which it was instituted, the cognizance of the said Court being nowhere barred by statute. It is not enough, however, to describe this suit as one of a civil nature. It is one for relief by way of declaration and injunction, and therefore subject to she provisions of the Specific Belief Act (I of 1877) the plaintiff must show that he has a valid cause of action within the provisions of that Act, before he can obtain an affirmative finding on issue No. 1. The relevant sections of the Act are 42, 54 and 55. It serves little purpose to refer to the provisions of Section 45 of the same Act, which admittedly have no application to this Court, and a fortiori no application to the Court of the Subordinate Judge of Banaras in which this suit was instituted. Before the plaintiff can obtain relief by way of declaration under the provisions of Section 42 of Act I of 1877, he must show that he is a person entitled to some legal character, and that this right of his is being denied, or contravened, by the defendant University. Under Sections 54 and 55 of the same Act it is necessary for a successful plaintiff to show that the defendant, against whom the suit is brought, is under some obligation in favour of the plaintiff, the breach of which can only be prevented by the granting of the injunction which the plaintiff seeks. The general question of law involved has bean argued with much force and keenness by the learned Counsel on both sides; and it is only in order to do justice to their learning and the zeal they have displayed in the cause of their respective clients that I feel it incumbent upon me to notice the various cases to which I have been referred. On the side of the plaintiff two oases were principally relied on. One is, In the matter of G.A. Natesan (1917) 40 Mad. 125. The other is a case which came before the Privy Council from the Supreme Court of New South Wales - that of Leslie Williams v. Haines Thomas Giddy (1911) 15 C.W.N. 669. The former of these cases is authority for the proposition that a High Court possessing authority to act under Section 45 of Act 1 of 1877 will make an order requiring a specific act to be done by the Syndicate of an Indian University, where it is clearly of opinion that the Syndicate is under a statutory obligation to perform that act, is refusing to do so without lawful cause, and the act is one the performance of which can readily be enforced under the order of the Court. The second casa is only remotely applicable to the facts now before me, It shows that their Lordships of the Privy Council held themselves empowered to interfere with the discretion of a statutory body, called the Public Service Board, and to correct by way of mandamus or injunction an injustice apparently perpetrated by the said Board in the exercise of its statutory powers. Two other cases referred to on behalf of the plaintiff were cases in which Courts granted injunction against Municipal Corporations : vide, Vali Ammal v. The Corporation of Madras (1912) 38 Mad. 41, and Gur Baksh Singh v. Chutta Singh (1918) 5 O.L.J. 471. Their Lordships of the Madras High Court laid it down 'that the principle governing such cases is that when a right and an infringement thereof is alleged, a cause of action is disclosed.' On the side of the defendant reference was made to two cases decided in this country, namely, In the matter of Purna Chunder Dutt (1908) 35 Cal. 915 and In the matter of Probhas Chandra Roy (1913) 40 Cal. 588. In each of these case3 the learned Judges were dealing with the proceedings of a Board of Examiners appointed by the High Court itself and acting on the powers delegated by the High Court. I do not find much assistance in either of these cases, except in certain remarks on the principles applicable to a writ of mandamus which their Lordships quote from a Privy Council case; The Bank of Bombay v. Suleman Somji (1909) 33 Bom. 1. The words quoted are : 'One of the principles is that the writ will not be allowed to issue unless the applicant shows clearly that he has the specific legal right to enforce which he asks for the interference of the Court, that he has claimed to exercise the right and none other, and that his claim has been refused.' Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru, on behalf of the defendant, also called my attention to a number of English cases which I may refer to by their description in the various reports actually laid before me. There is the case of Thomas v. The University of London 10 L.T. 403; the case of Reg v. Hartford College 39 L.T. 18; the case of Neate v. Denman L.R.E.S. 18; the case of Rex v. Burnard's Inn 5 A. & E. 17; and the case of The King v. The Benchers of Lincoln's Inn 4 B. & C.R. In connection with this last-mentioned case I am impressed with the energy with which the learned Judges repelled the suggestion that any person has an inchoate right to be admitted to one of the colleges of the University.
11. The case actually before me seems to me a fairly simple one, and perhaps a little in danger of being smothered under the weight of legal learning which has been brought to bear upon its elucidation. What the plaintiff wants essentially is a, declaration that he has passed a certain examination and an injunction to the defendant-University to admit him to a certain class of post-graduate study, namely, the second-year class of students preparing for the LL. B. degree. When all is said and done, the effect of the proceedings of which the plaintiff complains is obvious, enough. There is nothing in the action-of the University capricious, or spiteful, or directed against the plaintiff personally. The responsible authorities of the defendant University have arrived at the conclusion that young men preparing themselves for the degree of Bachelor of Laws, to be awarded by that University, who at the end of one year's study have failed to. show to the satisfaction of the examiners, a higher proficiency in the various subjects of their study than that attained by the present plaintiffs - a proficiency, in fact, at least equal to the obtaining of 50 per cent, of the total marks in the aggregate of all the papers set for the examination - are not properly qualified to proceed to the advanced course of study devised for the benefit of the second-year class. The resolution has been taken in the interests of the young men themselves. It is the considered opinion of the University authorities that it will be for the benefit of students in the position of the present, plaintiff to submit to another year of study in the first or preliminary law class, that is to say, in the class which is preparing for the Previous LL. B. examination, before they obtain promotion to the-class which is preparing for the Final examination in Law. Now, the plaintiff wants first of all a declaration that he has passed the Previous LL. B. examination. He says, referring to the provisions of Section 42 of Act No. 1 of 1877, that he has a 'legal character' namely, that of a graduate student of the Benares Hindu University who has passed the Previous Examination for the degree of LL. B. held in the month of July, 1924. The overwhelming answer to this contention is that the plaintiff does not possess the 'legal character' claimed by him. He has not passed the examination. Stated at its very highest, the argument; submitted to me on his behalf is that, if the constituted authorities of the defendant-University had taken a proper view of the regulations of the University and of the legal effect of the Syndicate's proceedings of the 16th of November, 1923, the Syndicate would have declared him to have passed the examination. The fact remains that the Syndicate, which was the body competent to determine such matters, declared that the plaintiff had failed to pass the examination. When a student enters any University as an undergraduate, and a fortiori when a graduate of such University presents himself for a course of post-graduate study, he is a member of the 'Universities' or Corporation, and as such he is subject to the authority and discipline of those persons who have been duly placed in authority in this corporation. If he considers himself to be oppressed by some misuse of authority on the part of a person, or body of persons, set over him, it is open to him to consider whether he cannot obtain redress from higher authorities within the same corporation. The question whether he has or has not passed a certain examination is one in respect of which, by the very act of presenting himself for such examination, he submits himself to the decision of the authorities appointed by the University for the conduct of the same. No Court of Law can possibly entertain a claim on his part that he has passed a certain examination when the authorities of the University conducting the examination, and lawfully empowered to adjudicate upon its results, declare him to have failed.
12. These considerations apply a fortiori to the further relief sought by way of injunction. As a student of the Benares Hindu University, and still more as a postgraduate student holding by virtue of his degree a certain status in the corporate body known as the University, and bound as such to set an example of discipline and good conduct to members of the University of lower status than himself, the plaintiff is not entitled to challenge the decision of those in authority over him that it is expedient for him, if he desires to proceed to the degree of Bachelor of Laws, to spend a second year sin preparing for the Previous LL. B. examination, before he passes on to any-higher class. The University must have absolute discretion over its students in the matter of the classes to which the students are admitted. An injunction directing the authorities of the University, against their will and against their better judgment, to place a young man in a class where he will receive instruction by which he is not, in the opinion of those authorities, as yet properly qualified to benefit is to my mind simply unthinkable.
13. On the first of the issues set for trial my finding is that the plaintiff has no valid cause of action.
14. On the second issue I find that he is entitled to no relief by way of declaration or injunction; also that he has suffered no loss by being required to repeat the year of study in the first law class from which he had failed to derive adequate benefit.
15. The third issue does not arise.
16. The suit fails on these grounds, and I dismiss it accordingly with costs, including fees on the higher scale.