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B. Ramesh Chandra and anr. Vs. (Firm) Kashi Ram Bhajan Lal - Court Judgment

LegalCrystal Citation
SubjectLimitation
CourtAllahabad
Decided On
Reported inAIR1936All152
AppellantB. Ramesh Chandra and anr.
Respondent(Firm) Kashi Ram Bhajan Lal
Excerpt:
- .....for the plaintiffs the learned government advocate contends that under sections 19 and 20:a fresh period of limitation shall be computed from the time when the acknowledgment was so signed, or when the payment was made.2. his argument is that under section 6, lim. act, the plaintiffs are under a legal disability and that the date of 16th november 1929 should be taken under section 6 as the date at the time from which the period of limitation is to be reckoned.' that is he argues that the payment by cheque does not merely extend limitation for a period of three years but it operates under section 6, lim. act, to produce the result that at the time from which the period of limitation is to be reckoned the plaintiffs were under the legal disability of being minors and therefore the.....
Judgment:
ORDER

Bennet, J.

1. This is a civil revision by plaintiffs against a decree of the Small Cause Court of Farrukhabad dismissing a suit of the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs are two minors who sued through the Collector of Farrukhabad as manager of Court of Wards for a sum of money alleged to be due from the defendant on the basis of a bahikhata account. The lower Court held that the suit was barred by limitation. The Court found that on 17th November 1928 the defendant purchased a hundi from the plaintiff for Rs. 2,502-5-6 and therefore became in debt to the plaintiff for payment of that amount. A few days later on 20th November 1928, the father of the plaintiffs died. By 25th November 1929 the defendant firm had paid almost all the principal but apparently the interest was not paid. On 16th November 1929 the defendant firm made a payment to the plaintiff by a cheque (Ex. l). This was the last transaction and the suit was brought more than three years after this date in 1934. There is no doubt that the payment by cheque gave a fresh start to limitation on 16th November 1929 but the Court below has held that this only extended limitation for three years from that date, and as the suit was brought after that period the right to sue was barred. For the plaintiffs the learned Government Advocate contends that under Sections 19 and 20:

A fresh period of limitation shall be computed from the time when the acknowledgment was so signed, or when the payment was made.

2. His argument is that under Section 6, Lim. Act, the plaintiffs are under a legal disability and that the date of 16th November 1929 should be taken under Section 6 as the date at the time from which the period of limitation is to be reckoned.' That is he argues that the payment by cheque does not merely extend limitation for a period of three years but it operates under Section 6, Lim. Act, to produce the result that at the time from which the period of limitation is to be reckoned the plaintiffs were under the legal disability of being minors and therefore the plaintiffs have all the period for their suit given to them by Section 6. This is a subject on which the rulings of this High Court have differed. In an earlier ruling of 1909 under the former Limitation Act, Section 7 of 1877, there was a ruling reported in Ram Charan v. Ram Dass (1909) 6 ALJ 378. That ruling was contrary to the view advanced by the learned Government Advocate. On the other hand in a recent ruling of the year 1932 reported in Chandrabhan v. Raj Kumar 1933 54 All 1019 a Bench of this Court has adopted that view and has held that in a case similar to the present Section 6 will apply. I consider that I ought to follow the later ruling which appears to be more logical and in my opinion the plaintiffs are therefore entitled to sue. A further question was raised that on the wording of Section 6 the suit could only be brought by the plaintiffs personally after they had attained majority and within a period of three years from so attaining majority. It is not quite clear on this theory what would happen if there was a difference of more than three years between the ages of the plaintiffs and I was not shown any ruling in which this point of view had been adopted. On the other hand in Musi Imran v. Collector of Bijnor 1934 ALJ 803 a Bench of this Court has held that a suit could be brought on behalf of the minors in which the minors obtained the benefit of Section 6, Lim. Act.

3. This appears to me to be the meaning of the section. It would cause great inconvenience if it were held that under Section 6 time must always run for the full period until minors have come of age because in such a case interest would accumulate largely to the detriment of the defendant. Accordingly therefore I consider that in the present case the plaintiffs were entitled to sue for the amount due to them. In this view I allow this application in revision and I remand the suit for disposal by the Small Cause Court Judge. Costs hitherto incurred will be costs in the case.


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