1. This special appeal is directed against an order of Manchanda J. dated November 11, 1963, by which he has reviewed his earlier order dated August 13, 1962, allowing Writ Petition No. 1558 of 1962 Shamsher Bahadur Mehrotra v. Income-tax Officer, Kanpur  50 I.T.R. 156 (All.). filed by the appellant. The writ petition was filed against proceedings for the recovery of arrears of income-tax and was based on the ground that the recovery proceedings were time-barred. In his judgment allowing the writ petition, Manchanda J. held that the notice of demand was served on March 30, 1955, the recovery proceedings should have been taken by March 31, 1956, and, since the recovery certificate was actually issued on December 24, 1956, the recovery proceedings were time barred. He, accordingly, allowed the writ petition. In the review application filed by the respondents, it was asserted that two very important and relevant documents had been suppressed by the appellant. These documents are two orders dated March 8, 1956, and March 14, 1956 (annexures ' A ' and ' E' to the review application). By these orders, the time for paying the demand was first extended up to March 20, 1956, and then upto May 15, 1956. There is no doubt that, if limitation is, computed on the basis of these two subsequent orders, then the recovery proceedings were well within time. On the ground that relevant documents had been suppressed as well as on the ground that, on the basis of these relevant documents, the recovery proceedings had been taken within time, Manchanda J. allowed the review application, Income-tax Officer v. Shamsher Bahadur  54 I.T.R. 783 (All.) and dismissed the writ petition. It may be mentioned that, at the hearing of the review application, certain technical objections were raised. One of the objections was that no review lay against the judgment in a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. This objection was rejected by Manchanda J. following a Full Bench decision of this court and a decision of the Supreme Court. Another objection was raised that the review application was time-barred. This objection was also repelled on the ground that the time taken in obtaining certified copies of the judgment or order sought to be reviewed could be excluded, and, therefore, the review application was within time. A third objection taken was that, since an appeal lay against the judgment on the writ petition, the review application was not competent. This objection was also rejected.
2. We are fully satisfied that the view taken by Manchanda J. in the review application is the correct one. In view of the decision of the Supreme Court in Shivdeo Singh v. State of Punjab, A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 1909 it is now well settled that the High Court has power to review an order made under Article 226 of the Constitution. The appellant's contention that no review application lay is, therefore, without any force.
3. In our opinion, the review application filed by the respondents was nottime-barred. Nothing has been shown to us to induce us to hold that theview taken by Manchanda J. on this question is not correct. The fact thatan appeal lay against the original judgment did not bar the review application. A special appeal was filed by the respondents but it was allowedto be withdrawn as the review application had been filed.
4. At the time of the hearing of the review application, Manchanda J.examined the records of the income-tax department and from those recordsit appeared that a letter dated March 2, 1956, had been sent to the assesseein reply to his earlier letters for extension of time and that he was giventime to pay the arrears upto March 6, 1956. The subsequent orders datedMarch 8, 1956, and March 14, 1956, further extending the time forpayment, were also passed on the applications of the appellant. It is,therefore, clear that the time for making the payment was extended uptoMay 15, 1956. The recovery proceedings were started in December, 1956,and were well within the period of limitation prescribed. That being so,there was no good reason for quashing the recovery proceedings.Manchanda J. was fully justified in allowing the review application anddismissing the writ petition.
5. There is no force in this appeal which is accordingly dismissed with costs. The stay order is vacated.