M.N. Shukla, J.
1. By means of this writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution the petitioner has prayed for quashing of the orders dated 27-10-1975 and 28-10-1975 passed by respondents Nos. 3 and 2 respectively whereby the lock placed by the petitioner over the accommodation alleged to be in his tenancy was opened and he was deprived of possession.
2. The short facts of the case are that the petitioner had been in occupation of shoo No. 35, Bahadurganj, Allahabad since the year 1971. After the enactment of the U. P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent & Eviction) Act, 1972 (U. P. Act No. 13 of 1972) (hereinafter to be referred to as the Act) the petitioner applied under Section 14 thereof for his possession, being regularised. His case was that he had been in possession with the consent of the landlord and, therefore, his possession should be deemed to be in the capacity of a tenant of such accommodation. In the same application the petitioner had also made a prayer for allotment of the accommodation in his favour. The application was resisted by the landlord respondent No. 1 and the Rent Control and Eviction Officer on 21-7-1975 gave the benefit of Section 14 to the petitioner. It was expressly found in that order that the accommodation had been let out to the petitioner by respondent No. 1 and that the petitioner's possession over the same had commenced in June 1971 and had continued without interruption. It appears that subsequently the landlord, respondent No. 1, approached the Additional District Magistrate (City) Allahabad with a representation that the said accommodation remained locked for eleven months and was no longer occupied by the petitioner, hence, suitable orders may be passed for breaking open the lock and putting respondent No. 1 in possession thereof. Without any notice to the petitioner and behind his back the Additional District Magistrate passed the impugned order- Pursuant to that order the City Magistrate, Allahabad (respondent No. 2) broke open the lock of the shop in dispute on 30-1-1975 and handed over possession to the landlord, respondent No. 1.
3. In our opinion the impugned order is manifestly erroneous and without aveneer of legal justification. The counsel for the respondents were unable to refer to any provision of law under which such order may be possibly upheld. It appears to have been passed by the Additional District Magistrate in a most capricious and arbitrary manner. The enormity of the conduct of respondent No. 1 is borne out by the fact that those proceedings were taken surreptitiously, behind the back of the petitioner and by suppression of the order dated 21-7-1975 (Annexure 1) passed under Section 14 of the Act to which both the petitioner and respondent No. 1 were parties. It is significant that respondent No. 1 had never challenged the order passed under Section 14 of the Act and the same was allowed to become final between the parties. In these circumstances the impugned orders are wholly unsustainable and must be quashed.
4. The petitioner has, however, also prayed for a writ in the nature of mandamus or any other writ, direction or order commanding respondents Nos. 2 and 3 to restore possession of the shop in dispute to the petitioner. From the facts mentioned above the conclusion cannot be escaped that the petitioner was thrown out of the shop in dispute in an illegal manner and has thereby suffered incalculable hardship. In a case like this the wrong inflicted upon him cannot be adequately redressed until he is put back in possession of the accommodation to which he was fully entitled by virtue of a legal order passed in proceedings under Section 14 of the Act. We have no doubt that in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 where it is established that arbitrariness has been perpetrated and the conscience of the Court is aroused, an appropriate direction can always be issued to redress the hardship suffered by the petitioner and restore the status quo ante. The language of Article 226 of the Constitution is advisedly wide and confers ample power on the High Court to afford complete relief to a party which has made out a case for exercise of the writ jurisdiction. Apart from issuing writs in the nature of habeas corpus, prohibition, quo warranto and cer-tiorari, it also confers a power of issuing suitable directions or order to any person or authority. When it comes to issuing a direction, the remedy is not confined to be exercised against an authority. It can with equal force be issued against a person. The law is now settled by the pronouncements of the Supreme Court that the jurisdiction of the High Courtunder Article 226 of the Constitution is not to be narrowly construed by equating it with the jurisdiction of the English courts to issue prerogative writs. The power of the High Court under Article 226 to issue directions or orders was explained by the Supreme Court in Dwarka Nath v. I. T. Officer, AIR 1966 SC 81. It was observed (at pp 84, 85 of AIR).
'This article is couched in comprehensive phraseology and it ex facie confers a wide power on the High Courts to reach injustice wherever it is found. The Constitution designedly used a wide language in describing the nature of the power, the purpose for which and the person or authority against whom it can be exercised. It can issue writs in the nature of prerogative writs as understood in England, but the scope of those writs also is widened by the use of the expression 'nature', for the said expression does not equate the writs that can be issued in India with those in England, but only draws an analogy from them. That apart, High Courts can also issue directions, orders or writs other than the prerogative writs. It enables the High Courts to mould the reliefs to meet the peculiar and complicated requirements of this country. Any attempt to equate the scope of the power of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution with that of the English Courts to issue prerogative writs is to introduce the unnecessary procedural restrictions grown over the years in a comparatively small country like England with a unitary form of 'Government to a vast country like India functioning under a federal structure. Such a construction defeats the purpose of the article itself.'
5. It is commonplace that sometimes in order to give adequate relief to an aggrieved petitioner it becomes imperative that some kind of consequential relief be also granted. This is precisely the reason why in the language of the Supreme Court the High Courts are entitled to mould the relief to meet the peculiar and complicated requirements' of a case. The question has, for instance, arisen in those matters where orders relating to the assessment of sales-tax have been challenged. In State of Madhya Pradesh v. Bhailal Bhai, AIR 1964 SC 1006 the facts were that the assessment of tax under the impugned notification had been held invalid by the High Court. A portion of the tax, however, assessed had already been deposited by the petitioners.Apart from Quashing the order by a writ of certiorari, a writ of mandamus was also issued by the High Court commanding the State of Madhya Pradesh to refund the amount illegally collected. The order directing the refund of tax was upheld by the Supreme Court and Das Gupta, J. observed : fat p. 1011 of AIR)
'We see no reason to think that the High Courts have not got this power. If a right has been infringed -- whether a fundamental right or a statutory right --and the aggrieved party comes to the Court for enforcement of the right it will not be giving complete relief if the Court merely declares the existence of such right or the fact that that existing right has been infringed. Where there has been only a threat to infringe the right, an order commanding the Government or other statutory authority not to take the action contemplated would be sufficient. It has been held by this Court that where there has been a threat only and the right has not been actually infringed an application under Article 226 would lie and the courts would give necessary relief by making an order in the nature of injunction. It will hardly be reasonable to say that while the court will grant relief by such command in the nature of an order of injunction where the invasion of a right has been merely threatened the court must still refuse, where the right has been actually invaded, to give the consequential relief and content itself with merely a declaration that the right exists and has been invaded or with merely quashing the illegal order made.'
We are fully satisfied that the case in hand is a fit one for issuing directions to respondents Nos. 2 and 8 to restore the status quo ante.
6. For the reasons stated above this writ petition is allowed with costs. The impugned orders dated 27-10-1975 and 28-10-1975 passed by respondents Nos. 3 and 2 respectively are quashed. We further direct that respondents Nos. 1, 2 and 3 shall forthwith restore possession of the accommodation in dispute to the petitioner.