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Bunni Pandy Vs. Brahmdeo Pandy and anr. - Court Judgment

LegalCrystal Citation
SubjectCivil
CourtAllahabad
Decided On
Reported inAIR1931All735
AppellantBunni Pandy
RespondentBrahmdeo Pandy and anr.
Excerpt:
- - 2. the learned advocate for the applicant however contends that inasmuch as the cause of action had accrued while the old tenancy act was in force, the plaintiff had the right to come to the civil court, and that the subsequent passing of the new act would not take away his right to choose such a forum, strong reliance is placed on the judgment in abdul hakim v. it is not necessary for us to say in this case whether we agree with that view or not, because we are clearly of opinion that section 99 does not apply to the present case, which is governed by section 121 of the new tenancy act......as the cause of action had accrued while the old tenancy act was in force, the plaintiff had the right to come to the civil court, and that the subsequent passing of the new act would not take away his right to choose such a forum, strong reliance is placed on the judgment in abdul hakim v. mukarram ali : air1930all158 . in that case it appears to have been held that where an ejectment from tenancy had taken place before the new act came into force, there was no ejectment otherwise than in accordance with the provisions of the new act, and that therefore the plaintiff's case could not fall within the purview of section 99, and a suit for possession of the holding would still be maintainable in a civil court. it is not necessary for us to say in this case whether we agree with that view.....
Judgment:

Sulaiman, Ag. C.J.

1. This is an application in revision by the plaintiff arising out of a suit brought in the Munsif's Court for maintenance of joint possession over a one-third share in certain fixed rate tenancies and for a declaration of the plaintiff's right. In the plaint it was admitted that the defendants wore tenants of the plots, but it was said that they were claiming exclusive title and denying the plaintiff's rights. It was alleged that the cause of action for the suit accrued in 1925, when the defendants denied the plaintiff's title and also in February 1926, when the revenue Court declined to correct the jamabandi. It appears that on a previous occasion the plaintiff's application in the revenue Court for correction of jamabandi was disallowed, the Court being of opinion that the dispute was as to title to property which should properly be litigated in a civil Court. The suit was filed on 19th February 1929 long after the now Tenancy Act had come into force. The defendant raised the objection that the suit was not cognizable by the civil Court at all. This objection prevailed with the first Court, and its view was affirmed by the lower appellate Court. So far as the claim for declaration of title or joint possession against the defendants, admitting them to be claiming title from the landholder is concerned, the suit would not be cognizable by the civil Court in view of the pronouncement of the Full Bench in Sahdeo v. Budhai A.I.R. 1929 All.

2. The learned advocate for the applicant however contends that inasmuch as the cause of action had accrued while the old Tenancy Act was in force, the plaintiff had the right to come to the civil Court, and that the subsequent passing of the new Act would not take away his right to choose such a forum, Strong reliance is placed on the judgment in Abdul Hakim v. Mukarram Ali : AIR1930All158 . In that case it appears to have been held that where an ejectment from tenancy had taken place before the new Act came into force, there was no ejectment otherwise than in accordance with the provisions of the new Act, and that therefore the plaintiff's case could not fall within the purview of Section 99, and a suit for possession of the holding would still be maintainable in a civil Court. It is not necessary for us to say in this case whether we agree with that view or not, because we are clearly of opinion that Section 99 does not apply to the present case, which is governed by Section 121 of the new Tenancy Act. Much of the reasoning adopted by the learned Judges was based on the peculiar phraseology of Section 99, which cannot be taken into account when we have to consider the language of Section 121.

3. It seems to us that the mere fact that the cause of action for a declaratory suit had arisen before the new Tenancy Act came into force, on account either of the denial of the plaintiff's title or some order of the Revenue Court in the previous proceeding, would not make the new Act inapplicable, when it definitely fixes the jurisdiction of the revenue Court to entertain suits of a particular class. The rule as to the appropriate forum for a particular kind of suits is one of procedure and not of substantive right, and a plaintiff cannot claim to have the choice of a forum in spite of an enactment which has come into force on the supposed ground that his cause of action had accrued before the new Act was passed. Had he been in time, and instituted his suit before the Act came into force, the position would of course have been different. But having waited till the Act has bean altered by the legislature, he is bound by the statutory provisions that have come into force, and he cannot by reason of his previous cause of action confer jurisdiction on a civil Court to entertain his suit, when its jurisdiction has been ousted by the new statute. It seems to us that exclusive jurisdiction having bean conferred on the revenue Courts to entertain suits of this nature, it is no longer open to the plaintiff to come to the civil Court to seek his relief.

4. We are therefore of opinion that the order of the Court below was right. We dismiss the revision with costs.


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