R.S. Pathak, J.
1. The petitioner prays for the quashing of an order of the State Government suspending the execution of a resolution of the Nagar Mahapalika, Kanpur, and an order of the Deputy Mukhya Nagar Adhikari made pursuant to it.
2. With a view to implementing certain development schemes, the Nagar Mahapalika on July 18 1962 decided to allot a number of plots to Transport Agencies and Luggage Carriers, and invited applications for allotment of these plots. The Executive Committee of the Mahapalika constituted a Sub-committee to process the applications and finalise the allotments. Apart from this, an allotment of flats, housesand shops was also made by the ExecutiveCommittee.
3. On July 21, 1964 the Mahapalika taking cognizance of complaints in respect of the allotments made by the Executive Committeeand its Sub-committee constituted two SpecialCommittees to examine those alloments and to submit its report to the Mahapalika. It also directed that the registration of transfer deeds and delivery of possession in respect of such plots, house, flats and shops should be stayed until the submission of the report by the Specail Committee. On July 29 1964 the Deputy Mukhya Nagar Adhikari, in giving effect to the resolution of the Mahapalika directed that lease deeds should not be registered and possession should not be given.
4. The State Government then by its order dated September 19, 1964 suspended the resolution dated July 21, 1964 and the order dated July 29, 1964 These two measures have been assailed by the petitioner, who is a Sabhasad of the Mahapalika.
5. A preliminary objection has been raised to the maintainability of this petition. It is urged that the petitioner has no such interest in the quashing of the Government order as can entitle him to maintain the petition. Having heard learned counsel for the parties, I am of opinion that the preliminary objection must be sustained.
6. The resolution was passed by the Mahapalika. If anybody was aggrieved at all by the suspension of that resolution and could petition this Court for its being quashed, it was the Mahapalika. It is true, as learned counsel points out, that the petitioners contributed to the passing of the resolution by participating in the proceedings which led to it. That, However, in my opinion does not invest the petitioner with the right to institute the proceedings no right belonging to the petitioner has been affected by the impugned order of the State Government. The right which the petitioner enjoyed was the right which belongs to every Sabhasad, namely the right to participate in the meeting of the Mahapalika and to vote therein. When the proceedings culminated in a resolution, it was a resolution passed by the Mahapalika and represented the indivisible, disembodied voice of the Mahapalika. The, Mahapalika is a corporate body, and a resolution passed by it at its meeting cannot be said to be the distinct and separate act of each of the individual members constituting it.
The only ground upon which learned counsel for the petitioner attempted to meet the preliminary objection was that the petitioner having participated in the proceedings and voted in favour of the resolution had sufficient interest for maintaining this petition. It is not possible to accept that contention. The impugned order of the State Government, to the extent to which it suspended the order of the Deputy Mukhya Nagar Adhikari, cannot also, for the same reasons, be challenged by the petitioner.
7. I may refer here to two decisions of the Supreme Court cited by learned counsel for the petitioner before me. They are reported in Charanjit Lal Chowdhuri v. Union of India, AIR 1951 SC 41 and Dwarkadas Shrinivas v. Sholapur Spinning and Weaving Co., Ltd., AIR 1954 SC 119. The first arose upon a petition under Article 32 of the Constitution by ChiranjitLal Chowdhuri, a shareholder of Sholapur Spinning and Weaving Co., Ltd., challenging the constitutional validity of an Act under which the control and management of the Company and its properties and effects were taken over by the Government of India by appointing their own Directors. It was held that the petition was not maintainable by a shareholder because none of the rights belonging to him had been affected by the Act. The second was an appeal arising out of a suit by a shareholder of the same Company, upon whom the Directors appointed by the Government under the aforesaid Act had made a call for payment of the amount remaining unpaid on the shares held by him. It was held that the suit was maintainable because the basis of the suit was that the appellant was being required to do something by persons appointed under an invalid statute and, therefore, enjoying no jurisdiction to make the call.
The decision in Charanjit Lal Chowdhury's case, AIR 1951 SC 41 (supra) was explained, and it was pointed out that the view taken in that case could :
'very well have been the correct view in the case of a fully paid up shareholder who had no further liability or who was not likely to suffer in any manner by the enforcement of the Ordinance but the situation of a partly paid up preference shareholder as in this case is quite different and distinguishable'.
The decision in Bhagwan Das Barniwal v. State of U. P., Civil Misc. Writ Petn. No. 1865 of 1960 decided by Oak and Kailash Prasad, JJ. on March 29, 1961 (All) upon which learned counsel also relies, was rendered in a case where a Municipal Board had been superseded by the State Government and this Court found the petitioner entitled to maintain the petition because by reason of the supersession he had, as President of the Board, lost that office and was a person affected. To my mind, none of these decisions applies to the instant case.
8. In the circumstances, it is not necessary to consider the petition on its merits.
9. The petition is dismissed with costs.