1. The District Magistrate of Cawnpore on the 28th of September 1915 refused to interfere with an order of the Deputy Magistrate of Cawnpore. That Deputy Magistrate on the 16th of August 1915 had passed an order whereby five persons, Chunni Lal, Raja Ram, Gajadhar, Sidhan Lal, and Manu Lal, residents of Mauza Deoha were bound over to keep the peace under the authority conferred on the Deputy Magistrate by Section 107 of the Criminal Procedure Code These same five persons have come to this Court and ask this Court to interfere in revision on the ground: (1.) Because there is no finding by the Court below that each of the persons ordered to furnish security is likely to commit a breach of the peace or disturb public tranquillity or is likely to do some wrongful act which may occasion such a disturbance, and the order complained of is, therefore, bad in law. (2) Because the occasion on which there was anyapprehension having passed off quietly before the order was passed, the said older is not warranted in law. (3) Because the mere fact that there is a marked tension between the Hindus and Muhammadans is not enough to justify an order under Section 107. (4) Because the Police report was vague and indefinite and consequently no proceedings under Section 107 could be legally started. (5) Because there is nothing to show that the applicants were doing any wrongful act or anything which they had not a legal right to do. (6) Because the Muhammadans were the aggressors and they ought to have been bound over and not the Hindus. There is a seventh ground which is a general ground and need not be considered.
2. The learned Vakil who has appeared for the applicants has done the very best he could under the circumstances and has put forward every point likely to tell in favour of his clients, but while throwing his whole force into pleas such as Nos. 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6 of, the application I did not, in the arguments, notice equal energy bestowed on his part in confronting the evidence which is on the record and which is in reality that on which the Deputy Magistrate had to arrive at his finding. Granting that the order drawn up in writing under Section 112 might have been expanded with advantage and granting further that the Police report, upon which the learned Vakil says that order was founded, proceeded upon matters which his clients have done their best to meet, there is no doubt that the persons who heard that order read under Section 113 of the Code could not have failed to have an accurate apprehension of what was the information they had to meet. Both in that order and in the evidence which followed, these five persons must have known that the grievance against them was that they were likely to commit a breach of the peace and to disturb the public tranquillity, and I deemed it necessary under the circumstances to look into the evidence and see whether that evidence disclosed reliable statements that the applicants were men who had shown by their acts and general behaviour that the object of their lives for the time was to disturb the Muhammadans of Deoha. With this view I read through the evidence, not the Police evidence only but the evidence of both Hindus and Muhammadans who appear to be people of standing in Deoha. The evidence shews that v up to recent time public tranquillity in Deoha was on a secure footing. Neither the Hindus set themselves against the Muhammadans nor the Muhammadans set themselves against the Hindus. It is only in recent time that a state of tension has been created in this village and the persons who are responsible for this have a great deal to answer for. Public security and public tranquillity are two of the greatest blessings that can be enjoyed and when at the same time the freedom of individuals to do lawful acts is interfered with, the responsibility of those who disturb the public tranquillity is still greater. There are many acts which a person is entitled to do and has a right to do, but that right is subject to the limitation that it is not used in such a way as to offend others. In the evidence before me, if it is reliable and I see no reason to doubt it is, there was no real attempt made to break it down by cross-examination and it is evidence which is not prompted by malice or prejudice, the case is remarkably free from these unfortunate incidents. With one or two exceptions the evidence shows internally that it was given by persons of even and moderate temper. At the same time it discloses that acts were done by each of the persons before me, man by man, which were of such a provocative nature that the only probable result was the disturbance of the public tranquillity. My brother Piggott has dealt with a similar case, Emperor v Murli Singh 13 Ind. Cas. 922 : 33 A. 775 : 13 Cr. L.J. 170, and in the remarks made by him at page 777 Page of 33 A.--Ed , I fully concur and I, therefore, see no reason to repeat them. The learned Vakil for the applicants cited several cases before me, among them In the matter of the petition of Basdeo 26 A. 190 : A.W.N. (1902) 229, In the matter of the petition of Gauri Sahai 6 A. 114 : A.W.N. (1883) 240 Queen-Empress v. Abdul Kadir 9 A. 452 : A.W.N. (1887) 111; Jagat Narain v. Emperor 18 Ind. 818 : 11 Cr. L.J. 719 : 7 A.L.J. 1161; Dindayal Mozumdar v. Emperor 34 C. 935 : 11 C.W.N. 1002 : 6 Cr. L.J. 230; Narindra Bahadur Pal v. King-Emperor 1 A.L.J. 419 : 1 Cr. L.J. 696. I do not think it necessary to comment on these: they do not seem to me to meet the facts of the present case. But there were others which were brought to my notice. There was the case of Queen-Empress v. Nathu 6 A. 214 A.W.N. (1884) 51. In that case the learned Judge of this Court held that the order prepared under Section 112 did not properly or adequately disclose the substance of the information upon which the summonses were issued. The order under Section 112 is set out at page 215. It certainly was a most vague and loose order and it purported to refer to the commission of the breach of the peace at the Rathjatra' mela which was to be held at Kasi. That was a definite place and occasion on which the breach of the peace was apprehended and it appears that there was nothing in the evidence which justified wholesale order for security, which was passed in that case. The case; moreover, was one referring to events of the year 1884, when the law ran differently from what it runs now. Section 107 of Act No. X of 1882 did not make one of the objects of the section the mere disturbance of public tranquillity. These words were added in the present Code and they are very important words. A person bound over may be a person who is not likely to commit a breach of the peace and still is likely to disturb the public tranquillity and if there is reasonable apprehension that he will so act, the Code authorises the Magistrate to bind him over so that he will not disturb the public tranquillity. The same remaks apply to the case of Queen-Empress v. Abdul Kadir 9 A. 452 : A.W.N. (1887) 111. That was a case decided under the former Code and the main blot found in the procedure of the Court below was that a joint inquiry had been held and the learned Judge of this Court, though he could not say that a joint inquiry was ipso facto illegal, considered it necessary that overt acts should be proved before an order under Section 107 could be made and substantial grounds for the apprehension of the breach of the peace were established by proof of facts against each person implicated which would lead to the conclusion that an order for furnishing security was necessary. I hold that in this case this was done in the case of each of the persons who are now applying for revision. Another case cited before me was Jagat Narain v. Emperor 18 Ind. 818 : 11 Cr. L.J. 719 : 7 A.L.J. 1161. The persons bound down in that case appear from the judgment of this Court to have been bound down merely because they were wealthy and influential members of a party. That cannot be said of the present case. There remains the case of Brijnandan Prasad v. Emperor 26 Ind. Cas. 638 : 16 Cr. L.J. 46 : 37 A. 33 : 12 A.L.J. 1246. In that case the District Magistrate imported into the case certain facts which he had obtained from sources outside the record. No such mistake was committed in the present case. If the evidence before me had been confined to the constitution of a committee or the collection of funds for the Ram Naumi festival, I should have had to deal otherwise with the case; but the evidence before me, it is said and I see no reason for doubting it, is that the object of the persons concerned was not merely the restoration of the Ram Naumi festival but the bringing about what the persons hoped loss and disgrace to the Muhammadans. This was steadily put forward in the evidence. For all these reasons I do not think the order of the Deputy Magistrate can be disturbed and the order appears to be a very right and proper one. I dismiss the application.