K.C. Agrawal, J.
1. This is an execution first appeal preferred by Mukund Lal and others against the judgment of the Civil Judge, Saharanour dated 9-12-1969, allowing the objection of the respondents filed under Section 47 of the Civil P. C.
2. Suit No. 52 of 1929 filed by Pooran Mal and others for partition was decreed and a preliminary decree was passed on 12th May, 1932. This was followed by a final decree dated 5th March, 1934. Subsequently auras were prepared.
3. On an application for execution filed by the decree holders. Case No. 53 of 1946 was registered by the executing court. Through this application the plaintiff claimed possession over the quras allotted to them. Against the execution application, an objection was filed by the defendants which was numbered as 44 of 1965. The objections were dismissed on 9-12-1969. Against the dismissal of the objection the defendants filed the Execution First Appeal No. 2 of 1970 which has been dismissed by us by a separate judgment today.
4. On 12-10-1965, the defendants applied for execution of the decree which was numbered as execution case No. 51 of 1965. They prayed for possession over the quras which were allotted to them and also for compensation in respect of the share which the plaintiff decree-holders had realised by wav of compensation and rehabilitation want of the agricultural properties allotted to the defendants appellants. A number of objections were filed to the execution application. We are in this appeal concerned with that of the limitation. The respondents asserted that the final decree had since been passed in 1934, the execution application filed by the defendants-appellants on 12-10-65 was barred by time and as such, was liable to be rejected on that around. The executing court upheld the objection of limitation and rejected the execution application filed by the defendant appellants. Against the allowing of the objection under Section 47 the present appeal has been filed.
5. The only point that arises for decision in this appeal is about limitation. The dates given above would indicate that the application for execution of decree had been filed much after expiry of twelve years of limitation.
6. Section 48 of the Civil P. C. dealt with the minimum (maximum?) limitation of time for execution and no application would be entertained after this period. There was a controversy at one time whether Section 48 of the Civil P. C., 1908, laid down an absolute bar of twelve years for execution of decree orwhether it was controlled or overridden by the provisions of the Limitation Act. There has been a wide ranging conflict of the judicial opinion in the various High Courts on this controversy. But the High Courts which had earlier taken the view that Section 48 prescribes the bar. have now reversed the opinion. The unanimous opinion is that Section 48 of the Civil P. C. is controlled by the Limitation Act. 1963. (See Kandaswami Pillai v. Kannappa Chetty : AIR1952Mad186 Durg v. Pancham : AIR1939All403 Krishna Chandra v. Siva Paravatamma : AIR1953Ori13 : Ram Gopal v. Sidha Ram AIR 1943 Bom 164 and Ram Sarup v. Sher Singh .
7. In Lalji Raja and Sons v. Firm Hansrai Nathu Ram : 3SCR815 . the Supreme Court has also taken the same view.
8. In the instant case, we have seen above that the application for execution by the defendants appellants was filed much after the expiry of the period of twelve years of the date of the decree. Section 48 of the Civil P. C. imposes the outside period after which an application for execution is not maintainable. To meet this objection the learned counsel for the appellants relied on Article 182 of the Limitation Act. This Article provides for filing of an application within three years of the decree. The relevant portion of Explanation I of the aforesaid Article relied upon is being extracted below:--
'But where a decree or order has been passed jointly in favour of more persons than one, such application, if made by any one or more of them, or by him or their representatives shall take effect in favour of them all.'
9. The submission made before us by the learned counsel was that where a decree for partition is different from others, the execution started by one of the persons for possession of the property allotted to him under it would enure for the benefit of others also who have to get possession under it. In that connection, the basis of his submission was that the decree is a joint one.
10. Upon partition, the joint owner-ship and joint possession of others are transferred into separate and exclusive ownership and the possession of different portions by different co-owners. In a case, therefore, where separate shares have been allotted to the joint owners, each one of them would be en-titled to execute the decree independently and separately. Execution of a decree by one for possession of the share allotted to him would not in any way be for the benefit of others. Each has to initiate his own proceedings for getting the benefit derived under the decree. In Ramnath Rai v. Herendra Kumar Rai : AIR1931Cal581 , a Divi-sion Bench of the Calcutta High Court held that:
'A final decree insofar as it provides for separate allotments in favour of different parties to a partition suit cannot be regarded as a joint decree within the meaning of Para 2. Explanation I. Article 182. It is impossible to take such decree out of the words in Para '1' of the Explanation, 'where a decree or order has been passed severally in favour of more persons, than one distinguishing portions of the subject-matter as payable or deliverable to each': an application for execution by one party cannot, therefore, save limitation for others'.
11. We find ourselves in respectful agreement with the view taken by the Calcutta High Court. As introduced by the provisions of the Civil P. C. 1908, it is impossible to contend that the final decree insofar as it may provide for separate allotment in favour of the different parties to a partition suit can in any view be regarded as a joint decree within the meaning of para 2. Explanation I. Article 182 of the Limitation Act. In support of his contention that a partition decree has to be treated as joint and that pendency of an application for execution of such a decree is sufficient to keep realised the whole of the execution matter and the benefit thereof can be had even by a party other than the one who has made the application, the learned counsel relied upon the decisions, of the Nagpur High Court in Ahilvabai Tiwari v. Rambhajirao Gowardhan Bapu AIR 1954 Nag 264 and Gauri Shanker v. Kishanlal. 1964 All LJ 1013. In the latter decision, the rights of defendants to seek possession over the portion of the property which comes as residuary to them in a partition decree, was recognised, but there is nothing in it to show that the right to seek is incidental to the right of the plaintiff decree-holders to seek possession over the portion allotted to them. This authority does not deal with the controversy that arises for decision in the present case.
12. Before dealing with the first authority, we wish to note that Section 49 of theCivil P. C., even if held to nave application to a matter where one execution application is pending: the question would be about the applicability of Article 182 of the Limitation Act. Under this Article 182 an application for execution has to be made within three years. If such an application is not made within three years, the execution would be liable to be struck off on the around of limitation. In the instant case, to bring the execution within three years reliance on para 2 of Explanation I of Article 182 may be made if the decree was joint. But where, as here, share of each one of the co-sharers is separately demarcated and no one was interested in the share of the other, such a decree would not be liable to be considered as the joint decree.
13. In Man Mohan v. Madhu Sudan : AIR1932Cal869 , which was relied upon by the counsel for the appellants, the final decree for partition allotted various lands in severally to each of the parties but reserved certain property as joint. The first application for execution was dismissed on part satisfaction. Some of the defendants subsequently applied for execution within three years from the first application but more than three years after the decree. The question that came up for consideration before the Calcutta Bench was whether the application was within time.
14. The Calcutta High Court held that the decree before it was certainly one passed in favour of the plaintiff and the defendant, and as joint possession of one of the property was intearal in the deed of agreement, the defendants could apply para 2 of Explanation I of Article 182 of the Limitation Act. This case was clearly distinguishable. In this case, therefore, it appears clearly that on account of one item being joint the decree was considered as joint and the plea of limitation of the application being barred by time, was repelled.
15. The decision of Nagpur High Court in Ahilvabai Tiwari's case (AIR 1954 Nag 264) is not applicable to the facts of the present case. We do not know from the facts stated in this decision as to whether the decree was joint and was covered by para 2 of Explanation I of Article 182 of the Limitation Act.
16. Suhramanya Chettiar v. Alagappa Chettiar, (1906) ILR 30 Mad 268, was not accepted The Allahabad HighCourt in Nandlal Saran v. Dharam Kirti Saran : AIR1926All440 held.
'Where a decree is jointly passed against all the defendants in one matter and severally against different defendants with respect to other matters, thefirst portion of the 'Explanation should apply to decrees passed severally and the second part to the decree or decrees passed jointly.'
17. We find ourselves unable to agree with the Madras High Court. The Judgment stated the principles involved as follows:--
'The Bench of the Madras High Court held that the second para of Explanation to Article 182 must be read literally, and they took the view that although part of the decree was joint in so far as it related to costs and part of the decree was several in so far as it related to mesne profits, still the decree must be looked upon as a joint decree. With very great respect. I am unable to agree with this view of Madras High Court. It is difficult to understand what even a literal interpretation of the second para of Explanation to Article 182 should drive one to the conclusion to which the Madras High Court seems to have been driven. When the Explanation speaks of a decree, it must include a decree or part of a decree or a portion of a decree, and putting that interpretation upon the second para of the Explanation it is easy to come to a solution which is not illogical or anomalous.'
18. Both of the decisions were considered by the Bombay High Court in Dhulesaheb v. Municipal Borough. Biia-pur AIR 1949 Bom 260. The Bombay High Court dissented from the view taken in (1906) ILR 30 Mad 268 and adopted the view expressed in : AIR1926All440 .
19. It would suffice to distinguish Sheikh Khoorsed Hossein v. Nubee Fa-tima. (1877-78) ILR 3 Cal 551 and AIR 1922 Mad 327 by observing that these decisions were of a time when there was no distinction between a preliminary and the final decree. After the Civil P. C. 1908 it is not possible to contend that final decree in so far as it may provide for separate allotment in favour of the different parties to a partition suit can still be regarded as a joint decree within the meaning of para 2 of Explanation X of Article 182 of the Limitation Act.
20. Reverting to the facts of the pre-sent case, we find that the shares hadbeen separately given to the parties to the partition suit. Each one of them had his own matters. Para 2 to Explanation I of Article 182 did not apply. Hence, the Court below was right in holding that the execution application of the defendant-appellants was barred by time.
21. In the result, the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.