1. This is an application in revision by six persons against their convictions under Section 323, I.P.C., and 379, I.P.C., and the abetment of Section 379, I.P.C., and fines of Rs. 25 each imposed by the Magistrate which were reduced to fines of Rs. 10 each by the 1st Class Magistrate who heard the appeal. The name of another person, Sarabjit, appears as an applicant for revision, but this Has been entered by a mistake, as Sarabjit was not one of the persons on trial before the Tahsildar or convicted by him. The facts as found are that Anrudh Rai, the complainant, alleged that on the evening of 7th October 1929 he found the three accused 'Ahirs,' Ram Dhayan, Bhirgunath and Ramjanam stealthily cutting his crop, and he caught Ram Dhayan Ahir, and there was a struggle and the other three 'Bhuinhar' accused came up and told the complainant to release Ram Dhayan and the complainant refused and all the accused then beat the complainant and kicked him and rescued Ram Dhayan. The argument in revision is that because the complainant had caught hold of one of the three Ahirs therefore he had legally arrested this Ahir and the action of the other Ahirs and Bhuinhars in assaulting the complainant and releasing this Ahir amounted to an offence under Section 225, I.P.C., a section which is not triable by a Third Class Magistrate. Therefore it is argued that the trial by the Tahsildar was illegal.
2. In support of this argument reference is made to two rulings of the Madras High Court, one being In re Madurai  12 Mad. 54, and the other King-Emperor v. Ayyan  24 Mad. 675. The first ruling was the case of a man who had torn up a promissory note and he was convicted by a Magistrate under Section 426, I.P.C., for mischief. It was held that the offence of tearing up a promissory note being one which falls under Section 477, I.P.C., a case cognizable only by the Court of Session cannot be legally tried by a Magistrate by the mere device of making a charge under Section 426, I.P.C. Similarly, in King-Emperor v. Ayyan  24 Mad. 675, certain persons were charged with giving false evidence in an inquiry before a Magistrate on a charge of murder. They were prosecuted under Section 193, I.P.C., in the Court of a Magistrate of the Second Class but the offence of giving false evidence on a charge of murder falls under Section 194, I.P.C., and is exclusively triable by the Court of Session. There-fore it was held that under Section 530 (P), Criminal P. C, the proceedings of the Magistrate in trying the accused were Void.
3. Now it is to be noted that in both these cases there was a particular offence charged which fell under a particular section of which the trying Magistrate was not entitled to take cognizance. In the present case however the complaint dealt with offences under Sections 323, 426 and 379, I.P.C. All of these were offences of which the Tahsildar, a Third Class Magistrate, was entitled to take cognizance. It is true that the offence of Section 225, I.P.C., might have been also charged in the complaint, but it would have been a separate and distinct offence from the offence of theft and abetment of theft with which the six accused were charged and also a distinct offence from the offence under Section 426, I.P.C. The offence of Section 323, voluntarily causing simple hurt, is no doubt indirectly connected with the offence of Section 225, I.P.C. The section in question is Section 530, Criminal P. C This section lays down that if any Magistrate not being empowered by law tries an accused, his proceedings are void. Now the Tahsildar was entitled to try the accused under the sections named in the complaint. No ruling has been shown to me in which it has been laid down that because another section could also be charged in the complaint therefore the trial of the sections charged in the complaint is void. The case therefore differs from the two rulings in the Madras High Court. Further, if we refer to Section 201, Criminal P.C., we find it laid down that if a complaint has been made in writing to a Magistrate, who is not competent to take cognizance of the case, he shall return the complaint for presentation to the proper Court. This section does not cover the case of a Magistrate who is entitled to take cognizance of some of the charges named in the complaint, but he is not entitled to take cognizance of charge not named in the complaint, but which could possibly be made out from the allegations in the complaint.
4. Further, it appears to me that a charge of Section 225, I.P.C., in the present case would be highly technical and would not naturally arise on the complaint. It was only one of the three Ahirs who were stealing the crop who was caught by the complainant and the complainant was still struggling with that accused when the other accused interfered and rescued him. In these circumstances I do not consider that anything illegal is shown to have occurred which vitiated the trial. Accordingly I refuse this : application in revision.