1. I his appeal arises out of a suit in which the plaintiff claimed a declaration that he was the proprietor of a certain plot of land and for a similar declaration with regard to another plot and for possession of the latter plot. The first paragraph of the plaint is not quite correctly translated. It is there alleged, that the plaintiff's predecessor-in-title for more than fifty years held the land as a charitable gift made by the zemindars. Properly translated, the allegation is that the plaintiff's predecessor held the land under a rent free grant from the zemindars for charitable purposes. It appears that in 1905 the present defendants sued under Section 150 of the Agra Tenancy Act for resumption of possession. The Court of first instance dismissed the suit. On appeal to the Commissioner the suit was dismissed on the ground that it was premature, no notice of the intention to resume having been served. In 1906, similar suit was brought under the same section -which resulted in a decree by the Court of first instance which was confirmed by the Commissioner whose decision was again confirmed by the Board of Revenue. The defence as set forth in the written statement is to a large extent based on the fact that the litigation of 1906 barred the present suit. The lower appellate Court in its judgment says that the question is res judicata. Inonr judgment this is not strictly accurate. The plaintiff's whole claim is based on the ground that what originally was a rent free grant has ripened into proprietary possession and that he is entitled to a declaration of the nature mentioned in Section 158 of the Tenancy Act. Section 167 of the Tenancy Act provides that all suits and applications of the nature specified in the fourth Schedule shall be heard and determined by the Revenue Courts and, except in the way of appeal as thereinafter provided, no Court other than a Revenue Court shall take cognizance of any dispute or matter in respect of which any such suit or application might be brought or made. Suits and applications under Sections 150 to 158 are all included in the fourth Schedule group C. It is argued on behalf of the appellant that a decision in a suit under Section 150 on a question of proprietary title can never be res judicata, in our opinion this proposition is much too wide. A question of proprietary title based on what was originally at least a rent free grant, which admittedly is the fact in the present case, not only can be tried by a Revenue Court, but, as we have already pointed out, is exclusively triable by such Court. It is perfectly clear that the present suit was a suit which was not cognizable by a Civil Court, that the point between the parties had already been heard and determined by the Revenue Court and that, therefore, it was rightly dismissed by the lower Courts. We dismiss the appeal with costs including in this Court fees on the higher scale.