1. Dr. Katju who argued this application for revision desired to impress the Court by stating that members of both sections of the Radhaswami sect were mostly LL. Bs. and not likely to cause a breach of the peace. He has been kind enough to furnish this Court with a typed copy of all the relevant papers which has been a great help and saved a considerable amount of time. On the vary first page there is a letter of the then District Magistrate Mr. Dreyfus, dated 12th June 1927, in which he speaks of a complaint by members of the faction whom Dr. Katju represents that; they were pummelled and pushed by LL. B's. of the opposite faction. The whole typed record is full of indication as to a fear of a breach of the peace, if no orders were passed to restrict the two parties and it is therefore idle to argue here that there was no possibility of a breach of the peace. The heading of the very order objected to shows Emperor v. Nehal Chand, that proceedings were started on the complaint of Dr. Katju's party, and that it was not the other party which first sought the protection of a criminal Court. The order complained of is by the District Magistrate of Agra, dated 22nd June 1929, and the typed book gives in serial order the various proceedings which followed the letter of the District Magistrate of l2th June 1927 referred to by me above. I consider the present order of 22nd June 1929, to be merely in continuation of the proceedings instituted in 1927. It is not necessary to go into details as to the dispute between the two factions but some summary of the dispute is necessary. There was no schism in the Radhaswami sect till the death of the Guru Mahraj Saheb in 1907. He was an accountant deeply versed in finance before it was discovered that he was an emanation of God.
2. He, therefore, took the very wise step of establishing a trust in 1904, and putting all the properties of the brotherhood in charge of the trust. Of the two present factions the Swamibagh faction and the Dayalbagh faction, this trust has been captured by the Swamibagh faction and that faction is an charge of the properties. The dispute arose after the death of Maharaj Saheb as he had indicated his sister as the next emanation, but on his death some of his followers did not accept that indication, but seceded and discovered the emanation in a gentleman of the name of Mr. Kamta Prasad Sinha, known after his recognition as Sarkar Saheb. The trust being captured by the Swamibagh section, the other section of the Dayalbagh found difficulty in worshipping at the shrines of their religion, two of them being at Agra, known as She samadhs, and a dispute arose as to the right of the Dayalbagh section to enter these samadhs for the purposes of worship.
3. It appears that in 1927, the Dayal bagh people insisted on entering which led to the complaint to the District Magistrate by members of the Swamibagh section against the rough behaviour of members of the Dayalbagh section. At that time an appeal had been pending in this Court from a decision of the Subordinate Judge of Benares in a suit filed for a declaration by an official of the Swamibagh section, and it was desired by that section that the trust may be declared a private trust and not a public one and that the men of the opposite faction may be debarred from the use of the properties belonging to the trust. That suit failed in the Court of the Subordinate Judge and the appeal was dismissed by this Court on 12th June 1929. As the dispute was brought to the District Magistrate in 1927, proceedings continued and various orders were passed restricting the Dayalbagh section from the free use of the two samadhs at Agra. Finally on 11th June 1929, the two parties came to a settlement and agreed to abide by the judgment of the High Court. The judgment of the High Court was delivered on 12th June and the District Magistrate's order complained of was passed on 22nd June. He removed all the restrictions placed on the Dayalbagh section as to the use of the semadhs. Dr. Katju frankly admitted that no objection can be raised to that portion of the order. If according to him the District Magistrate had no jurisdiction to interfere necessarily, it will follow that the District Magistrate will have no jurisdiction to place any restrictions on the use of the samadhs by the Dayalbagh section and he could not complain of the removal of these restrictions. After removing these restrictions the order goes on:
provided only that they shall not held any ceremonies or worship on such day or days as may be reasonably required by the Swamibagh branch for similar ceremonies for their party.
4. (This proviso is against the Dayalbagh party and the applicant here would naturally not object to it). The objectionable portion so far as the applicant is concerned now follows:
The Swamibagh branch are hereby directed that they shall freely permit to the Dayalbagh branch opportunities for such worship etc, so far as may bo equal in number and convenience with the opportunities which they reserve for themselves.
5. The view of the learned Sessions Judge that the District Magistrate had passed this order in his executive capacity, a capacity not known to me or to the law, was not supported by counsel on either side here. What was definitely argued before me was on the side of the applicant that the order did not fall within the provisions of Section 147, Criminal P.C. and on the opposite side that the order was covered by the provisions of that section. I have held that there is a danger of a breach of the peace. The application of the provisions of Section 147 can only be doubted if the question of entry into a place required by any religion were not subject to action under Section 147, Criminal P.C. There was a conflict of opinion between the Madras and Calcutta High Courts: see Kader Batcha v. Kader Sakha  29 Mad. 237 in opposition to Guiram Ghosal v. Lal Behari Das  37 Cal. 578. This conflict was, however, set at rest by Act No. 18 of 1923 amending the Criminal Procedure Code wherein the view of the Madras High Court was adopted. Originally the words were:
a right of use of any land or water including any right of way or other easement over the same.
6. These words indicated to the Calcutta High Court certain rights which were confined to rights of easement and similar rights. In the amended section, the wider view of the Madras High Court was adopted and it was specifically noted that the provisions of that section would apply whether such right be claimed as an easement or otherwise.
7. Dr, Katju the editor of a commentary on the Criminal Procedure Code knew of this amendment and so he quoted a Calcutta case subsequent to the year 1923. Surendra Nath Banerji v. Shasi Bhushan Sarkar A.I.R. 1928 Cal. 437. In that case the learned Judge who delivered the judgment of the Bench specifically noted that there was no dispute then as to the right of a user of any land or entry into any building, but the dispute related only to the performance of pooja of an idol. Argument was addressed to the Bench there that the ruling in Guiram Ghosal v. Lal Behari Das  37 Cal. 578 was no longer operative after the amendment of the Code in 1923. But that argument was not examined for the reason that the dispute before the Bench was in a very narrow compass as to the right to perform pooja and not as to the right of entry into any temple or mosque. After the amendment of the Code no doubt remained as to the provisions of that section attaching to disputes as regards the entry into a temple or mosque. In the present case a samadh is of as great religious sanctity to the followers of the Radhaswami as a temple and the entry in the compound of the samadh would be covered by the words 'right of use of any land.'
8. Dr. Katju next pointed out that there had been no proper enquiry as directed in the section, that no order was recorded, and no written statements from the two parties called for. Again reference should be made to the typed copy of the relevant papers, in which such a declaration by a Magistrate will be found and such request to the parties to enter into written statements (notice issued under Section 147, Criminal P.C. on 15th November 1927). The proceedings were suspended under a compromise by both parties, which was accepted by the District Magistrate that the parties would abide by the decision of the High Court here. This compromise has given rise to the argument of Dr. Katju that a District Magistrate is not entitled to interpret a judgment of this Court in criminal proceedings. The Magistrates has, however, to decide the question of the right of the Dayalbagh party according to Clause (2), Section 147. That clause runs as follows:
If it appears to such Magistrate that such right exists, he may make an order prohibiting any interference with the exercise of such right.
9. It is difficult to understand how a Magistrate can adjudicate upon the existence or non-existence of a right without interpreting the judgments of a civil Court. In the present case Dr. Sapru has referred on behalf of the respondent to the last sentence of the judgment of this Court:
We find also that the defendants are entitled to have an interest in the alleged trust and in the trust properties.
10. Clearly therefore, the judgment gave evidence of the existence of the rights of the Dayalbagh section to use all the properties of the trust and it was admitted that these samadhs in Agra are properties of the trnst.
11. Finally Dr. Katju referred to the proviso and pointed out that the District Magistrate overlooked the necessity of the party, in whose favour the order was made, exercising such right within three months. Three months however, are not the three months prior to the order, but three months next before the institution of the enquiry, The enquiry was instituted in June 1927, and from the fact of the Dayalbagh party exercising the right which gave rise to the complaint to the District Magistrate. On the part of the Swamibagh section, I am satisfied that the right of entry was exercised by the Dayalbagh party within three months of 12th June 1927.
12. I dismiss this application, The stay order is withdrawn.