K.N. Singh, J.
1. Rajesh Kumar Shukla, applicant, has approached this Court by means of this application under Sections 11 and 12 of the Contempt of Courts Act to initiate contempt proceedings against opposite parties and to punish them according to law.
2. Briefly the facts giving rise to 'his application are that an advertisement for the post of a Lecturer in Sociology was issued by the Management Committee of Pt. Sunder Lai Memorial Degree College, Kannauj, District Farrukhabad, a degree college affiliated to the Kanpur University. The applicant also applied for the same. The Selection Committee constituted in accordance with the provisions of Section 31 of the U.P. State Universities Act, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') recommended the applicant's name in 1977 for appointment as Lecturer in Sociology. But the Management Committee did not agree with the recommendation of the Selection Committee and consequently it did not appoint the applicant. The Management Committee, however, failed to make any reference to the Vice-Chancellor even though it disagreed with the recommendation of the Selection Committee as contemplated by Section 31(8)(b) of the Act. The Vice-Chancellor however directed the Management Committee to issue appointment letter in favour of the applicant. The Management thereupon approached the Chancellor under Section 68 of the Act. The Chancellor affirmed the order of the Vice-Chancellor and refused to interfere. Even then the Management did not issue appointment letter to the applicant. The applicant thereupon filed a writ petition in this Court which was dismissed on 1.1.1980 by us with the following observations:
The Management has failed in its attempt and it has now no choice in the matter as under the law it is bound to issue appointment order in petitioner's favour. In case the Management does not comply with the statutory duty the State Govt. has got ample power under Sections 57 and 58 of the Act to take action against the erring Management.
In view of this change of circumstances we do not consider it necessary to issue any mandamus. The petition is accordingly dismissed but there, will be no order as to costs.
3. After the aforesaid order the applicant approached the Management but no appointment letter was issued in his favour. The applicant thereupon filed this application for taking contempt proceedings against the opposite parties.
4. The applicant's main grievance is that the Management of the College has disobeyed the order of this Court in refusing to issue appointment letter to him and for that reason Dr. S.S. Dubey, President of the Management Committee, and Dr. P.N. Tandon, Secretary of the Management Committee, opposite parties Nos. 1 and 2 respectively are guilty of contempt The Vice-Chancellor, Kanpur University, the Secretary of Education Department, Govt. of U.P., and the Director of Education (Higher Education) U.P., Allahabad, opposite parties Nos. 3 to 5 respectively are also guilty of contempt as they have not taken any action against the erring Management. On notice being issued the opposite parties filed affidavits and have contested the contempt application.
5. In their counter-affidavits Dr. S.S. Dubey and Dr. P.N. Tandon, opposite parties Nos. 1 and 2, the President and Secretary of the Management Committee respectively stated that they were not satisfied with the conduct of the applicant as he was involved in love affair with a girl-student whom he was teaching and therefore there was likelihood of breach of peace in the College as the atmosphere in the College was highly surcharged on account of the applicant's conduct. In these circumstances they did not consider the applicant a desirable person for appointment as Lecturer in the Degree College. They asserted that this Court had issued no direction to the Management Committee for issuing appointment letter to the applicant and as such they are not guilty of any wilful disobedience of this Court's order. They further asserted that in refusing to issue appointment letter the Management Committee may have violated law but that is not sufficient to take contempt proceedings against them. During the course of hearing opposite parties Nos. 1 and 2 appeared before us on 12.12.1983 and they stated that they were ready to appoint the applicant as Lecturer on probation in the College. The learned Counsel for the applicant took time to obtain instructions from his client and today he has stated before us that the applicant is not ready to accept the offer unless the appointment is made with retrospective effect, i.e. from the date the Management Committee refused to accept the recommendation, of the Selection Committee. Thus the opposite parties Nos. 1 and 2 who represented the Management Committee are ready to offer appointment to the applicant but he is not ready to accept the same unless the appointment is made with retrospective effect.
6. By our order dated 1.1.1980 we had merely stated the position of law, but we refused to issue any mandamus to the Management Committee. We further, made it clear that if the Management Committee failed to act in accordance with law, the State Government had ample power under Sections 57 and 58 of the Act to take action against the erring Management. We had thus left the matter to the Slate Government. We never intended to issue a mandamus or direction to the Management Committee to issue appointment letter to the applicant. In the absence of any such mandamus or direction being issued to the Management Committee it is difficult to accept the contention that the Management Committee is guilty of wilful disobedience of this Court's order.
7. It was urged on behalf of the applicant that a declaration of law by this Court is sufficient to make it binding on the Management Committee and it was their duty to have complied with the same. Since they failed to comply with the law, declared by this Court, they were guilty of wilful disobedience. Reliance was place on a decision of Supreme Court reported in : 1973CriLJ19 Baradakanta Mishra v. Shri Bhimsen Dixit. Having given our anxious consideration to the decision of the Supreme Court we are unable to accept the applicant's contention. The facts before the Supreme Court were quite different than those involved in the present case. There is no similarity in the two cases. We had made it clear, that if the Management failed to comply, applicant's remedy was to approach the State Govt. We had passed a reasoned order refusing to issue a mandamus to the Management Committee. In these circumstances the Management Committee or its office bearers are not guilty of wilful disobedience of this Court's order.
8. As regards opposite parties Nos. 3 to 5, nothing has been pointed out to show that they are guilty of any wilful disobedience of this Court's order.
9. When the President and the Secretary of the Management Committee made offer to the applicant for appointment as a Lecturer we hoped that he would accept the same and join his duties but he has refused to accept the same. The reason advanced by the learned Counsel for this refusal is that the appointment letter issued at this stage by the Management Committee would be void in view of Section 12 of the U.P., Higher Education Service Commission Act, 1980. We find no substance in the contention. Section 12 lays down that after the commencement of the U.P. Higher Education Service Commission Act, 1980, no appointment shall be made except in accordance with the provisions of the Act Sub-section (4) of Section 12 however lays down that the provisions of Section 12 shall not apply to the appointment of a teacher vacancy in respect whereof had been advertised in accordance with Sub-section (10) of Section 31 of the U.P. State Universities Act, 1973 at any time, before the commencement of this Act. The U.P. Higher Education Service Commission Act, 1980, was promulgated on 3.10.1980 whereas the advertisement for the appointment to the post of Lecturer in Sociology in the College had been issued in 1976. As already stated the selection was held in 1977 when the applicant was found suitable for appointment. The only thing left was the issue of appointment letter which was a ministerial act. In these circumstances Section 12 could not make the order of appointment void. It appears to us that the applicant has raised a lame excuse in rejecting the offer of appointment. We are satisfied that the applicant was not interested in getting the job, instead he was interested in harassing the opposite parties. Had he been interested in getting the job he would have accepted the offer made before us. The contempt proceedings it appears have been initiated by the applicant to satisfy his personal grudge against the opposite parties Nos. 1 and 2. Without going into the details it is sufficient to observe that contempt proceedings cannot be taken to satisfy personal grudge.
10. In the result the contempt application is dismissed with costs which we assess at Rs. 300/- payable to opposite parties Nos. 1 and 2.