S.S. Dhavan, J.
1. This is a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution praying for the quashing of an order of the Sub-Divisional Officer, Jalalabad, allowing the election petition of the respondent Baboo Ram and setting aside the petitioner's election to the office of Pradhan. The facts as stated in the affidavit supporting the petition are these : The petitioner was a branch postmaster of the Post Office Jarinpur in the district of Shahjahanpur. He was drawing an allowance of Rs. 25/- per month and looked after the office. On 22-11-1955 he sent his resignation from the post and on the next day 23-11-1955 he filed his nomination for election to the post of Pradhan of the Gram Sabha, Jarinpur.
He says that no abjection was filed by the respondent Baboo Ram and his nomination was accepted. On 28-11-1955 the petitioner's resignation was accepted with effect, to quote his own words, 'from 22-11-1955' but he was directed not to leave his duties till some other arrangement had been made. The election was held on 22-12-1955, there being only two contesting candidates the petitioner and Baboo Ram respondent No. 2. The petitioner, however, continued to work as branch Postmaster till February 1956 but he alleges that he did not draw his allowance for December 1955 and January-February 1956.
2. After the election the respondent Baboo Ram filed an election petition impugning the petitioner's election on the ground that, being a Government servant, he was disqualified to be elected. The petition was dismissed at first, but on an application by the respondent Baboo Ram, the decision was reviewed by the Sub-Divisional Officer respondent No. 1 who allowed the petition and set aside the petitioner's election. As this was done without notice to the petitioner, he filed a petition in this Court challenging the legality of the order which was passed behind his back. The petition was allowed and this Court directed the Sub-Divisional Officer to decide the petition after issuing notice to the petitioner. When the case went back to that Officer he reviewed his order, asked the parties to produce evidence, and finally allowed the election petition on the ground that the petitioner's nomination paper was improperly accepted and that this materially affected the result of the election. The order was passed after due notice to the petitioner.
3. Learned counsel for the petitioner urged two points before me in support of his contention. First he contended that the finding of the Sub-DivisionalOfficer that the petitioner was a Government servant on the date of filing his nomination paper is erroneous. He relies on his allegation that the order accepting the resignation, when it reached the petitioner, was found to be with effect from 22-11-1955. According to the learned counsel, the date on which the resignation is accepted is irrelevant and the material date is 23rd November as the resignation was directed to take effect from that date.
He contends that the petitioner was not a Government servant, when he filed his nomination paper. I do not agree. No copy of the order accepting the petitioner s resignation has been filed before me. Nor was it filed before the Sub-Divisional Officer. The Sub-Divisional Officer has observed that his letter of resignation does not indicate when it was accepted. There is nothing in his order to show that the qualifying words 'with effect from 23-11-1955' were proved before him, Even in the affidavit supporting the present petition it is not stated that any evidence was led before the Sub-Divisional Officer to prove that the resignation was accepted with effect from 23rd November. Learned counsel for the petitioner has drawn my attention to paragraph 13 of the affidavit which alleges that evidence was led before the Sub-Djvisional Officer 'to prove that the petitioner was only getting allowance and was not drawing any salary .... and that the petitioner's resignation was to be accepted from 22-11-1955.
I am afraid this allegation is vague. The petitioner states that he was only getting an allowance and not drawing any salary, but that is a matter concerning his remuneration and not his status as a Gov-eminent servant. He also alleges that his 'resignation was to be accepted' from 22-11-1955. The allegation is made in the passive voice and it has not been specified who accepted the resignation, nor is it stated that the order of acceptance of resignation was produced before the Sub Divisional Officer.
4. As against this vague allegation, there are facts (stated by the petitioner himself) which proved beyond doubt that his status was that of a Government servant not only on the date of nomination but also of election. According to him, the resignation was accepted on 28-11-1955 'with effect from 22-11-1955' whatever that may mean but he was directed to continue till he was relieved. I asked learned counsel to state what the petitioner's status was on 27-11-1955 that is one day before his resignation was accepted and he was compelled to admit that the petitioner was a Government servant on that date. Furthermore, it is well settled that a, Government servant does not relinquish his post till he hands over charge.
In this case, he admits that he continued to work as branch postmaster till February 1956, but relies on the fact that he did not draw his allowance between December 1955 and February 1956. The fact that a Government servant does not choose to draw his allowance would not affect his status as a Government servant. He had been elected on 22-12-1955 and he decided to forego his salary for the purpose of creating evidence that he was not a Government servant divesting himself of the status of Government servant. But this gesture could not achieve the purpose, for voluntarily surrender of salary never affects a Government servant's status His allowance or salary is there for him to draw or not to draw at his option. The view of the Sub Divisional Officer that the petitioner continued to be an employee of the Central Government even after his resignation is correct. The finding that the petitioner's nomination paper was improperly accepted is therefore unassailable.
5. Secondly, learned counsel submitted that there ought to have been a finding that the acceptance of the petitioner's nomination paper had materially affected the result of the election. I find that there is such a finding. The concluding sentence of the Sub Divisional Officer's order is 'it (the acceptance of the nomination paper) materially affected the result of the election.'
6. These were the only two points urged before me and I do not find any substance in them.The petition is rejected.