Iqbal Ahmad, J.
1. This is an appeal by Sat Deo Prasad, minor, an unsuccessful plaintiff, whose suit for a declaration that the compromise decree in suit No. 233 of 1933 of the Court of the Munsif, West Allahabad, was conclusive and void and was not binding on him (the plaintiff) has been dismissed by both the Courts below. The parties to the present suit are descended from one Bhagwan Prasad and their family pedigree is as follows:
Debi Badal, defendant 1.
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Mathura Prasad Dwarka Prasad, Mahadeo
= defendant 3. Prasad,
Inder Koer, defendant 2.
defendant 4. Sat Deo, plaintiff.
2. It appears that suit No. 233 of 1933 was filed on behalf of Sat Deo Prasad by his mother, Mt. Bhagwati Devi, who acted as his next friend in the suit. The defendants to that suit were amongst others Debi Badal, Dwarka Prasad and Inder Kuer. As Mt. Bhagwati Devi was a pardanashin lady she appointed one Balgobind as an attorney to look after the prosecution of the case. The powers given to Balgobind were evidenced by a registered power of attorney dated 8th May 1933. By this deed Balgobind was inter alia authorized to file a compromise. The Urdu words used in the document were 'sulahnama dakhil karen. An advocate named B. Mahabir Prasad was appointed a pleader on behalf of the plaintiff by means of vakalatnama that was signed by Bhagwati Devi. By the vakalatnama extensive powers concerning the conduct and prosecution of the suit were given to B. Mahabir Prasad and he was inter alia authorized to appoint arbitrators, to file compromise (sulahnama dakhil karen) and to file documents and it was stated in the vakalatnama that all the acts done by B. Mahabir Prasad would be, accepted by Sat Deo Prasad, plaintiff. In short wide and extensive powers were conferred on B. Mahabir Prasad by the vakalatnama.
3. Suit No. 233 was contested by the defendants and on the date of the recording of evidence the parties entered into a compromise when the trial Judge was actually recording the statement of Balgobind. It has been found by the Courts below that the terms of the compromise were discussed by the parties or their pleaders in the presence of the presiding Judge and after the terms were settled the counsel for the parties made a statement concerning those terms and that statement was recorded and signed by Balgobind and the pleaders of the parties. In short, it is manifest from the findings recorded by the Courts below that the compromise was not a hole and corner affair but was arrived at in open Court after mutual discussion between the parties. The plaintiff appellant assailed the validity of the compromise on four grounds. He alleged that his mother, who was his next friend, gave no instructions for the compromise to any person whatsoever. Secondly he alleged that Balgobind was under the influence of Debi Badal who was one of the defendants in suit No. 233. Thirdly he alleged that the compromise was entered into without the permission of the Court and lastly he asserted that the compromise was prejudicial to his interest.
4. The contention of the plaintiff that the compromise was entered into without the permission of the Court was baseless. It has been found by both the Courts below that the requisite permission to enter into a compromise on behalf of the plaintiff, who was a minor, was given by the presiding officer of the Court. The question whether the compromise was or was not for the benefit of the minor had no material bearing on the decision of the present suit unless the compromise was vitiated on any of the grounds alleged by the plaintiff. If the compromise was otherwise valid and binding the question whether or not it was for the benefit of the plaintiff cannot now be debated and discussed. That was a question to be determined by the Judge who granted the permission for the compromise. It may be assumed for the purposes of argument that the mother of the plaintiff who was his next friend did not give any directions either to Balgobind or to B. Mahabir Prasad to enter into the compromise. Nevertheless, the compromise must be held to be valid and binding if it is found that either Balgobind or B. Mahabir Prasad had the authority to enter into the same and that in exercising that authority they acted honestly and without being in collusion with the defendants to the suit.
5. So far as B. Mahabir Prasad is concerned he was undoubtedly competent to enter into the compromise. As stated before the vakalatnama in his favour conferred very wide powers in very general terms on him, and as such, the vakalatnama must by necessary implication be deemed to have authorized him to enter into the compromise. This was the view taken in the Full Bench decision of this Court in Akbari Begam v. Rahmat Husain : AIR1933All861 . It was contended on behalf of the plaintiff-appellant that the words 'sulahnama dakhil karen' that find a place in the power of attorney and in the vakalatnama did at best authorize Balgobind and B. Mahabir Prasad to file a compromise and not to enter into a compromise. We are unable to agree with this contention. The words noted above are words of general import and uncontrolled as they are by any condition to the effect that the compromise must bear the signature of the plaintiff's guardian before the same can be filed in Court the only reasonable interpretation that can be put on those words is that the attorney and the vakil were given the authority to enter into a compromise on behalf of the minor. That being so the competence of the vakil and of Balgobind to compromise the suit cannot be questioned. We find that the compromise was signed also by the plaintiff's father. It is not suggested that the plaintiff's father was in collusion with the other defendants to Suit No. 233.
6. The allegation that Balgobind or the plaintiff's father were either in collusion with or under the influence of Debi Badal was not accepted by either of the Courts below. It follows that the compromise was entered into by authorized persons and was not vitiated by fraud or collusion. The Courts below were, therefore right in holding that the compromise decree was binding on the plaintiff-appellant. This appeal must therefore fail and is dismissed with costs.