Amitav Banerji, J.
1. This is a second appeal by the plaintiffs. Plaintiffs' suit for permanent injunction and in the alternative for partition of a house and mesne profit has been dismissed by both the courts below. The suit property is a Chabutra. The trial court after considering the evidence on record held that the plaintiffs could not prove the alleged ancestral nature of the property or even its partition and the disputed Chabutra being allotted to their share. He also held that the plaintiffs were never in possession thereof and the defendants had been in exclusive and adverse possession of the suit property. The trial court dismissed the suit, for the plaintiffs failed to prove their title and possession over the property in suit.
2. The lower appellate court on an appraisal of the evidence on record and after considering the contentions raised by the learned counsel for the plaintiffs held that the plaintiffs could not prove that the suit property ever pertained to any joint ancestral house of the parties or that on a partition it was allotted to their exclusive share. They also failed to prove that they were in possession of the suit property. The court further found that the defendants' evidence proved that their ancestors had been in exclusive and adverse possession over the suit property for a period more than 12 years preceding the suit and had thus prescribed an absolute proprietary title. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed, and the judgment and decree of the trial court was affirmed.
3. Learned counsel for the appellants raised three contentions: Firstly; that the document of partition Ex. 1 was not compulsorily registerable. He urged that this was a document executed in 1897, and provisions of the Registration Act, 1908 had no application to it. The Registration Act, 1908 did not come into play, but there were earlier Registration Acts of the year 1871 and 1877. It could not be shown that the provisions analogous to Section 49 of the Registration Act, 1908 were not there in the previous Registration Acts. This contention was never raised in the court below, and I find no merits in this contention.
4. The second contention was that the partition deed, even if it was not registered, could certainly be looked intofor a collateral purpose. This proposition is correct that if a document is compulsorily registerable and has not been registered, it will be admissible in evidence only for a collateral purpose, but the collateral purpose has a limited scope and meaning. It cannot be used for the purpose of saying that the deed created or declared or assigned or limited or extinguished a right to immovable property. If these could not be established by the collateral purpose, then in that event how could the document be used for showing that the property was partitioned or that particular properties were given to the various parties in the partition. If the document was unregistered, then it could not be used for showing that is created, declared, assigned, limited or extinguished a right to immovable property. The term 'collateral purpose' would not permit the party to establish any of these acts from the deed. In my opinion, the contention that it would be used for collateral purpose does not advance the case of the plaintiffs at all. It still falls short in proving that there was a partition between the parties.
5. Learned counsel then contended that the deed could be treated to be a' family arrangement and a family arrangement was not compulsorily registerable. This contention, in my opinion, is not correct. The Supreme Court in the case of Kale v. Dy. Director of Consolidation : 3SCR202 , held that a family arrangement in case it is oral needs no registration, but if the terms thereof were reduced into writing, it became imperative to have the document registered and unless it was registered, it could not be looked into. The plea of family arrangement is sought to be derived from Exhibit-1. That document is in writing. Even if it was treated to be a family arrangement, it required registration, and having not been registered, it could not be looked into for the purpose of showing it to be a family arrangement.
6. The oral evidence regarding partition on the basis of this document, Ex. 1, could not be led, as it was barred by Section 91 of the Evidence Act. For the reasons indicated above, it is clear that the lower appellate court has rightly recorded that the document Ex. 1 was inadmissible in evidence. The finding is correct and in accordance with law.
7. It was next contended by the learned counsel that the conclusion of the lower appellate court that the defendants were in exclusive and adverse proprietary possession was also vitiated because the principle of adverse possession would not be applicable in the case of a reversioner. He cited a decision of the Full Bench of the Madras High Court in the case of P. Kanakamma v. B. Krishnamma (AIR 1949 Mad 445), where it was observed that 'the possession of Andalmmal and her daughters was undoubtedly adverse to Seethamma, but it was not adverse to the respondent as the reversioner'. I do not see how the principle laid down in the above case is applicable to the facts of the present case. There is no question of any reversioner in the present case. There were two parties in the suit. Each were claiming right on the Chabutra. The defendants claimed that they were in exclusive possession thereof. This possession of theirs has been accepted. The lower appellate court has found that their possession being possession for more than 12 years, they had prescribed for themselves an absolute proprietary title, I do not find any error of law in this conclusion. The finding arrived at by the lower appellate court is not vitiated by any error of law, either in the appreciation of the evidence or in the application of the principle of law.
8. No other point was argued. I find no merits in this appeal.
9. In the result, therefore, the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.