1. This is an application for the revision of an order of the District Judge of Farrukhabad reversing the decision of the Munsif who had held that the plaintiff's suit could lie in the district of Farrukhabad. The Munsif held that no part, of the cause of action arose within the district of Farrukhabad, but the learned District Judge has disagreed with him. The plaintiff is a vaid practising in Farrukhabad and he received a letter in January 1928 from Raja Gajendra Singh, of Kothar in the district of Shahjahanpur, asking him to hurry to Kothar to treat the Raja for diabetes. The plaintiff went to Kothar and treated the Raja there and also supplied medicines to him, and his-suit was based on the allegation that he had not been paid the full expenses. I am not, however concerned with the, merits of the case. I am only concerned with the question of whether any part of the plaintiffs cause of action arose within the district of Farrukhabad. It appears both from the ^statement of the plaintiff which was recorded by the Munsif that the actual agreement as to terms was not made between the plaintiff and the Raja until the (plaintiff had arrived at Kothar and it further appears that an arrangement was made between them that the fees and cast of the medicines should also be paid at Kothar and that lis. 600 was actually paid by the Raja to the plaintiff at Kothar. All this goes to show that the whole of the contract between the parties was 'made at Kothar including an arrangement that money was to be paid there. In over-ruling the dicision of the Munsif the learned Judge has said that the mere fact that it was agreed that the fee etc., was to be paid at Kothar does not show that it was payable only at Kothar. No doubt this is so. The fee and the cost of medicines might have been paid anywhere, but that would not in itself give any Court jurisdiction to try a suit for the recovery of part of the fee that was claimed anywhere except in Kothar. The Judge has also relied on the fact that in the letter written by the Raja to the plaintiff, a proposal was made by the Raja to the plaintiff to go to Kothar and the plaintiff went in consequence of this letter. This latter, however, only amounted to a proposal that the plaintiff should go to Kothar. It did not in itself form any part of the cause of action of the present suit. If the plaintiff had gone to Kothar and had not treated the Raja, either in consequence of a failure to come to terms as to the fee or for any other reason, he might have had a cause of action against the Raja for the expenses of going to Kothar, but it would not have been the same cause of action as that in the present suit and it is difficult to see how it can be held to be any part of that cause of action. The cause of action was that the plaintiff made an agreement at Kothar to treat the Raja at certain fixed fee and to receive other payments and the whole of this was arranged at Kothar. The letter received at Farrukhabad did not carry with it a proposal to pay any particular fee and, indeed, if all the terms of the contract had been contained in his letter, it would have been unnecessary to make another agreement after the plaintiff's arrival at Kothar.
2. In my opinion the decision of the Munsif on the question of jurisdiction is undoubtedly right and that of the lower appellate Court is wrong. Under Section 21 of the Civil P.C. however, an objection as to the place of suing shall not be allowed by a revisional Court unless there has been a 'consequent failure of justice'; and it has not been shown to me that there is anything in this case to suggest that there has been a consequent failure of justice, that is to say, a failure arising from the fact that the suit was filed and tried in Farrukhabad district and not in Shahjahanpur. It must be presumed that the pleadings would have been the same and the evidence the same if the proceedings had been held in Shahjahanpur and there is therefore no reason to suppose that the decision of the Court would have been different. I cannot therefore hold that there has been a consequent failure of justice within the meaning of Section 21 and it is unnecessary for me therefore to set aside the order of the lower appellate Court on the ground that it was passed without jurisdiction. As, however, I have agreed with the applicant on the merits of the question argued before me I pass no order as to costs of this application, which is dismissed for the reason given.