1. This application in revision arises out of a suit instituted in the Court of Small Causes at Cawnpore for recovery of compensation for non-delivery of goods consigned. The suit was dismissed on the ground of limitation and the question is whether the decree of the Court below was incorrect. It appears that on the 27th July 1922, a bale of cotton goods was consigned to the opposite parties for delivery at Cawnpore. The plan recites that on the 21st of August 1922, the plaintiffs sent their man to take delivery of the goods who paid the freight, handed over the railway receipt and obtained a gate pass in order that ho might remove the goods. When, however, the goods were to be actually removed they were found missing. On these allegations the suit was brought for compensation. In paragraph 7 of the plaint the cause of action was stated to have arisen on the 21ht August 1923. It appears to me that this date viz., 21st August 1923, is merely a slip for 21st August 1922, the date mentioned, in paragraph 3 of the plaint. It in, however, immaterial for my purpose whether the date given in paragraph 7 of the plaint is the correct one or not. It is common ground that Article 31, Schedule 1 of the Limitation Act applies to the case. If that be so, the limitation begins to run from the date when goods ought to be delivered on the 2lst August 1922 the date mentioned in paragraph 3 of the plaint. The suit was not filed till the 10th December 1923, that is to say, some sixteen months after the date on which the parties expected the goods to be delivered. On the face of it, therefore, the suit was barred by time. The learned Counsel for the applicants has relied on a two Judge case decided by this Court viz., Jugal Kishore v. G.I.P. Railway A.I.R. 1923 All. 22. On the facts of that case the learned Judges of this Court held that the defendant Company had been putting off the plaintiff with assurances that they were making an enquiry for the goods and were hoping to find them and to deliver them. The learned Judges, therefore, found that they were unable to say that the goods ought to have been delivered more than one year before the institution of the suit. The case was really decided on the peculiar facts involved therein and does not lay down any general rule of law.
2. Mr. Thompson sought to argue that in this case also correspondence was going on between the parties and that some subordinate officers of the opposite parties were making reports to their superior officers. Most of the documents referred to by the learned Counsel are not on the record and there is nothing in the judgment of the Court below to show that the plaintiffs were being put off from seeking their remedy by suit on account of any conduct of the opposite parties. In the circumstances the plain rule of law as laid down in Article 31 of the Limitation Act and as laid down in the two Judge case of G.I.P. Railway v. Ganpat Rai  33 All. 544 applies. The application is dismissed with costs.