1. Our learned brother Seth dismissed the petition for certiorari filed by the appellant, and it is urged before us that his decision is incorrect because the award was manifestly erroneous in law.
2. It is contended that the application initialing conciliation proceedings was signed by an officer of the Press Workers Union and that the provisions of Section 6-1(3) prohibited the making of that application by that officer inasmuch as on the date when the application was made the Union had not been registered for a period of two years. We are of the opinion that this contention cannot be accepted. The provisions of Section 6-1 provide for representation of the parties in proceedings before a Board, Labour Court or Tribunal. The Board has been defined by Section 2(d) of the U. P. Industrial Disputes act as a Conciliation Board constituted under Clause (d) of Section 3. According to the order contained in notification No. 738-ST (XXXVI-A-112-ST) 1957 dated December 31, 1957, which was made under Section 3(d) of the Act, a Conciliation Board is constituted only after an application for conciliation proceedings has been made before the Conciliation Officer. It is upon the constitution of the Board that the question of representation in proceedings before it arises. There is no Board in existence at the time when the application for conciliation proceedings is made. Accordingly the provisions of Section 6-I do not apply to the making of an application for conciliation proceedings .
3. Moreover, even if the application for conciliation proceedings was made by a person not competent to make it, it will not affect the validity of the proceedings before the Labour Court and of the award made by it. The proceedings before the Labour Court are brought into existence by reason of an order under Section 4-K made by the State Government referring an industrial dispute for adjudication. The State Government has discretion whether or not to make the order for adjudication. 'It may decline to make the order even though the conciliation proceedings have failed. There is no continuity between the conciliation proceedings before the Board and the proceedings before the Labour Court, and any defect in the proceedings before the Board will not affect the validity of the proceedings before the Labour Court.
4. It is then contended by learned counsel that the written statement on behalf of the workmen filed before the Labour Court was signed by an officer of the Press Workers Union and for that reason the proceedings before the Labour Court were invalid. Reference in this behalf is again made to the provisions of Section 6-1(3). It appears, however, that the written statement was signed not by an officer of the Press Workers Union but by an officer of the Indian National Trade Union Congress, a federation of unions to which the Press Workers Union was affiliated.
5. Learned counsel then urges that when the written statement was filed, Rule 40 of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Rules contained a clause prohibiting an officer of a federation of unions from representing a party unless the federation had been approved, and he points to an admission in the counter-affidavit to the effect that the approval was accorded to the federation a day after the written statement was filed. On these facts learned counsel contends that the written statement was signed by a person not authorised in law to represent the workmen. This objection was not taken before the Labour Court. Learned counsel has referred us to an objection set out in the rejoinder statement filed before the Labour Court on behalf of the appellant, but upon a perusal of that rejoinder statement we cannot say that any such specific objection as is now sought to be raised was taken before the Labour Court. In our opinion, we cannot allow the objection to be taken at this stage. If the appellant is allowed to raise the objection now it would work serious prejudice to the respondents. Had the objection been taken before the Labour Court, it would have been open to the workmen to apply to the Labour Court for an opportunity to file a fresh written statement. There is nothing in law against the filing of a fresh written statement by a party, and it would have been open to the Labour Court in its discretion to permit the filing of a fresh written statement.
6. No other point has been pressed before us.
7. There is no force in this special appeal, which is therefore, dismissed summarily.