1. This is a petition on behalf of four applicants praying that under the provisions of Chap. 23, Rule 29 of the Rules of Court the applicants be ordered to execute bonds undertaking to lodge a petition before the Supreme Court and the execution of the sentence against them may be stayed.
2. The facts which have given rise to this petition briefly are that the applicants were convicted by a Magistrate under Sections 325/34 and 323, I. P. C. Their convictions were maintained on appeal and the appellate court gave a sentence of imprisonment till the rising of the Court and Rs. 50/- as fine each.
3. A revision was filed to this Court against the decision of the Additional Sessions Judge in appeal. At the time of the admission of the revision, notice was issued by a learned Single Judge of this Court to show cause why the sentences passed upon the applicants should, not be enhanced. Both the revision application on behalf of the applicants and that relating to enhancement matter came up before us and we, by our order dated 15-3-56, rejected the application of the applicants and enhanced the sentences passed by the court below from one of till the rising of the court to three months' R.I. An application was made to us for leave to grant a certificate to file an appeal to the Supreme Court against our order enhancing the sentences. We, by our order dated 30-3-56, rejected that petition also. Thereupon the present petition has been filed praying for suspension of the sentence pending the proposed application for special leave to appeal against our judgment in the Supreme Court.
4. In our opinion there is no power under the provisions of Chap. 23, Rule 29 of the Rules of Court to suspend the operation of the sentence pending the proposed application for special leave to appeal to the Supreme Court against our judgment. Chapter 23, Rule 29 of the Rules of Court provides as follows:
'On the applicant executing a bond with or without sureties undertaking to lodge an appeal in the Supreme Court within the prescribed time, the Court may-
(i) order that the execution of the sentence or order be stayed; or
(ii) where the applicant is in confinement, admit him to bail on such terms as the Court may think fit pending the disposal of the application or where a certificate is granted, pending the lodging of an appeal in the Supreme Court.'
5. In our opinion the scheme of Rule 29 is that on the applicant executing a bond undertaking to lodge an appeal to the Supreme Court this Court has power to suspend the execution of the sentences and further if the applicant is in confinement admit him to bail on such terms as the Court may think fit pending the disposal ot the application or where a certificate has been granted pending the lodging of an appeal in the Supreme Court.
6. The contention of the petitioner is that. the words of Rule 29 are wide enough to give power to this Court to suspend the execution of the sentence pending the proposed application for special leave to the Supreme Court. Even after the leave has been granted by the Supreme Court under the Rules of that Court an appeal has to be lodged and as soon as that undertaking is given by the applicant he is entitled to the stay of the execution under Clause (1) of Rule 29.
7. In our opinion there is no force in this argument of the petitioner.
8. Rule 29 has to be read along with Rule 28 which provides as follows:
'An application for a certificate under Article 333(1) or 134(1)(c) of the Constitution in a criminal proceeding shall be made to the Court orally or in writing before or at the time when any judgment, final order or sentence is passed. The Court shall thereupon record an order granting or refusing to grant such certificate.'
9. This Rule has now been amended and under the amended Rule an application can be filed within 30 days from the date of the order. The word 'applicant' in Rule 29 necessarily means a person who had made an application under Rule 23. It cannot mean a personwho proposes to make an application to the Supreme Court for a special leave. When these two Rules are read together the only way in which these Rules can be interpreted is that Rule 29 contemplates only cases where the petitioner has applied for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court in this Court and if the application is pending, pending the disposal of the application the sentence can be suspended; in the event of the certificate having been granted pending the lodging of the appeal the execution of sentence can be suspended. The cases where the special leave petition has been made to the Supreme Court are dealt with by Section 426 (2-B), Cr. P. C. and not by these Rules.
10. Section 426 (2-B) provides that: 'Where a High Court is satisfied that convicted person has been granted special leave to appeal to the Supreme Court against any sentence which the High Court has imposed or maintained, the High Court may, if it so thinks fit, order that pending the appeal the sentence or order appealed against be suspended, and also, if such person is in confinement, that he be released on bail.'
11. There is no provision either under the Rules or under the Code which gives power to this Court to grant bail or suspend the operation of the sentence pending the proposed application for special leave to appeal to the Supreme Court against the judgment of this Court.
12. It was urged by Mr. Beg that if any of these provisions do not expressly apply the High Court has got inherent powers under Section 561-A, Cr. P. C. to order suspension of the order of execution of sentence. We do not see there is any force in this contention. In the case of 'Jairam Das v. Emperor it was held by the Privy Council that the Code of Criminal Procedure confers no power on a High Court to grant bail in the case of a convicted person, and the fact that he has obtained leave from His Majesty in Council to appeal from his conviction or sentence makes no difference in this regard. It was contended in that case that the High Court has such power under Section 561-A, Cr. P. C. Their Lordships reviewed the authorities and observed:
'From this review of the authorities in India it would appear that the various views which have prevailed may be summarised thus: (1) if leave to appeal has been obtained from His Majesty in Council and the Judicial Committee has said that an application for bail must be dealt with by the High Court, the High Court will have power under Section 498, Cr. P. C. to release a convicted person on bail pending the hearing of the appeal; (2) the High Court has an inherent power to do so if special leave to appeal has been obtained from His Majesty in Council; (3) the High Court possesses no inherent power as regards bail; (4) after disposal of a criminal appeal by the High Court it is functus officio, has no longer any seisin of the case, and cannot grant bail to a convicted person . . . .'
13. Then again after discussing differences in Rules and various sections empowering the High Court under the Code of Criminal Procedure to grant bail, their Lordships observed;
'A power to grant bail would not include a powe.r to exclude the period of bail from the term of the sentence; this is so is shown by the fact that it was necessary to enact the special provision which is contained in Sub-section (3) of Section 426 of the Code. Under these conditions the exercise of a power to grant ball would, in the event of the appeal being unsuccessful, result in defeatingthe ends of Justice. Moreover, in the same event it would result in an alteration by the High Court of its judgment which is prohibited by Section 369 of the Code. Finally their Lordships take the view that Chap. 39 of the Code together with Section 426 is, and was intended to contain, a complete and exhaustive statement of the powers of a High Court in India to grant bail, and exclude the existence of any additional inherent power in a High Court relating to the subject of bail. They find themselves in agreement with the views expressed by Richardson, Henderson and Bose JJ. in the three cases referred to earlier in this judgment,'
14. In our opinion there being an express provision in the Code of Criminal Procedure contained in Section 426 and Chap. 39 of the Code giving power to this Court to grant bail no inherent powers are possessed by this Court outside the scope of these provisions. They exhaustively deal with the entire power of this Court to grant bail in different cases. Section 561-A only preserves inherent powers; it does not confer any new power. It was enacted, as has been pointed out in various cases, with a view to indicate that the inherent powers of the High Court have been preserved; it does not confer any new or additional power on the High Court. In our opinion, therefore, there is no inherent power in this Court to grant bail during the pendency of the proposed application for leave to appeal.
15. Reference was made to an unreported case (Misc. Cri. Revn. No. 2074 of 1953 (All) (B) ), decided by a learned Single Judge of this Court. This point was not expressly decided in that case. On the contrary it was observed that:
'Without expressing myself finally on the question whether Rule 29, Sub-rule (1) of Chap. 23, Part V, Section B covers a case where an applicant proposes to make an application under Article 136 of the Constitution but has not applied to the High Court, I am prepared to make an order that the execution of the sentence, in this case, be stayed in order to maintain a uniformity of practice.'
16. In the result, there is no force in thispetition and it is rejected.