M.N. Shukla, J.
1. In this execution second appeal the question that arises for decision is whether the compromise decree under execution was a nullity and also otherwise inexecutable ?
2. The respondent is the owner of a shop in suit which was let out to the appellant on a monthly rent of Rs. 26. The landlord after determining the tenancy by giving a formal notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act filed a suit for ejectment with the allegation that the shop was constructed after 1951 and therefore the U. P. (Temporary) Control of Rent & Eviction Act, 1947 (U. P. Act No. III of 1947) did not apply to it. The landlord prayed for ejectment of the appellant and claimed arrears of rent and past mesne profits up to the date of the filing of the suit. The appellant denied the allegation that the accommodation in suit was constructed after 1951 and took a definite plea that the shop was quite old and had been constructed long before 1951 and hence U. P. Act No. III of 1947 was applicable to the case and the landlord had no right to file a suit for ejectment unless one of the grounds mentioned in Section 3 of the aforesaid Act existed. The suit was instituted on 6-2-1963 However, the parties came to terms and a compromise was filed in court on 11-12-1964. The suit was decided in terms of the compromise. The compromise arrived at between the parties formed part of the decree which was passed by the trial court in the aforesaid suit. The main terms of the compromise were that the defendant would continue as tenant of the shop at Rs. 30/- per month from 1-1-1965 up to 31-12-1974 i. e. for a period of ten years and after expiry of this term would vacate the shop and in the event of his failing to vacate the same the decree-holder would have a right to take possession by executing the decree. In paragraph 2 of the compromise it was clearly mentioned that except on the ground of non-payment of rent the plaintiff would have no right to take possession before the expiry of the said period. It is a matter of admission that after the passing of the compromise decree the appellant regularly paid rent at Rs. 30/- per month and, in fact, receipts were filed by the appellant before the executing court to prove his assertion.
3. After the expiry of the stipulated period, the landlord commenced execution of the compromise decree. On 1-1-1975 he made an application for execution which was registered as Execution Case No. 3 of 1975. The appellant filed objections under Section 47 C.P.C. and maintained that the compromise decree passed in utter disregard of the mandatory provisions contained in the U. P. Act No. III of 1947 was a nullity, that a new tenancy had been created by the compromise filed in the suit and consequently the decree-holder was not entitled to get possession in execution of the decree. It was also maintained that in view of the U. P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent & Eviction) Act, 1972 (U. P. Act No. 13 of 1972) having been passed, the decree-holder was not entitled to execute the decree unless one of the grounds specified in Section 20 of the new Act was proved to exist. It was further pleaded that in view of the compromise the status of the judgment-debtor was that of a tenant and hence the decree-holder had no right to execute the decree.
4. As against this the contention of the decree-holder has been that the shop in suit was constructed in the year 1962 which allegation appears to have been accepted by the court below and consequently U. P. Act No. III of 1947 did not apply to the same and there was no bar to the filing of the suit for ejectment and release of the accommodation, that the judgment-debtor agreed to get a consent decree passed in the suit, that there was sufficient material on record to prove that U. P. Act No. III of 1947 did not apply to the case and that in these circumstances the judgment-debtor secured an advantage by entering into a compromise inasmuch as it permitted him to remain in possession for ten years. It was further pleaded that the suit was maintainable and that the judgment-debtor was in possession merely on the basis of a consent decree and his contention that a new tenancy had been created was untenable.
5. Both the courts dismissed the objection under Section 47 C. P. C. and the judgment-debtor has preferred this second appeal against the impugned order.
6. Two points arise for determination in the present appeal, firstly whether the decree passed in the suit on the basis of the compromise between the parties is a nullity inasmuch as the compromise incorporated in such decree does riot show that any one of the grounds mentioned in Section 3 of U. P. Act No. III of 1947 for the filing of a suit was available, and secondly, whether as a result of the compromise the judgment-debtor had acquired the status of a tenant and the notice terminating his tenancy given prior to the institution of the suit stood waived and the decree for ejectment had become inexecutable ?
7. The first question has arisen time and again in various cases of ejectment governed by the Rent Control Acts. The basic question which such special Acts have given rise to is as to whether the general rights of the lesser and lessee stand abrogated by the restrictions imposed by the said Acts, and if so, to what extent Cases are not unknown where tenants have been obliged to enter into agreements or compromise whereby they have voluntarily waived the benefit of the Rent Control Act and yet it has been strenuously argued on their behalf that such agreements were extorted from them and had no legal validity, inasmuch it was not open to a party to contract out of statute. The extreme proposition argued in this behalf found favour with a learned single Judge of this Court who ruled that the language of Section 3 of U. P. Act III of 1947 did not prohibit the passing of a decree in terms of a compromise within the meaning of Order 23, Rule 3 C. P. C., even if one of the grounds mentioned in Section 3 was not found in the compromise and further that the protection given to the tenant by Section 3 being for his benefit, could be given up by him. 'The compromise entered into between the parties is not illegal or against the public policy. The decree passed on the basis of the compromise is not against the provisions of Section 3 and is not void. 'See Tej Chaddha v. Smt. Sideshwari : AIR1973All324 . With great respect 1 must point out that the above dictum has been in some measure whittled down by a series of Supreme Court decisions. While it has been affirmed by the Supreme Court that the Rent Control Act does not have the effect of abrogating the provisions of Order 23, Rule 3 C. P. C. and a compromise entered into on fulfilment of certain conditions is permissible under those provisions, but the proposition that a compromise decree may be passed, even if none of the grounds mentioned in Section 3 of the U. P. Act No. III of 1947 is found in the compromise, has not received the approval of the Supreme Court. The law laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court is that the compromise must be founded on one of the grounds mentioned in the provisions of the Rent Control Act on which a suit for ejectment can be filed. In Ferozi Lal Jain v. Man Mal : AIR1970SC794 it was observed that after the Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act (38 of 1952) had come into force, a decree for recovery of possession could be passed by a court only if it was satisfied that one or more of the grounds mentioned in Section 13(1) were established. Without such satisfaction, the court was incompetent to pass a decree for possession. In other words, the jurisdiction of the court to pass a decree for recovery of possession of any premises depended upon its satisfaction that one or more of the grounds mentioned in Section 13(1) had been proved. That principle was elaborately examined in Nagindas Ramdas v. Balpat-ram Iccharam : 2SCR544 in which case that Court had to interpret the provisions of Sections 12 and 13 of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act (57 of 1947) which contained the statutory grounds on which a tenant could be evicted. Sarkaria, J. speaking for the Court observed.
'Construing the provisions of Sections 12, 13 and 28 of the Bombay Rent Act in the light of the public policy which permeates the entire scheme and structure of the Act, there is no escape from the conclusion that the Rent Court under this Act is not competent to pass a decree for possession either in invitum or with the consent of the parties on a ground which is de hors the Act or ultra vires the Act. The existence of one of the statutory grounds mentioned in Sections 12 and 13 is a sine qua non to the exercise of jurisdiction by the Rent Court under those provisions. Even parties cannot by their consent confer such jurisdiction on the Rent Court to do something which, according to the legislative mandate, it could not do'. Commenting on the effect of the provisions of the said Act on Order 23, Rule 3 C. P. C. it was held :
'The mere fact that Order 23, Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure is applicable to the proceedings in a suit under the Bombay Rent Act, does not remove that fetter on the Rent Court or empower it to make a decree for eviction de hors the statute. Even under that provision of the Code, the Court, before ordering that the compromise be recorded, is required to satisfy itself about the lawfulness of the agreement.
Such lawfulness or otherwise of the agreement is to be judged, also on the ground whether the terms of the compromise are consistent with the provisions of the Rent Control Act'.
The final conclusion was thus stated :
'From a conspectus of the cases cited at the bar, the principle that emerges is that if at the time of the passing of the decree, there was some material before the Court, on the basis of which, the Court could be prima facie satisfied, about the existence of a statutory ground for eviction, it will be presumed that the Court was so satisfied and the decree for eviction apparently passed on the basis of a compromise, would be valid. Such material may take the shape either of evidence recorded or produced in the case, or, it may partly or wholly be in the shape of an express or implied admission made in the compromise agreement itself'.
In an earlier decision of the Supreme Court in K. K. Chari v. R. M. Seshadri : 3SCR691 had to interpret the provisions of Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act (18 of 1960) and therein also it was ruled that an order of eviction based on consent of the parties was not necessarily void if the jurisdictional fact viz. the existence of one or more of the conditions mentioned in Section 10, was shown to have existed when the court made the consent order. As regards the mode of satisfaction the Supreme Court held that in suitable cases it was open to the court to act on mere admission of the tenant that one or other of the statutory grounds mentioned in the Act existed. It was observed.
'Satisfaction of the Court, which is no doubt a pre-requisite for the order of eviction, need not be by the manifestation borne out by a judicial finding. If at some stage the Court was called upon to apply its mind to the question and there was sufficient material before it, before the parties invited it to pass an order in terms of their agreement, it is possible to postulate that the Court was satisfied about the grounds on which the order of eviction was based. Before making an order for possession the court is under a duty to satisfy itself as to the truth of the landlord's claim, if there is a dispute between the landlord and tenant. But if the tenant in fact admits that the landlord is entitled to possession on one or other of the 'statutory grounds mentioned in the Act, it is open to the Court to act on that admission and make an order for possession in favour of the landlord without further enquiry'. The ratio of this case was reiterated by the Supreme Court in Roshan Lal v. Madan Lal : 1SCR878 . Untwalia, J. dealing with the point remarked :
'In order to get a decree or order for eviction against a tenant whose tenancy is governed by any Rent Restriction or Eviction Control Act the suitor must take out a case for eviction in accordance with the provisions of the Act, when the suit is contested the issue goes to trial. The Court passes a decree for eviction only if it is satisfied on evidence that a ground for passing such a decree in accordance with the requirement of the Statute has been established. Even when the trial proceeds ex parte, this is so. If, however, parties choose to enter into a compromise due to any reason such as to avoid the risk of protracted litigating expenses, it is open to them to do so. The Court can pass a decree on the basis of the compromise. In such a situation the only thing to be seen is whether the compromise is in violation of the requirement of the law. In other words, parties cannot be permitted to have a tenant's eviction merely by agreement without anything more. The compromise must indicate either on its face or in the background of other materials in the case that the tenant expressly or impliedly is agreeing to suffer a decree for eviction because the landlord, in the circumstances, is entitled to have such a decree under the law.'
In that case it was expressly held that it was too late in the day to contend that the provisions of Order 23, Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure could not apply to eviction suits governed by the special statutes. But all the same the Supreme Court laid great emphasis on the requirement that the court passing the consent decree must be satisfied on a consideration of the material on record that one or other of the statutory condition necessary for eviction was fulfilled. In paragraph 6 of the Reports it was pointed out :
'If the agreement or compromise for the eviction of the tenant is found, on the facts of a particular case, to be in violation of a particular Rent Restriction or Control Act, the Court would refuse to record the compromise as it will not be a lawful agreement. If, on the other hand, the Court is satisfied on consideration of the terms of the compromise, and, if necessary, by considering them in the context of the pleadings and other materials in the case, that the agreement is lawful, as in any other suit, so in an eviction suit, the Court is bound to record the compromise and pass a decree in accordance therewith. Passing a decree for eviction on adjudication of the requisite facts or on their admission in a compromise, either express or implied, is not different'.
8. Thus, the principle which can be culled from the decisions quoted above may be summed up as follows :
'The Special Acts in the shape of Rent Control Acts do not supersede or abrogate the basic provision contained in Order 23, Rule 3 C. P. C. which confers upon the litigating parties a right to enter into a compromise and to have the same recorded through the instrumentality of the court. This right has not been destroyed altogether by imposing restrictions on the eviction of a tenant by enacting Rent Control legislation but the right must be deemed to be subordinate to the paramount principle that no agreement or compromise which is contrary to a Rent Control order or statute or is otherwise unlawful may be implemented by taking recourse to the provisions of Order 23. Rule 3. If it is established on facts that the compromise is not vitiated by any provision of law, the mere enacting of the Rent Control Act would not in any manner detract from the rights of the parties to avail of the benefit conferred by Order 23, Rule 3. Nevertheless, the general law that the assistance of the court will not be available for arriving at a decision which is unlawful must prevail. It is in this context that the series of decisions adverted to earlier have insisted upon laying down that the compromise decree must be passed on one of the statutory conditions on which the eviction of a tenant is permissible.'
9. The instant case is however, different on facts from the cited decisions, though it would be covered by an extension of the dictum laid down therein. It may be incidentally noticed that all the aforesaid decisions arose out of Rent Control Acts, and, therefore, the court was only called upon to consider as to whether the compromise decree was in any manner in violation of the provisions of those statutes. It was for this reason that it was ruled that the compromise must be based on one of the statutory grounds of eviction of tenants under those Acts. In the case on hand we are faced with a situation in which the matter is not governed by any of the Rent Control Acts which were enforced in the State of Uttar Pradesh. Learned counsel for the appellant endeavoured to take some advantage of this anomalous position and contended that since admittedly the compromise incorporated in the consent decree in the present case was not based on any of the requirements either of Section 3 of U. P. Act No. III of 1947 or Section 20 of U. P. Act No. 13 of 1972 the jurisdictional condition was absent and hence the decree was void. As I have already observed, even though the present case may not be literally covered by the dictum laid down in the aforesaid cases, yet they contain sufficient indication of the vital principles of law which should be adopted for determining as to whether a consent decree should be pronounced as valid or void in a particular case. Where the case falls outside the ambit of the Rent Control provisions, it will still have to be seen whether the compromise was hit by any other provision of law so as to vitiate it. If there is no provision of law which makes the compromise invalid, then in that case the existence or non-existence of any of the sta-tutory conditions of the Rent Control Act would be wholly irrelevant. In a case like the one before us it would be entirely for the tenant to establish that the compromise was in any other manner unlawful or invalid. On his failure to do so, the compromise must be accepted as valid. It would be very pertinent in the context to scrutinise as to whether the terms of the compromise run counter to the provisions of Section 23 of the Indian Contract Act. Learned counsel for the appellant has not been able to point out any such legal infirmity in the compromise in question. Thus, the criterion formulated in the above decisions shall apply to the present case also 'mutatis mutandis' and instead of saying that the court must be satisfied that the compromise decree is based on one of the statutory grounds contained in the Rent Control Act it will have to be said that the court must be satisfied that the compromise decree is not based on such terms or conditions as violate any other provisions of law and thereby render it unalwful. It is manifest that on the peculiar findings arrived at in the present case the conclusion cannot be escaped that neither U. P. Act No. III of 1947 nor U. P. Act No. 13 of 1972 applied to it. It is not disputed that the house was built in 1962. U. P. Act No. 13 of 1972 came into force from 15-7-1972 and Section 43 thereof repealed U. P. Act No. III of 1947. Section 2 (2) of U. P. Act No. 13 of 1972 says that 'except as provided in Sub-section (5) of Section 12, Sub-section (1-A) of Section 21, Sub-section (2) of Section 24, Section 24-A, 24-B, 24-C or Sub-section (3) of Section 29, nothing in this Act shall apply to a building during a period of ten years from the date on which its construction is completed.' Evidently the requisite period of ten years in the present case shall be completed some time in 1972. The compromise decree was, however, passed on 11-12-1964. Thus, it is abundantly clear that the instant case would not be governed by any of the Rent Control Acts. Hence, it would be irrelevant to apply the test that the compromise must be based on one of the statutory conditions of the Rent Control Acts. Instead the guideline would be as to whether the compromise is hit by the provisions of any other law so as to make it unlawful. In the absence of any such provisions shown on behalf of the appellant, in my view the compromise decree was perfectly legal and was not void.
10. Another subsidiary objection canvassed on behalf of the appellant was that even though the compromise decree might have been passed earlier, the execution was commenced on 1st January, 1975 when U. P. Act No. 13 of 1972 had come into effect and consequently the decree was no longer capable of execution. This agreement has no substance. There is nothing in U. P. Act No. 13 of 1572 which prohibits the execution of the decree passed prior to the enforcement of the Act. In U. P, Act No. III of 1947 there was provision. In Section 14 which barred the execution of decree for eviction passed before the date of commencement of that Act. No such analogous provision is contained in U. P. Act No. 13 of 1972. This question directly arose for decision in Ram Saroop Raizada v. Dr. Madan Mohan Misra, 1974 All WR (HC) 407. I am in respectful agreement with K. C. Agarwal, J. who held that a decree for ejectment in respect of a post-1951 construction, before the commencement of Act 1972, was executable even if none of the grounds of Section 20 of Act 1972 had been proved in execution proceedings. Thus, there was no bar to the execution of the compromise decree passed in the year 1964.
11. There is, however, yet another ground on which the execution of the decree has been challenged. It was vehemently urged on behalf of the appellant that the effect of the compromise decree was to create a new tenancy in favour of the judgment-debtor and the fact having been conclusively proved that rent was paid by him and accepted by the respondent even after the compromise, the notice determining tenancy stood waived and hence the appellant could not be evicted in execution of that decree. This argument though superficially attractive is, however, fallacious. Sri K. B. Mathur appearing for the appellant laid great stress on the terminology of the compromise and the recurrence of the words 'tenant' and 'rent' therein. It was said that the intention of the parties to maintain the relationship of landlord and tenant between them and to accept rent in future was unmistakably reflected in the document. Judicial decisions have always contained a warning that it is the substance and not the form of the document which would determine its legal character find more often than not the words 'rent' or 'tenant' are loosely used in a wide sense and what is actually implied by the use of the word 'rent' in such context is really either mesne profits or damages or compensation for use and occupation. In Konchada Ramamurty Subudhi v. Gopinath Naik : 2SCR559 the question arose as to whether the compromise deed created a lease or licence and it was held that the fact that the word 'rent' had been used in the compromise deed was not conclusive as in its wider sense rent meant any payment made for the use of the land or building. Precisely the same question has arisen in the present case. While the contention of the appellant is that a new tenancy was created in his favour by the compromise, the argument on behalf of the respondent is that the document of compromise merely created a licence and the appellant's status was only that of a licensee. Learned counsel for the appellant strongly relied on the decision of the Bombay High Court in Ratilal Narbheram v. Walji Nagji, trading in the name of Nagji Ghelabhai : AIR1975Bom218 for the proposition that where a consent decree providing for execution of the decree in case of default in payment of future rent is passed, a new tenancy is created and the decree cannot be executed without taking recourse to the provisions of the Rent Control Order. The facts of the case are, however, entirely distinguishable. In fact, in that decision Dharmadhikari, J. emphasised :--
'There is a distinction between the consent decree whereunder the tenancy is continued and a consent decree for eviction, whereunder an ex-tenant is allowed to retain possession for a specified period by way of concession. In such cases the landlord's right to take possession is postponed and no new tenancy is created, nor the old tenancy is continued'.
The above observations apply with full force to the facts of the instant case. On behalf of the appellant reliance was placed on Associated Hotels of India Ltd. v. R. N. Kapoor : 1SCR368 where the distinction between a licence and a lease was elaborately dealt with but there also it was ruled that it is the substance 'of the agreement that counts and not the form, for otherwise clever drafting can camouflage the real intention of the parties. The ultimate test while summing up the law in paragraph 27 of the Reports was stated in these words :
'The real test is the intention of the parties whether they intended to create a lease or a licence'.
Learned counsel also referred to the cases of Kai Khushroo Bezonjee Capadia v. Bai Jarbai Hirjibhoy Warden and Bhawanji Lakhamshi v. Himat Lal Jamnadas Dani, : 2SCR890 but these cases deal with expiry of the lease and are not relevant. The real test as held by the Supreme Court is the intention of the parties. So far as the agreement of compromise in the present case is concerned the document evidencing compromise leave no room for doubt that the intention of the parties was not to continue the old tenancy or create a new tenancy. It was, in fact, merely a concession granted to the appellant to retain possession for a period of ten years. No doubt, the tenant was granted immunity from eviction within that period if there was no default in payment of rent. However, on the expiry of the said period even the past conduct of the tenant could not save him from, eviction. Howsoever good a paymaster he may be but the spectre of eviction after ten years stared him in the face. Notwithstanding the compromise the landlord had armed himself with a relentless weapon which would throw out the tenant after a certain time and against which there was no protection whatsoever. In my opinion the fact that the plaintiff arrogated to himself the unfettered power to evict the appellant after ten years provides a clue for holding that the compromise decree reduced the appellant to the status of a mere licensee and not a tenant. It was merely a concession afforded to him. This crucial circumstance was postulated in the terms of the compromise decree passed in the case of Ratilal Narbheram (supra). I also get support for my opinion from certain observation made by the Supreme Court in Smt. Nai Bahu v. Lala Ram Narayan : 1SCR723 in which the facts were very much similar. The suit was filed for eviction of the tenant which was resisted but an order was made on July 13, 1960 whereby a decree was passed in terms of the compromise between the parties. The compromise provided that the defendants shall put the plaintiff in vacant and peaceful possession of the entire tenancy premises except a portion of the ground floor only, shown by letters A. B. C. D. E. The possession of this latter portion was to be delivered by 15-7-1965. If the defendants failed to do so, the compromise provided that the plaintiff shall be entitled to execute her decree against the defendants at their costs. After a consideration of the compromise and the whole tenor of the compromise petition it was held that there was no intention to create a lease between the parties. Goswami, J. observed :
'It is the dominant intention of the document which must guide the construction of its contents. In the recitals of the compromise petition in three places it is stated categorically that 'the plaintiff shall be entitled to execute her decree against the defendants.' There was, therefore, no intention to create a lease with regard to any portion of the property.'
It is my considered opinion on a perusal of the document of compromise in the instant case that the dominant intention of the same was not to dreate a lease. The most conspicuous feature of the agreement was to equip the landlord with unconditional power of executing the decree and thereby evicting the appellant after completion of the period to ten years. Thus, the terms of the consent decree in the present case can in no way be interpreted as creating a new tenancy between the decree-holder landlord and the judgment-debtor i. e., the erstwhile tenant. All that the decree-holder did was to allow the judgment-debtor to continue in possession for ten years on payment of certain amount as a concession for entering into a compromise. Therefore, the argument of the appellant that either the old tenancy continued or a new tenancy was created by means of the compromise is devoid of substance.
12. To sum up, in the case before me it can be definitely held that the decree passed on the basis of the compromise was not a nullity. There was material to satisfy the Court that the shop in dispute was constructed in 1962 and hence neither U. P. Act No. III of 1947 nor U. P. Act No. 13 of 1972 applied to the case. From the terms of the agreement it was quite clear that the intention of the landlord was not to treat the tenancy as subsisting or to create a new tenancy. The decree-holder merely granted a concession to the judgment-debtor for continuing in possession for ten years and after the expiry of that period he had a right to execute the decree.
13. In the result this appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. The order passed by the executing court dismissing the objection by the appellant under Section 47 C. P. C. is affirmed.