1. This is an application by an Advocate of this court for leave to appeal to His Majesty in Council from an order of suspension passed against him by a Full Bench on 26th May 1932. He has been suspended for a period of three months with effect from that date. It appears that this High Court has on previous occasion treated such applications as falling under Section 109(c), Civil P.C., and granted leave in fit cases. The words of that section are no doubt general and leave to appeal from any order is allowed when the case is certified to be a fit one for appeal to His Majesty in Council. In Parbati Charan Chatterji 1895 17 All 498, In re Rajendro Nath Makerji 1900 22 All 49, and In re S.B. Sarbadhicary 1907 29 All 95 leave was applied for and granted by this Court. It also does not appear that any objection was taken to the granting of such leave before their Lordships of the Privy Council.
2. We think that inasmuch as an advocate has been ordered to be suspended from practice he is entitled to have the propriety of the order re-examined on appeal. We accordingly direct that leave be granted and we certify that this is a fit case for appeal to His Majesty in Council. There is a further prayer that pending the disposal of the appeal to His Majesty in council the order suspending the advocate from practice may not be carried into effect. No doubt this is not a case analogous to a decree in execution which can be stayed. But it is akin to a conviction for criminal offence. It is true that the order has already come into operation and is in force,' but it is equally true that the appeal before their Lordships of the Privy Council would take much more than three months for disposal. By the time it is finally disposed of, the order of suspension would have been exhausted and the appeal will in one sense become in-fructuous. The loss suffered by the advocate during this period would not be recouped in case his suspension is set aside.
3. We think that in a case of this kind we have inherent jurisdiction to order that the order for Suspension should remain in abeyance till the appeal is disposed of by their Lordships of the Privy Council. We may refer to the case of Ram Saroop v. Emperor : AIR1927All97 for purposes of analogy. The applicant has already undergone suspension for a period of fifteen days. We order that his suspension for the rest of the period should be held in abeyance till the matter has been finally disposed of. If his appeal is dismissed by the Privy Council he will have to undergo suspension for the remaining period.