1. This is an application in revision against an order rejecting an application for leave to sue in forma pauperis. So far as I am concerned I reserve the question whether an application in revision lies against such an order. Personally I think the question is distinguishable from that decided recently by a Full Bench of this Court (1921) I.L.R. 43 All. 564, in that no suit was ever instituted in the court below, as the suit would only have commenced if the application had been accepted and the petition registered as a plaint. Moreover, the effect of the order brought before us in revision was to dispose, for the time being, of the entire matter pending in that court. However, reserving this point, I am clearly of opinion that the application before us must fail. The court below has written a long order, certain portions of which do in my opinion go beyond the jurisdiction of the court, at the particular stage then reached, as limited by Rule 5 of Order XXXIII of the Code of Civil Procedure. Nevertheless the order before us does in my opinion give adequate reasons, proceeding upon materials then properly before the court for rejecting this application. In substance the court below has held that the petition accompanying the application discloses no cause of action against the first defendant, namely, the Secretary of State for India in Council. In so holding I think the court below was clearly right and the finding has not been seriously contested in argument before us. All that the court below has done, after coming to that conclusion, is to say that the application as it stands, supported by the statement of particulars (vide Order XXXIII, Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure) which actually accompanied it, should be rejected on the ground that it discloses no cause of action against the principal defendant. The question whether an application, supported by a somewhat different set of particulars, and alleging a cause of action against some only of the other defendants, would or would not have been maintainable, and would or would not have been accepted by the court below, is a matter which that court was not called upon to decide and has not decided. This application was in my opinion rightly rejected for the reasons already given. I would, therefore, dismiss this application with costs.
2. I agree on the merits and I merely wish to add that in my view we could not have entertained this application on any ground, it not being a 'case decided' within the meaning of the decision of the recent Full Bench (1921) I.L.R. 43 All. 564, and that any previous decisions of this Court which have admitted revisions in the case of the rejection of an application to be allowed to sue in forma pauperis must be treated as having been overruled.