V.D. Bhargava, J.
1. This is a writ petition filed by the Industrial Employees Union through its General Secretary, against the State of Uttar, Pradesh, the Adjudicator at Kanpur, Messrs. Cawnpore Tannery Limited, and the Electric Inspector to Government Uttar Pradesh, Lucknow. The prayer in the writ petition is that the order of the Adjudicator dated the 20th of May, 1957, be quashed, a direction be issued to the Electric Inspector to Government of Uttar Pradesh not to enforce the award given by the Adjudicator; a further direction be issued to the Government of Uttar Pradesh not to enforce the award dated 20th of May, 1957; and Sri Abdul Rashid Wire-man be given compensation.
2. Abdul Rashid was working as a wire-man in the concern of respondent No. 3, Messrs. Kanpur Tannery Limited. He was working as an electric wire-man and his licence used to be renewed from time to time. For the year 1954 the licences was sent to the Assistant Electric Inspector to Government for renewal along with the forwarding letter of respondent No. 3, but his licence was not renewed and it was cancelled on the 21st July, 1954.
After the cancellation of the licence under the rules framed under the Electricity Act a wire-man cannot work as an electric wire-man in any concern if he does not hold a licence. Therefore, the services of Abdul Rashid were terminated. This matter appears to have been taken up by the Industrial Employees Union, petitioner, and the matter was referred to the Adjudicator. The issue before the Adjudicator was whether the employers have wrongfully and/or unjustifiably discharged Shri Abdul Rashid? If so, to what relief is the workman entitled? The Adjudicator came to the conclusion that the workman had been rightly discharged and he was not entitled to any relief.
The writ petition has been filed challenging this order on the ground that he was entitled to retrenchment compensation. The order was also challenged on the ground that the cancellation of the licence was unjustified and, therefore, the Electric Inspector to Government should be directed to renew the licence of Sri Abdul Rashid.
3. A preliminary objection has been taken to the maintainability of this writ petition on the ground that in a writ petition it is the individual or a corporation whose rights are affected, who can come to this Court. Any other association cannot espouse the cause of the person who has been injured. The second ground taken is that the Industrial Employees Union had been registered as a trade Union not for leather, but as 'miscellaneous'.
There were at that time at least four otherUnions of leather representing leather industry.They were Cawnpore Tannery Employees UnionKanpur Tannery and Leather Workers Union,Chamra Mazdoor Panchayat and Kanpur ChamraMill Karmachari Union. It was contended that anUnion, only of the trade to which this worker be-longs, is the proper Union to represent and On thatscore also the present petitioner has no right torepresent the employee.
4. There can be no doubt that so far as this case is concerned, it is the individual right of Abdul Rashid which had been affected. No other person in the whole firm of the Kanpur Tannery Limited is in any way affected. The question, therefore, is that in such circumstances can the petitioner Union file a writ petition
5. On behalf of the petitioner it has been argued that it is only an industrial dispute which can go before an industrial court. If it were an individual dispute it would not be an industrial dispute and, therefore, in the industrial court, it is necessary that it should be taken up by the workmen of that industry or by some trade union and if it is necessary for the purpose of industrial dispute, that an Union should take its cause, then it should be deemed that it is the Union and the Union alone which would be the party even in the writ petition and not the individual. It was further contended, that, if this view is not accepted, it might lead to great difficulties. There may be cases where many people might be affected by one order of the Adjudicator and in that event all individuals will have to file writ petitions in this Court.
6. It is true that so far as industrial courts, are concerned, power of representation has been given to the Unions and it has been held in News-papers Ltd. v. State Industrial Tribunal, U. P., (S) AIR 1957 SC 532, that it is only when an Union represents a cause, that it will become an industrial dispute. But I think the jurisdiction which is exercised in a writ jurisdiction is different from the jurisdiction which is exercised by an industrial court or tribunal and under the circumstances in a writ jurisdiction, it is the individual who must come before the Court.
7. It is not in industrial dispute alone, but there have been several cases where by one order hundred or thousands of people have been affected. For example, U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act when passed affected thousands of people and each one of them filed separate petitions in this Court. It has been held by a Bench of this Court in Uma Shanker Rai v. Divisional Supdt. Northern Rly. Lucknow, 1959 All LJ 864, (AIR 1960 All 366), that even two persons cannot combine in a writ petition having separate rights.
A writ petition can be filed only by one unless the right is joint. In Indian Sugar Mills Association v. Secretary, to Govt., Uttar Pradesh, Labour Dept., AIR 1951 All 1, the writ petition was filed on behalf of several sugar mills by the Indian Sugar Mills Association. All the sugar mills of U. P. were members of the Indian Sugar Mills Association find the order which affected was passed by the Government affecting every sugar mill. But the Full Bench of this Court had held :
'Though Article 226 makes no mention as to who shall apply for an appropriate order under the Article, other writs, directions or orders cannot be placed on the same footing as the writ of habeas corpus and only those persons whose interests are directly affected by a statute or an order can apply for redress under the Article.'
Thus if the right of the petitioner is not directly affected, but the order for the sake of argument be accepted as unconstitutional, I do not think that the petitioner would be entitled to present the petition. In that case the petitioner Association also was registered under Section 4 of the Trade Unions Act, but that was held not to give right to present a petition.
In Charanjit Lal v. Union of India, AIR 1951 SC 41, the same view had been taken by their Lordships of the Supreme Court. There Sholapur Spinning and Weaving Company (Emergency Provisions) Act (XXVIII of 1950) was challenged by one of the share-holders and it was held that the shareholder's right not being affected directly, he had no right to challenge and it was the Company itself which was to challenge the Act. Hon'ble Fazal Ali J., has observed as follows:
'It has been held in a number of cases in the United States of America that no one except those whose rights are directly affected by a law can raise the question of constitutionality of that law. This principle has been very clearly stated by Hughes J., in Mc Cabe v. Atchison, (1914) 235 U. S. 151, in these words : 'It is an elementary principle that in order to justify the granting of this extraordinary relief, the complainant's need of it and the absence of an adequate remedy at law must clearly appear. The complainant cannot succeed because someone else may be hurt. Nor does it make any difference that other persons who may be injured are persons of the same race or occupation. It is the fact, clearly established, of injury to the complainant -- not to others -- which justifies judicial interference.'
Here there cannot be the least doubt that it was not the Industrial Employees Union which was directly hit. It is Abdul Rashid who has been injured and he should come to this Court.
His Lordship further observed that:
'On this statement of the law, with which I entirely agree, the scope of the discussion on this petition is greatly restricted at least in regard to the first two fundamental rights. The company and the shareholders are in law separate entities, and if the allegation is made that any property belonging to the Company has been taken possession of without compensation or the right enjoyed by the Company under Article 19(1)(g) has been infringed, it would be for the Company to come forward to assert orvindicate its own rights and not for any individualshareholder to do so.'
At another place Hon'ble Mukherjea J., laid down :
'Article 32(1) of the Constitution guarantees to everybody the right to move this Court, by appropriate proceeding, for enforcement of the fundamental rights which are enumerated in Part III of the Constitution. Clause (2) of the Article lays down that the Supreme Court shall have the power :to issue directions or orders or writs including writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari whichever may be appropriate for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by this part.
Thus anybody who complains of infraction of any of the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution, is at liberty to move the Supreme Court for the enforcement of such rights and this Court has been given the power to make orders and issue directions or writs similar in nature to the prerogative writs of English law as might be considered appropriate in particular cases.'
Thereafter his Lordship held that the fundamental right is available not only to an individual citizen but also to corporate bodies as well, and since the corporation hag a distinct personality of its own with rights and capacities, duties and obligations separate from those of its individual members, the petition was considered to be not proper by a shareholder. The Union, if I may say so has also a separate entity, legal personality of its own with rights and capacities, duties and obligations separate from the individual. Therefore, in my opinion, the petitioner has no right to present this petition on behalf of Sri Abdul Rashid.
8. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court in (S) AIR 1957 SC 532, held that an individual can be represented only 'by a Trade Union of the same nature and of which he was a member at the time when this dispute arose. I had an occasion to refer to that observation in J.K. Cotton . v. U. P. Govt., Writ Petn. No. 2471 of 1957 decided by me on the 10th of February 1960 : (AIR 1960 All 734). In that case also an Union of an entirely different trade had represented a worker and I had come to the conclusion that it was not open to the worker to be represented by a Trade Union of a different nature. I had held that:
'The Union which had espoused his cause was not of the same trade and industry, but was an entirely different industry. Taking up causes, by other industries, or by unions of other concerns, is likely to create more trouble and disturb the peace and tranquillity of the industry concerned.'
The Industrial Disputes Act has been framed as its preamble shows to provide for powers to prevent strikes and lock outs and for the settlement of industrial disputes and other incidental matters. If the services of any employee are terminated in any industry and no worker of that industry is in any way affected, then I do not think that it should be permissible for the Unions of other industries or of other concerns to take up the cause and create a disharmony in the industry itself. In the present case the present petitioner had been registered as 'Miscellaneous'. No Union of the Kanpur Tannery had taken up the case nor any Union of the workers of leather industry had taken up the case.
In the circumstances, I think that the Industrial Employees Union was not entitled to take up the case of Sri Abdul Rashid. For that reason also the petitioner is not entitled to present this petition in this Court. Learned counsel for the petitioner has prayed that he may be allowed to make Abdul Rashid as a petitioner. I do not think at such a late stage that it will be advisable to amend the petition. I do not wish to express any opinion on the merits of the case because that might affect the case of Abdul Rashid who is not before me. Under the circumstances this writ petition is dismissed with costs.