1. This is a judgment-debtor's appeal arising out of an execution proceeding. It appears that the appellant's father was the lambardar of a village, and he did not pay the full share of the profits to the respondents decree-holders. A suit was brought against his father and a decree was obtained against him, which was both for the amount collected by him and also for the amount remaining uncollected on account of his negligence. Before any property could be attached, the lambardar died. His son was brought on the record as his legal representative and execution was sought, against him by the attachment and sale of the joint family property. Objection was taken on behalf of the judgment-debtor that the decree could not be executed against him because he had received no assets from the deceased debtor, and that the debt was not binding upon him because it was based on the negligence of the deceased. Both the Courts below have allowed the execution and overruled the objection of the judgment-debtor.
2. No doubt there were certain rulings in which it was doubted whether the son of a Hindu lambardar could be liable for the amount of profits which remained uncollected owing to the 1am-bardar's negligence or misconduct. But in the Full Bench case of Bharat Singh v. Tej Singh  40 All 246, Banerji, J., with whose judgment the other learned Judges concurrently laid down that the legal representative of a deceased lambardar is, so far as the assets of the deceased in his hands are concerned, liable to the same extent as the lambardar, that is to say, not only for the money actually collected by the lambardar but also for money uncollected owing to his negligence or misconduct. That is a binding authority for us, and shows that a Hindu son is liable for the amount or profits payable by his deceased father, whether actually collected by him or left uncollected owing to his negligence or misconduct. Such a debt cannot be treated as a debt tainted with illegality or immorality so as to exempt the son from his pious obligation to pay it. This being the view of a Full Bench of this Court, we must accept it as laying down the correct law.
3. In the case mentioned above a decree was passed against the son of the deceased after the lambardar's death. The present case is much stronger, inasmuch as a decree had been passed against the father himself' before' he died. Had there been am attachment of the family property be-; fore his death, no doubt could possibly have arisen. But even if there was no such attachment, we are clearly of opinion that the decretal amount was a debt due from the father, which, in view of the pronouncement of the Full Bench was a debt for the payment of which the joint family property, under the Hindu Law, was liable.
4. This being the position, the decree can undoubtedly be executed as against the son to the extent of the joint, family estate in his hands. Prior to 1908 there was considerable conflict of opinion as to whether when the father dies after the decree and before attachment, the decree can be executed against the joint family property in the hands of the son. That conflict has now been set at rest by the enactment of Section 53, Civil P.C., under which property in the hands of a son or other descendant which is liable under the Hindu law for the payment of the debt of a deceased ancestor, in respect of which a decree has been passed, shall be deemed to be the property of the deceased which has come to the hands of the son as his legal representative. For purposes of execution proceedings the joint family property in the hands of the son must be deemed to be assets received by the son from the deceased father: See Rudra Pratap Singh v. Sharda Mahesh Prasad Singh : AIR1925All471 . The learned advocate for the appellant relies strongly on a single Judge decision of this Court in Bhagwati Saran v. Deo Saran : AIR1928All166 . The learned Judge in that case followed the reasoning of the earlier decisions of this High Court and expressed doubt as to the liability of the son for the payment of debts incurred by the father in his capacity as a lambardar based on his negligence or misconduct. The learned Judge thought that the joint family property in the hands of the son cannot be treated as a part of the private assets of the deceased, because the property comes to the son by right of survivorship and not by inheritance. The attention of the learned Judge was apparently not drawn to the new Section 53, for there is no reference to it in the judgment. We do not think that that case can be taken as an authority for the proposition put forward by the appellant. If it was intended to lay down that in spite of the provision of S, 53 the joint family property in the hands of the son cannot be treated as the assets of the father, then we dissent from that ruling. The appeal is accordingly dismissed with costs.