1. This appeal arises out of a suitfor ejectment from a house in Sundarbagh,Lucknow and for recovery of rent.
2. The defendant-appellant, C. D. Hana wasin occupation of the premises at a monthly rentRs. 37/8/0. The plaintiff, Munnu Lal purchasedthe house on 4th June 1948 and shortly thereafterhe applied to and secured on 28th December1948 from the Rent Control and Eviction Officer,Lucknow an order permitting him to institutethree months after the date thereof proceedingsfor ejectment against the defendant if the latterdid not exchange the house for another house ofthe plaintiff of approximately the same rentalvalue in Chowk. The sanction did not mature asit was rescinded by the Eviction Officer on 12thFebruary, 1949 and it is suggested that this actionwas inspired by an order passed on 15thJanuary 1949 by the District Magistrate, Lucknowwho was moved by the tenant to reconsiderthe matter. Notwithstanding, however, thewithdrawal order Munnu Lal gave, on 8th march1949 a notice to Hans to quit and sued him on24th April 1949 for ejectment and recovery ofRs. 37/8/0 as arrears of rent for the period 4thMarch 1949 to 3rd April 1949. He urged that thesecond order of the Eviction Officer was ultravires.
3. The Courts below upheld his contention andordered eviction on the basis of the sanctiondated 28th December 1948. The view taken bythem was that permission once given could notbe withdrawn and in any event the order of theRent Control and Eviction Officer was virtuallynot his order but that of the District Magistrate.
4. In second appeal on behalf of Hans, anumber of contentions have been urged. It isclaimed: (1) That the initial sanction was invalidbecause in the first place the landlord didnot genuinely require the accommodation for hisown use and further because the order was aconditional one, and (2) That the permissionlost its force by reason of the withdrawal orderdated 12th February 1949.
5. A perusal of the U. P. (Temporary) Controlof Rent and Eviction Act (III of 1947) wouldshow that the power to accord sanction for evictinga tenant has not been expressly given byany of the provisions of the Act. The legislaturehas apparently adopted the unusual method ofconferring that power by merely mentioning inS. 3 that
'no suit shall without the permission of the DistrictMagistrate be filed in any civil Court against a tenantfor his eviction from any accommodation.....'
It is conceded, however, on all hands that on atrue construction of the section, such power mustbe deemed to exist. One of the first principles oflaw with regard to the effect of an enablingAct is that if the Legislature enables somthingto be done, it gives power at the same time, bynecessary implication, to do everything whichis indispensable for giving effect to that powerfor the purpose of carrying out the purpose inview. Again on general principles, if not onthe basis of S. 21, General Clauses Act, the authorityempowered to grant sanction for the commencementof a suit under S. 3 of the Act must bedeemed to have also the power to revoke thatsanction in suitable cases. By S. 16 of the Act,orders passed under the Act are not liable to bequestioned in a Court of law. But apart fromthe prohibition contained in that section, it hasto be further remarked that the Rent Controland Eviction Officer in either granting sanctionor revoking it does not act in a judicial ora quasi-judicial capacity. It would thus be fruitlessto proceed to discover whether the orderof withdrawal emanated from the EvictionOfficer himself, in the sense that it was passedon his own initiative or was brought about oninspiration derived from the District Magistrate'sorder dated 15 January 1949. It is sufficientthat it was passed over the signatures ofthe same officer who had given the originalsanction on 28th December 1948.
6. I am clear in my mind that the sanctionof the Rent Control and Eviction Officer dated28th December 1948, was ineffective after 12thFebruary 1949, and it could not be availed offor the purpose of institution of the suit whichgives rise to this appeal.
7. In the view that I take of the case, it appearswholly unnecessary even if it were possibleto do so inspite of S. 16 of the Act to enterinto the further question whether the initialsanction was or was not valid.
8. I allow the appeal, set aside the order ofthe Courts below and dismiss the plaintiff's suitwith costs here and heretofore.