O.H. Mootham, C.J.
1. This is an appeal from an order of Mr. Justice S. N. Sahai dated the 19th September, 1957.
2. On the 9th January, 1954, the appellants were awarded Rs. 3,500 compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act as compensation for the death of one Chhotey who was the son of the first and third appellants and the husband of the second appellant. The compensation awarded was directed to be paid by the respondents who were the employers of Chhotey at the time of his death. From that order the respondents filed an appeal to this Court under Section 30 of the Act. The learned Judge held that the respondents had not been served with notice of the proceedings before the Commissioner for Workmen's Compensation and that the award of compensation was accordingly made without the respondents being afforded an opportunity of contesting the application. The learned Judge accordingly set aside the order of the Commissioner and remanded the case for further hearing.
3. The appellants appeal against the order on the ground that no appeal lay to this Court from the order of the Commissioner as such appeal did not involve a substantial question of law within the meaning of the first proviso to Section 30 of the Act. Now Sub-section (1) of that section specifies the orders of a Commissioner from which an appeal shall lie to the High Court, and it is not in dispute that such orders include an order awarding as compensation a lump sum. The subsection is however subject to three provisos, the first of which is that 'no appeal shall lie against any order unless a substantial question of law is involved in the appeal.' Mr. Justice Sahai was of opinion -- with which we agree -- that the Commissioner had committed a serious error of law, but learned counsel for the appellants argues that the phrase 'substantial question of law' as used in the first proviso to Section 30(1) of the Act has the same meaning as the similar phrase used in Section 110 of the Code of Civil Procedure and that in consequence of it the application of well settled principles of law to a particular set of facts is not a question which can be described as substantial.
4. We are unable to accept the submission that the words 'substantial question of law' in Section 30(1) of the Workmen's Compensation Act must be given the same meaning as in the Code of Civil Procedure. Section 110 of that Code makes provision for appeals from decrees and final orders of a Court which, unless leave to appeal to the Supreme Court is granted, is a final appellate Court. Section 30 of the Workmen's Compensation Act on the other hand makes provision for an appeal to this Court from a tribunal of first instance and if learned counsel's submission be accepted it follows that this Court will have no jurisdiction in a case in which the Commissioner had arrived at an obviously wrong conclusion on a question of law. We do not think that that was the intention of the legislature.
In our opinion the phrase 'substantial question of law' as used in the proviso to Section 30(1) of the Act must be given a wider construction than is to be attributed to it in Section 110 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and that the phrase should be construed to cover a case such as the present in which the Commissioner has clearly misdirected himself on a question of law. This view is in accordance with the opinion of thisCourt in upper Ganges Electric Employees Union v. Upper Ganges Valley Electricity Supply Co. Ltd., AIR 1956 All 491 (A), in which the Court had to consider the meaning of the same phrase as used in Section 7(1) of the Industrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunal) Act, 1950.
5. In our opinion this appeal fails and it is accordingly dismissed.
6. It is clearly very desirable that the appellants' claim for compensation should be reheard by the Commissioner at as early a date as possible.