1. This petition is directed against an assessment order dated June 27, 1972, and a notice of demand dated June 29, 1972, under the Estate Duty Act.
2. Sri Shyam Hari Singhania died on 3rd December, 1960, leaving behind his widow, who is petitioner No, 3, and his mother, the petitioner No. 2, as his heirs. He also left behind him his father, who is petitioner No. 1 before us. The return of estate duty was filed on 1st August, 1961. The Deputy Controller issued notice under Section 58(2) of the Estate Duty Act on 4th October, 1961, for furnishing information mentioned in it. Notices were also issued on 22nd July, 1963, and 15th July, 1967. In relation to the notice issued in 1967 the accountable person filed an objection that it is beyond time in view of Section 73 of the Estate Duty Act. The objection was overruled and the Assistant Controller of Estate Duty passed an assessment order on 27th June, 1972. He held that the estate duty payable by the accountable person was Rs. 7,05,985.92. In the assessment order three persons were shown as accountable persons. At serial No. 3 was mentioned the father of the deceased in his capacity as karta of the Hindu undivided family.
3. On behalf of the petitioners the assessment order is challenged on two principal grounds. It was urged that the proceedings became barred by time under Section 73A. The second point raised was that the father of the deceased was not an accountable person and hence he was not liable to estate duty. The notice of demand issued to him was invalid.
4. From the counter-affidavit it appears that the petitioner has already instituted an appeal against the impugned assessment order. In that appeal he has taken both these pleas as grounds of appeal. It is thus evident that the petitioner not only had an adequate alternative remedy but in fact he has exercised it. In Lalji Haridas v. R.H. Bhatt,  55 ITR 415the Supreme Court held that the jurisdiction conferred on the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution is not intended to supersede the jurisdiction and authority of the Income-tax Officers to deal with the merits of all the contentions that the assessee may raise before them and so it would be entirely inappropriate to permit an assessee to move the High Court under Article 226 and contend that a notice issued against him is barred by time. This is a matter which the income-tax authorities must consider on the merits in the light of the relevant evidence. In our opinion both the points raised on behalf of the petitioner can conveniently be dealt with by the appellate authority. This is in our opinion not a fit case for our interference.
5. The writ petition is accordingly dismissed with costs without going into the merits raised therein.