V.D. Bhargava, J.
1. This is a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution by Virendra Singh Verma who was appointed as Junior Chemical Asssistant (Junior Soil Assistant) under the Agricultural Chemist at Rudrapur district Niani Tal, in Group II of Subordinate Agricultural Service by means of notification No. AB-5019/II-9A dated 17-8-53 by the Director of Agriculture, U. P. He joined the post on 26-8-53 as probationer and was on probation for two years. This appointment was till a suitable candidate was selected and approved by the Public Service Commission. An advertisement for the post was made by the Public Service Commission on 15-7-1954 and the petitioner applied for it. He was later on informed by a letter dated 26-9-55 by the Officer-in-charge of the Regional Soil Laboratory, Rudrapur that he had been selected by the Public Service Commission.
According to the petitioner, thereafter he served as a permanent employee in a substantive post to the entire satisfaction of his superior officers and there had been no adverse remarks against him. In December 1955 the petitioner's application for Senior Agriculture Inspector, Group I, was duly forwarded by the Director of Agriculture to Public Service Commission. He was told by the Agricultural Chemist to the U. P. Government in the same month that a complaint had been received against the petitioner from the Secretary of the Town Congress Committee, Rudrapur, that he was a member of the 'R. S. S.', which had been forwarded to the Director of Agriculture. It is said that on 21-1-56 Sri A. N. Misra, Assistant Soil Chemist, Regional Soil Laboratory, Rudrapur after office hours showed the petitioner a letter from the Administration Officer enquiring about the action taken against the petitioner on the aforesaid complaint of the Town Congress Committee. On 23-1-1956 the petitioner received an order terminating his services under the orders of the Additional Director.
2. The grievance of the petitioner was that he was never told the charge or charges against him and was not afforded any opportunity of giving an explanation or showing cause against the order proposed. He further complains that the Additional Director of Agriculture sent a communication to the Public Service Commission in pursuance of which the interview of the petitioner for the post of the Senior Agriculture Inspector Group I was cancelled by the Public Service Commission, and he was not called for interview, though candidates for lower qualification were called; and his complaint is that thereby there had been discrimination and Article 16 of the Constitution had been infringed, because he was denied equality of opportunity in matter relating to employment. In the post of Group I, one Mr. Saxena had been appointed, who was less qualified than the petitioner, fay the Public Service Commission. The petitioner asked for a discharge certificate which was not given. It was contended that he was appointed by the Director of Agriculture and his services could not be terminated by the Additional Director.
3. Some of the facts have been contested on behalf of the State. The parties to the petition are the Additional Director of Agriculture and the Public Service Commission, besides the State of Uttar Pradesh. In the counter affidavit it has been alleged that the petitioner was appointed purely in a temporary capacity, and he had not been appointed as a probationer for two years. He was appointed purely temporarily as a stop gap arrangement pending selection of a suitable candidate by the Public Service Commission, and Rule 25 of the Subordinate Agricultural Services Rules only applies to persons selected for a permanent appointment.
4. It was further alleged that the Public Service Commission merely approve candidate for appointment to posts and actually they are not concerned with actual appointment. Actual appointments are made by the State Government. Selection of a candidate by the Public Service Commission only entitled him to be appointed permanently, but this did not amount to appointment in fact.
5. It was further stated in the counter affidavit that the work of the petitioner has not been satisfactory and there were adverse remarks dated 13-5-54 about his work being far from satisfactory. It was also stated that he had not been removed on account of the complaint. Quotations from the letter of the Public Service Commission have also been given, which show that his name was never removed from the list of candidates, who were to be called for interview, on account of any adverse remarks having been sent by the Director or the Additional Director of Agriculture.
6. It wag the case of the Opposite party that his services had been terminated under the terms of G. O. No. O-230/II-B-1953 dated 30-1-53, according to which temporary services of an employee can be terminated after giving him one month's notice. The Additional Director of Agriculture has been vested with the powers of Director pertaining to Research and Education and bulk. of administration, vide G. O. No. A-6843/XIIA dated 27-10-1953. The petitioner held the post at the pleasure of the Government.
7. One of the main questions in the case is whether the petitioner had ever been appointed to a permanent post or not, or he was holding a temporary post. As regards that, there is no letter of appointment produced by the petitioner except his assertion in the affidavit. On the other hand, the appointment of the petitioner being of a permanent character has been denied by the State, Further it has been denied that he has been dismissed on account of the complaint against him. These are matters of fact which can properly be gone into in a suit rather than in a writ petition, as has been held in the case of Union of India v. T. R. Varma, (S) AIR 1957 SC 882. It has been held in that case that:
'It will be a sound exercise of discretion to refuse to interfere in a petition under Article 226, unless there are good grounds therefor.' Their Lordships have further held that: ''Under the law a person whose Services have been wrongfully terminated, is entitled to institute an action to vindicate his rights, and in such an action, the Court will be competent to award all the reliefs to which he may be entitled, including some which would not be admissible in a writ petition.'
8. On the last occasion when this case came up before me, as the nature of the employment was not clear from the affidavit, I was inclined to reject this petition on that preliminary ground. but it was urged on behalf of the petitioner that since he had got another Government job, he had not filed a rejoinder affidavit. But since) his services from that job have also been terminated he would like to contest this petition and, therefore, he prayed for a rejoinder affidavit and it was contended that he could establish by documentary evidence that his post was permanent and a substantive one and, therefore, the termination of his services was illegal.
A rejoinder affidavit has been filed and an application has also been filed along with the rejoinder affidavit in which a prayer has been made to ask the Government to produce a certain G.O. No. 1372/XII B-1916/54 dated 21-4-1955, and it hag further been prayed that the name of persons occupying temporary posts which were made permanent in pursuance of the aforementioned Government Order as well as the list of employees in Group II in the Regional Soil Laboratories, their qualifications etc. may also be called for from the opposite party.
I do not think that this Court will compare the qualifications and thereafter come to the conclusion as to who was the better qualified candidate. That matter, in my opinion is not justiciable. The order of the 21st of April 1955 was passed before the name of the present petitioner was approved by the Public Service Commission. But he has nowhere alleged in his petition that his name was ever approved for a permanent appointment under that notification. Under the circumstances, if he has not made that allegation I do not think that I would be justified in a writ petition to ask the opposite party to supply that notification and also the names of the persons and their qualifications. That application, is, therefore, rejected.
9. AS regards the first complaint that the petitioner was never told the charge or charges against him and was not afforded any opportunity to give any explanation is concerned, I think Article 311 does not apply to the facts of the present case, because it is neither dismissal, nor removal nor reduction in rank. It had been held by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Satish Chandra v. Union of India, AIR 1953 SC 250 in similar circumstances that Article 311 had no application because there was neither dismissal, nor removal from service nor reduction in rank.
10. The second objection of the petitioner was that there had been discrimination and he was not afforded an equal opportunity in matters relating to re-employment or appointment when the Public Service Commission did not summon Mm. If there are limited number of posts and numerous applicants apply for those posts, it has to be left to the choice of the selecting authority to summon only some of those candidates. It will be almost impossible, if for five or six posts there are two thousand applicants, to summon every one. If his application had been rejected on any particular ground, the matter would have been different. But I do not think anybody can claim as of right to be called for interview. The only reason shown for the complaint appears to be that some second divisioners in M.Sc. were called for the interview while the petitioner, who is a first divisioner in M.Sc., was not called. We know nothing about the other qualifications of those candidates who have been called for the interview. It may be that they got in the final examination a second division while the petitioner got a first division, in M.Sc., but those other candidates had better records at the earlier stages, or those candidates may have better experience. These matters are for the Public Service Commission to decide and note for this Court.
11. If the order either of termination of service or rejecting his application for interview had been a speaking order and the reasons had been given in that order and the reasons were such which could not justify rejecting the application the matter might have stood on a different footing. For example, if his application had been rejected or his services had been terminated on the ground that he had a particular colour, or was tall or short or fat or some other reason which was wholly irrelevant to the qualifications which a candidate should possess, then in that event it might have been said that Article 16 had been infringed. But if his services had been terminated under the rules for temporary services and no reason had been given in that order, then I think it will not be an infringement of Article 16. In the same case which I have mentioned earlier, viz., the case of AIR 1953 SC 250 where the sendees or a temporary servant had been terminated, their Lordships had held;
'Art. 16(1) deals with equality of opportunity in all matters relating to employment or appointment to any office under the State. The petitioner basnot been denied any opportunity of employment or of appointment. He has been treated just like any other person to whom an offer of temporary employment under these conditions was made. His grievance, when analysed, is not one of personal differentiation.'
12. In Raj Kishore v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1954 All 343 a Bench of this Court had held:
'In the matter of termination of the services of a Government servant, the provisions to be considered are Articles 310 and 311. Article 14 does not control Article 310. The reason is that Article 14 is a general provision relating to all kinds of laws and all kinds of persons, while Article 310 deals with a special or particular matter, namely, Government servants and termination of their services. The maxim 'generalia specialibus non derogant' applies.' In the above case a Government servant was compulsorily retired after completion of 25 years service and rule 465 of the Civil Service Regulations was challenged on the ground of discrimination, and that argument was repelled by the Bench. With great respect I agree with those observations. I think equally the above dictum will apply in the-present case to the provisions of Article 16, they being of a general nature while 310 being of a special nature.
13. Learned counsel for the petitioner has relied on a recent decision of the Bombay High Court in Pandurang Kashinath v. Union of India, AIR 1959 Bom 134 where their Lordships have disagreed with the view of this court in the 1954 case of Allahabad cited above. I am bound by the decision of this Court and I might have referred this matter to a larger Bench if I had taken a different view. On facts, the Bombay case differed from the present case. There the petitioner had been responsible for strike and had been detained in jail for some time and, thereafter he had been suspended and action was taken against him. On account of the fact that he had taken part and he had been detained in jail, he was suspended and later on his services were terminated. Here the position is a little different from the facts of the Bombay case.
There it could be said that he had been 'picked out and sacked', as their Lordships have observed there. But in the present case it cannot be said, because the facts are not sufficient to show that the petitioner had been 'picked out and sacked'. I have already mentioned earlier that in case of a speaking order or where the circumstances are such that the order amounts almost to a speaking order, the position might have been different than the position in the present case. As I am inclined to dismiss this petition on the preliminary ground that there is an alternative remedy which the petitioner should have pursued, I do not wish to express any definite opinion on the merits of the case.'
14. The petition is accordingly dismissed withcosts.