Pramada Charan Banerji, Acting C.J. and Ryves, J.
1. The property to which this litigation relates originally belonged to one Guptar, who died leaving his widow Musammat Raj Rani and his daughter Musammat Jaipali. Raj Rani inherited the property as next heir to her husband. On the occasion of the marriage of Jaipali she executed a document by which she transferred her rights in the husband's property, which consisted of a share of zamindari and a house, to her daughter Musammat Jaipali. This she did in the year 1881. Jaipali was in possession for some years when she died. Raj Rani survived her. Jaipali left a daughter Sartaji, who is the defendant in this case. Sartaji has been found to have obtained possession upon the death of Jaipali and to have remained in possession for more than twelve-years.
2. The plaintiff Ramjas is the son of Balraj, who was the nephew of Guptar, and is the next reversioner to the estate of Guptar. Musammat Raj Rani died in 1918 and upon her death the present suit was brought by Balraj for recovery of the property from Sartaji.
3. The court of first instance decreed the claim, but the lower appellate court dismissed it. That court was of opinion that there was a surrender by Raj Rani of her rights as a Hindu widow, and this amounted to an acceleration of the reversionary rights of Jaipali. Upon Jaipali's death the only person who could claim the property was Balraj, and Balraj not haying brought any claim in respect of this property and Sartaji having been allowed to remain in possession for more than twelve-years, she had acquired an absolute right to the property, and the plaintiff could not recover it.
4. This decision of the lower appellate court has been reversed by a learned Judge of this Court solely on the ground that the transfer to Jaipali was made at the time of her marriage and as a marriage gift. No doubt in the document which Raj Rani executed in 1881 in favour of Jaipali she says that she was making this transfer to her daughter as dowry on the occasion of her marriage. We think, however, that the fact that the transfer was made to her on the occasion of her marriage makes no difference so far as the rights acquired by Jaipall were concerned. Jaipali was the next reversioner to the estate after her mother. Her mother divested herself of the whole estate and transferred it to her daughter. This amounted to an acceleration of the right of her daughter to succeed to the estate of her father. It was held in the cases of Rangasami Gounden v. Nachiappa Gounden (1918) I.L.R. 42 Mad. 523 and Bhagwat Koer v. Dhanukdhari Prashad Singh (1919) I.L.R. 47 Calc. 466 by their Lordships of the Privy Council that where the widow divests herself entirely of her estate and makes a transfer, the effect of which is an entire effacement of herself, it amounts to a vesting of the estate in the reversioner immediately upon the making of the transfer, whether this is called a surrender or an acceleration. It is not the form in which the transfer is made that is to be looked at but the effect which it would have on the estate itself. It cannot be held that what was transferred by Musammat Raj Rani to Jaipali was the life-estate of Raj Rani by way of gift as such life-estate. She completely effaced her own life-estate, and thereupon the right, which Jaipali would have succeeded to on her death, became vested in her at once. In this view it was a case of surrender of the estate, and the fact of the surrender having been made on the occasion of the marriage of Musammat Jaipali in the shape of a gift makes no difference., Upon the death of Jaipali the right to the property vested in the next reversioner to her father and not in her mother. Therefore the fact of her mother being alive for a number of years after the death of Jaipali does not affect the question of the plaintiff's right of succession. The plaintiff's right to succeed accrued upon the death of Jaipali, and that event having taken place more than twelve years prior to the institution of the suit, and Sartaji having been in possession for more than twelve years withoutt having any right, her possession thus amounted to adverse possession and the plaintiff's claim was beyond time and was rightly dismissed by the lower appellate court. We allow the appeal, set aside the decree of the learned Judge of this Court and restore the decree of the lower appellate court with costs of both hearings in this Court.