1. This is a plaintiff's appeal arising out of a suit for recovery of possession of a holding. In the plaint the plaintiff frankly admitted that defendant 2 is one of several zamindars in the village and defendant 1 as a ryot of defendant 2 and that two defendants forcibly ejected the plaintiff from his holding and sowed crops. The relief claimed was a decree for possession and mesne profits. The first Court came to the conclusion that the defendant's plea that the claim was not cognisible by the civil Court could not be entertained. On appeal the lower appellate Court came to a contrary conclusion. It is admitted that the dispossession took place after the coming in- to force of the new Tenancy Act and the case is no longer governed by the old Tenancy Act.
2. No doubt for some 3 years prior to the passing of the new Tenancy Act there were a few rulings of this Court in which it was laid down that an ejectment to come within the scope of Section 79, of the Ole Tenancy Act, must be an ejectment by the entire body of landholders and not by few individual landholders. An ejectment by a large body of landholders acting jointly hardly ever occurs. Anyhow the case is now governed by Section 99, read with Section 230, new Tenancy Act. According to that section a tenant ejected from or prevented from obtaining possession of his holding or any part thereof by his landholder, or any person claiming as landholder to have a right to eject him, must sue such persons in the revenue Court. The present section is much wider than the corresponding section of the former Act and there is no doubt that under the new section a tenant ejected by any person who is a landholder, or who is a person claming as a landholder, has his remedy only in revenue Court, and the jurisdiction of the civil Court is ousted. The policy of the legislature obviously is that dispute between tenants and land-holders as regards agricultural holdings must be settled by the revenue ' Court alone. If the mere fact that there are some landholders in the village in existence were allowed to take the case out of the jurisdiction of the revenue Courts, the result would be that many of the disputes between tenants and zamindars would have to be tried by the civil Courts.
3. In the case of Subedar Singh v. Komal Singh : AIR1929All656 , Dalal, J., held that the old rulings cannot be now considered to be binding because the wordings of Section 99 are now different from those of Section 79. He correctly laid down that it is not now necessary that only the landholder that is, all the proprietors of the mahal should eject a tenant in order to give jurisdiction to the revenue Court; and that it is sufficient if any person claiming to have the right to eject as landholder has ejected the plaintiff. The learned Judge rightly distinguished the previous rulings on the ground that they were under the old section. We are in full agreement with the view expressed by him and hold that a suit of this nature could lie under Section 99, Agra Tenency Act, and that therefore the jurisdiction of the civil Court is completely barred. The plaint has been rightly returned for presentation to the proper Court. The appeal is accordingly dismissed with costs in all the Courts.