V. Bhargava J.
1. The petitioner, the Swadeshi Cotton Mills Co. Ltd. Kanpur, carries on business of the manufacture and sale of cotton cloth, mainly dhoties and Saries, and has its registered office at Kanpur. The petitioner company alleged that, from August 1952, the stock of cotton cloth manufactured by the applicant company began to accumulate and the sales of the said cloth fell due to adverse market conditions. The applicant company was consequently forced to take a decision to play off its workmen in relays and on 23-10-1952 the management of the company put a notice playing off the workmen who were employed in the manufacture of textile cloth, under standing order No. 16 of the certified standing orders of the company.
During this play off and for some time after it, a large number of workmen applied to the management of the company requesting that the period of play off be converted to one of leave with wages. This request was acceded to by the management. Subsequently the accumulation of stock began to decrease as a result of increasing sales and therefore the management decided against any further play off. During the period of play off, the opposite parties Nos. 5, 7 and 8, the Suti Mill Mazdoor Union, Kanpur, the Kanpur Mazdoor Sabha Kanpur and the Hind Mazdoor Sabha, Kanpur addressed complaints on various dates in respect of this play off directly to the Regional Conciliation OfficerKanpur praying that a Conciliation Board be constituted and conciliation proceedings commended.
The Union approached the Regional Conciliation Officer without approaching the petitioner comany for redress of their alleged grievances. The conciliation proceedings before the Regional Conciliation Officer were infructuous as no amicably settlement could be arrived at. During these conciliation proceedings opposite party No. 6, the Kanpur Mill Mazdoor Union, Kanpur was also impleaded as a party to those proceedings. Subsequently the Government of Uttar Pradesh issued a notified Government Order No. 664 (LC)/XVIII-(LA)/717/2, 708/2 and 761/2(LKR)/1952 dated 25-2-1953 stating that an industrial dispute existed between the petitioner company and its workmen and referring, the following question to the State Industrial Tribunal, Uttar Pradesh Allahabad :
'(1) Whether the play off of workmen resorted to by M/s. Swadeshi Cotton mills Co. Ltd., Kanpur as noted below was wrongful and/or unjustified?
(i) Workmen in shift 'C' from 27-10-52 to 8-11-52.
(ii) Workmen in shift 'B' from 10-11-52 to 22-11-52.
(iii) Workmen in shift 'A' from 24-11-52 to 6-12-52 if so to what relief are these workmen entitled?
(2) Pursuant to this order, referring the industrial dispute to it, the State Industrial Tribunal commenced the hearing of the reference which was numbered as 31 of 1953 and gave an award on 2-6-1953. The crux of the decision given by this Tribunal was that, 'The play offs specified in the issue were unjustified to the extent of 6 days, concerning each shift. The management must pay 50% of the total average earnings which the workmen of each shift may have made during the whole period of play offs. The average shall be worked out on the basis of the earnings of each workman in the relevant month or months. These six days shall for all purposes be treated as days actually worked. Those workmen also, who got their period of play off converted into leave with wages, shall be entitled to the aforesaid reliefs. The payment must be made within one month after our award becomes enforceable according to law.'
The petitioner company alleges that the amount payable to the workmen under this award comes to about Rs. 200,000/-. Against this award the petitioner company preferred an appeal before the Labour Appellate Tribunal of India (Lucknow Bench) which was numbered as appeal No. III-271 of 1953. Before the Labour Appellate Tribunal, the petitioner company moved an application that the implementation of the award given by the Industrial Tribunal be stayed. Upon this application the Labour Appellate Tribunal on 6-10-1953 passed an order directing the payment of half the amount payable under the award within three weeks. The petitioner company found itself unable to pay the money in accordance with this stay order.
On 28-10-1953 the Regional Conciliation Officer issued a notice to the manager of the petitioner company calling upon him to implement the award forthwith and to send the intimation thereof within three days of the receipt of the notice and threatening legal action on failure to do so.
3. Under these circumstances, this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution was moved by the petitioner company on 16-11-1953. The reliefs claimed in the petition are :
'(a) That a writ in the nature of certiorari be issued to the opposite party No. 1 the State Industrial Tribunal Uttar Pradesh quashing the proceedings and the award in reference No. 31 of 1953 and to opposite party No. 3 the Labour Appellate Tribunal of India Lucknow Bench quashing the proceedings in appeal No. III-271 of 1953.
(b) That a writ in the nature of prohibition be Issued to opposite party No. 3 prohibiting it from proceeding further with appeal No. III-271 of 1953.
(c) That a writ in the nature of mandamus be Issued to opposite parties Nos. 2 and 4 the Regional Conciliation Officer Kanpur and the State of Uttar Pradesh directing them not to enforce the award dated 2-6-1953 nor to take any action against the applicant company and its officers for not implementing the award.'
4. The grounds on which these reliefs have been claimed may be briefly summarised as follows:
(1) Because Section 3, U. P. Industrial Disputes Act is ultra vires as it delegates essential legislative power to a non-legislative body and in particular Clauses (c), (d) and (g) of the said Section are ultra vires.
(2) Because the creation of and conferring jurisdiction on the State Industrial Tribunal under Section 3 (c), U. P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 had the result of modifying the jurisdiction of the ordinary Courts of law and therefore Section 3 (c) of the said Act amounts to an invalid delegation of legislative power.
(3) Because Section 3, U. P. Industrial Disputes Act is ultra vires as it results in the infringement of the applicant's right to property by a subjective determination of an executive body.
(4) Because the Government order No. 615 (LL/XVIII-7 (LL)-1951 (hereinafter referred to as the G. O. of 15-3-1951), by which the State Industrial Tribunal was constituted and under which the State Industrial Tribunal gave its award, was illegal and void inasmuch as the said Government order was passed without any satisfaction of the State Government that the condition set out in Section 3, U. P. Industrial Disputes Act call for such an order.
(5) Because the State Industrial Tribunal had no existence in the eye of law on account of the invalidity of the Government order dated 15-3-1951 mentioned above and consequently no appeal lay to the Labour Appellate Tribunal. These were the only grounds which were pressed before us by learned counsel in support of the claim for the reliefs mentioned above.
5. The first three grounds urged on behalf of the petitioner company which relate to the validity of Section 3, U. P. Industrial Disputes Act or its sub-clauses cannot be accepted in view of the recent decisions of this Court. A Full Bench of this Court in Basti Sugar Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of Uttar : (1954)IILLJ279All dealt with the question of the validity of Clause (b) of Section 3, Industrial Disputes Act, and held it to be valid.
The Full Bench took notice of the similarity of Section 3, U. P. Industrial Disputes Act with Section 3, Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers Act and relied on an earlier decision of a Pull Bench in Bhushan Lal v. State of Uttar Pradesh : AIR1952All866 and held that Section 3, U. P. Industrial Disputes Act was valid and did not amount to invalid delegation of legislative power. Clause (c) of Section 3, Industrial Disputes Act came up for consideration before a Division Bench of this Court. in British India Corporation Ltd. v. The Government of Uttar Pradesh 1954 All LJ 576 : (1954)IILLJ275All .
Relying on the two decisions cited above and after considering the grounds urged before it against the validity of Clause (c) of Section 3, U. P. Industrial Disputes Act, the Bench held this provision of law to be valid. These decisions are binding on us. The decisions specifically relate to the validity of Clauses (b) and (c) of Section 3 U. P. Industrial Disputes Act. In the case before us the question is slightly wider inasmuch asthe validity of Clause (d) of Section 3, Industrial Disputes Act has also been challenged.
We, however, consider that the reason which led this Court to hold in those earlier cases that Clauses (b) & (c) of Section 3, U. P. Industrial Disputes Act are valid, apply with equal force to Clause (d) of Section 3, U. P. Industrial Disputes Act and consequently this clause must also be held to be valid.
The view which has been taken in those cases and which we are now taking in this case is further strengthened by the subsequent decision of the Supreme Court in Hari Shankar v. the State of Madhya Pradesh : 1954CriLJ1322 . The Supreme Court in that case repelled the contention that Section 3, Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act 1946 amounted to delegation of legislative power outside the permissible limits. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court reaffirmed their decision in Article 143, Constitution of India arid Delhi Laws Act (1912) etc. In re AIR 1951 SC 332 (E) to the effect that:
'The Legislature cannot delegate its function of laying down legislative policy in respect of a measure and its formulation as a rule of conduct. The Legislature must declare the policy of the law and the legal principles which are to control any given cases and must provide a standard to guide the officials or the body in power to execute the law. The essential legislative function consists in the determination or choice of the legislative policy and of formally enacting that policy into a binding rule of conduct.'
Their Lordships further proceeded to hold, --
'In the present case the Legislature has laid down such a principle and that principle is the maintenance or increase in supply of essential commodities and of securing equitable distribution and availability at fair prices. The principle is clear and offers sufficient guidance to the Central Government in exercising its powers under Section 3. Delegation of the kind mentioned in Section 3 was upheld before the Constitution in a number of decisions of their Lordships of the Privy Council, vide 'Russel' v. Reg, (1882.) 7 AC 829 (F); Hodge v. Reg, (1884) 9 A C 117 (G) and Shannon v. Lower Mainland Dairy Products Board, 1938 AC 708: (AIR 1939 PC 36) (H) and since the coming into force of the Constitution delegation of this character has been upheld in a number of decisions of this Court on principles enunciated by the Majority in AIR 1951 SC 332 (E).
As already pointed out, the preamble and the body of the sections sufficiently formulate the legislative policy and the ambit and character of the Act is such that the details of the policy can only be worked out by delegating them to a subordinate authority within the framework of that policy.' These views expressed by their Lordships when dealing with validity of Section 3, Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act apply with full force when the validity of Section 3, Industrial Disputes Act has to be considered. The preamble and the provisions of the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act 1947 also clearly lay down the principle that the State Government is to exercise its powers only for the purpose and to the extent necessary for securing the public safety or convenience or the maintenance of public order or supplies and services essential to the life of the community or for maintaining employment.
The policy of the law and the legal principles having been laid down they also control & provide a standard for the guidance of the State Government in exercise of its powers to pass orders under the various sub-clauses of Section 3 of the Act. The provision permitting constitution of special Courts for settlement of industrial disputes referred under the conditions mentioned in Section 3, U. P. IndustrialDisputes Act, so as to take away the jurisdiction of ordinary courts of law, cannot be said to offend against the principle of equality before the law laid down in Article 14 of the Constitution as the constitution of such special Courts with specialised knowledge for such a special subject bring about a classification which is clearly related to the object which was sought to be achieved by the enactment of this Act.
These three grounds taken on behalf of the petitioner company cannot, therefore, prevail and must be overruled.
6. The fourth ground urged on behalf of the petitioner company is the principal one on which learned counsel for the parties have addressed us at great length.
It was urged by Mr. Pathak, learned counsel for the petitioner company that, whenever a Subordinate legislative body makes a law and the validity of that law comes into question, it must be shown that that body acted within the ambit of the powers granted to it and complied with all the conditions precedent to the exercise of the power of promulgating subordinate legislation. In support of this proposition we were refered to Craies on Statute Law, fifth edition, by Sir Charles E. Odgers at p. 273 where it has been said,--
'The initial difference between subordinate legislation and statute law lies in the fact that a subordinate law-making body is bound by the terms of its delegated or derived authority and that Courts of Law, as a general rule, will not give effect to the rules, etc., thus made, unless satisfied that all the conditions precedent to the validity of the rules have been fulfilled. The validity of statutes cannot be canvassed by the Courts, the validity of delegated legislation as a general rule can be.' (Note: Apparently this principle was enunciated for England where the validity of statutes parsed by the Parliament cannot be questioned by the Courts at all.)
'The Courts therefore will require due proof that the rules have been made and promulgated in accordance with the statutory authority, unless the statute directs them to be judicially noticed; in the absence of express statutory provision to the contrary, the Courts may inquire whether the rule making power has been exercised in accordance with the provisions of the statute by which it is created, either with respect to the procedure adopted, the form or substance of the regulation, or the sanction, if any, attached to the regulation; and it follows that the Courts may reject as invalid and ultra vires as regulation which fails to comply with the statutory essentials.'
Vom Baur in his book, Federal Administrative Law, Volume II, 1942 Edition at p. 537 has brought out the same principle as applicable in the United States of America in the following words: --
'Just as a statute validly delegating power to an administrative agency must set factual conditions for the application of a declared legislativepolicy, standard, or rule of conduct, so that the delegate of the power must find affirmatively that those conditions exist in a given case before the statutory mandate may be applied to the parties involved. Otherwise instead of retaining a defined and specific character the power delegated would be vagrant and unlimited. .....'
'It is essential that where an administrative agency is exercising delegated legislative power, it should comply substantially with all the statutory requirements in its exercise, and that if its making a finding is a condition precedent to its act in applying a statutory mandate, the fulfilment of that condition should appear in the record of the act. James Hart in his book 'An Introduction to Administrative Law with Selected Cases', second Edition at pp. 318 and 319, dealing with the requisites of a valid delegation has said,--
'The preceding New Deal cases suggest the following requisites of a valid delegation. Congress must:
1. Itself have power in the premises to regulate;
2. definitely limit the delegation by a denning the subject of the delegation; be providing a policy, in the form of a primary standard, or criterion to guide the rule-making authority;
3. require, in the case of contingent legislation, a finding;
4. delegate the power to public officers or authorities not to private persons or goups;
5. itself provide any penal sanction for violation of resulting rules.' Dealing with other requirements he goes on to say;
'It would seem, therefore, that, if what is delegated is discretion or judgment in bringing into operation a statutory rule, a finding is required in order to prevent an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power, as well as a violation of due process. It would seem, further, that otherwise the requirement of a finding in rule-making goes no deeper than the question of ultra vires.
It is also worthy of note that in this connection 'landing' does not seem to refer to conclusions of fact based upon evidence, but only to a recital in terms of a statutory definition of the conditions the existence of which the executive must 'find'. The Courts do not appear to go behind such a recital. In other words, it is a quasi-jurisdictional rather than a jurisdictional requisite. The recital indicates that the judgment has been exercised.'
7. Relying on this principle it was urged by Mr. Pathak that the G.O. of 15-3-1951, which promulgated a piece of subordinate legislation by creating industrial Courts and providing for settlement of industrial disputes and for the procedure to be followed in their settlement, is not valid, because when promulgated that G.O., the State Government did not state in it that in the opinion of the State Government it was necessary or expedient to make that order for securing the public safety or convenience or the maintenance of public order or supplies and services essential to the life of the community or for maintaining employment.
Under Section 3, U. P. Industrial Disputes Act, the power of the State Government to promulgate general or special order under Clauses (a) to (g) of that Section could only be exercised if in the opinion of the Provincial Government, it became necessary or expedient so to do for one or more of the purposes mentioned above, viz. securing the public safety or convenience or the maintenance of public order or supplies and services essential to the life of the community or for maintaining employment.
That power of the State Government to pass orders under various clauses of Section3 is subject to a condition precedent, that such an opinion should be formed by the State Government has not been disputed on behalf of the opposite parties by the learned Advocate-General. The principle that a subordinate legislation promulgated by an executive body without complying with the condition precendent laid down in the Statute would not be valid, was supported by Mr. Pathak on the basis of a number of decisions of the Amreican Courts and the Courts in India. In Mahler v. Eby, (1923) 68 Law Ed 549 at p. 556 (I) it was held:
'It is essential that where an executive in exercising legislative power he should substantially comply with all the statutory requirements in itsexercise, and that, if his making a finding is a condition precedent to this act, the fulfillment of that condition should appear in the record of the act.'
In that case reliance was placed on an earlierdecision in Wichita Railroad & Light Co. v. PublicUtilities Commission, (1922) 67 Law Ed 124 (J)where it was said:
'In creating such an administrative agency the Legislature to prevent its being a pure delegation of legislative power must enjoin upon it a certain course of procedure and certain rules of decision in the performance of its function. It is a wholesome and necessary principle that such an agency must pursue the procedure and rules enjoined and show a substantial compliance therewith to give a validity to its action. When, therefore, such an administrative agency is required as a condition precedent to an order to make a finding of facts, the validity of the order must rest upon the needed finding. If it is lacking, the order is ineffective. 'It is pressed on us that the lack of an express finding may be supplied by implication and by reference to the averments of the petition invoking the action of the commission. We cannot agree to this.'
It was further decided that.
'The character of the defect is such that we cannot relieve ourselves from its consideration. The Warrant lacks the finding required by the statute, and such a fundamental, defect we should notice. It goes to the existence of the power on which the proceeding rests.'
In Panama Refining Co. v. A. D. Ryan, (1934) 79 Law Ed 446 (K) it was held:
'There is another objection to the validity of the prohibition laid down by the Executive Order under Section 9. The Executive Order contains no finding, no statement of the grounds of the President's action in enacting the prohibition. Both Section 9(c) and the executive order are in notable contrast with historic practice by which declarations of policy are made by the Congress and delegations are within the framework of that policy and have relation to facts and conditions to be found and stated by the President in the appropriate exercise of the delegated authority.'
It was further held that:
'If the citizen is to be punished for the crime of violating of a legislative order of an executive officer, or of a board or commission, due process of law requires that it shall appear that the order is within the authority of the officer, board or commission and if that authority depends on determinations of facts, those determinations must be shown.'
The principle which had been enunciated in the earlier case reported in (1923) 68 Law Ed. 549(1), mentioned above was reiterated and followed.
8. In the case before us, it was urged by Mr. Pathak that not only is there an omission in the G.O. dated 15-3-1951 about opinion having been formed by the State Government that it was necessary to make an order for one of the purposes mentioned in Section 3, U. P. Industrial Disputes Act but even on the record of this writ, case before us no material has been supplied on behalf of the State Government to show that any such opinion was ever formed. In fact, no such averment has been made in any application or affidavit on behalf of the State.
Mr. Pathak's submission was that, even in an averment had been made during the proceedings in this case and an attempt had been made by the State to satisfy this Court the Government hadformed the opinion required by Section 3, U. P. Industrial Disputes Act, that could not be taken notice of by this Court as what is required is that the averment of that opinion must appear on the face of the order the passing of which is conditional on the forming of the opinion. It appears to us that it is not necessary in this case to give any decision on this question.
The case before us is one where the G. O. of 15-3-1951 did not contain any recital that the State Government had formed an opinion that it was necessary to make the order for one of the purposes mentioned in Section 3 and, in the record before us also, no such assertion was put forward and no evidence was adduced to establish that such an opinion had been formed before that Government order was promulgated.
What we have to consider is the effect of a total absence of material on the question that an opinion had been formed by the State Government as required Section 3, Industrial Disputes Act. In this connection Mr. Pathak drew our attention to various decisions of the Courts in India in which, according to him, it was held that if the satisfaction of the Government on a particular matter is a condition precedent to the making of a valid order, such satisfaction must appear on the fact of the order, and, even when it does so appear, it is open to the person challenging the validity of the order to show that there was in fact no satisfaction at all, though it is not open to the Courts to investigate the question whether the satisfaction was justified or probable and on what material it was based.
In Emperor v. Sibnath Banerjee ATR 1943 PC 75 (L), the Federal Court had to consider the validity of certain orders passed under the rules framed under the Defence of India Act, under which a person could be detain if, in the opinion of the Government it was necessary to do so, to prevent that person from acting prejudicially to the defence of India, the public safety, the maintenance of public order or the efficient prosecution of the war. The orders impugned contained a recitation that such an opinion had been formed.
In considering the validity of the orders, reliance was placed on Illus. (e) to Section 114, Indian Evidence Act which is to the effect that there is a presumption that official acts have been regularly performed. Their Lordships held that before any such presumption can arise, it must be shown that the orders are on the face of them regular, and conform to the provisions of the rule under which they purport to have been made.
The presumption was held to be rebuttable, so that it was open to the person challenging the orders to show that there had been actually no satisfaction that they were acting prejudicially to the defence of British India or the public safety or the maintenance of public order, or the efficient prosecution of the war. In the case of some of the persons the Court found that there had been no satisfaction recited in the order and the petitions of those persons were allowed. In Rex v. Durga Das 1943 All LJ 491: (AIR 1949 All 148) (FB) (M). Malik C. J. delivering the judgment, with which the other members of the Full Bench agreed, held:
'It is admitted that, if the detenu can prove that the detaining authority was in fact not satisfied, the order of detention would be illegal as the basis of the power of detention is the satisfaction of the detaining authority. In other words, the power to issue a valid order depends upon the fulfillment of a condition. That being so, the Courts have a right to see whether the condition has been fulfilled, i.e. whether the detaining authority was in fact satisfied. The burden of proving not an objective fact but a subjective state of mind of the detaining authority is necessarily heavy but it appears that it is not an impossible burden.'
In Amrita Lal Chatterjee v. The State : AIR1950Cal543 Harries C. J. with whom Mitter J. concurred held:
'It appears to me that before an order can come within Section 21(1) (a), the authority's satisfaction that the person against whom the order is made is doing or is about to do or is likely to do an act must be stated. Without a recital of that satisfaction the order is not in my view in accordance with the Act.'
It was held that the person disobeying such an order could not be convicted for doing so. This view was followed by a learned single Judge of the Calcutta High Court in Khudi Prosad v. State of West Bengal, : AIR1952Cal798 . A similar view was taken by the Madras High Court in A. K. Gopalan v. District Magistrate, Malabar AIR 1949 Mad 596 (P) and in M.R.S. Mani v. District Magistrate Mathurai : AIR1950Mad162 .
9. The cases show that the courts in India have fully accepted the principle that, if the making of an order by an executive authority is permitted by a statute subject to a condition the order has the force of law only if the condition precedent to the making of that order has been complied with by the authority making it. In some cases it has been held that the compliance with the condition precedent must appear on the face of the order itself and in its absence the order must be held to be invalid.
As we have said earlier, it is not necessary for us to express any opinion on this latter proposition as in this case not only is there no expression of the opinion formed by the State Government in regard to the matters mentioned in Section 3, U. P. Industrial Disputes Act in the order but there is not even an assertion and no material has been placed before us to show that such an opinion had ever been formed before or at the time when the G.O. of 15-3-1951 was promulgated by the Government.
10. The learned Advocate-General in view of the circumstance that the G.O. of 15-3-1951 did not recite that the Government had formed an opinion that it was necessary to pass that order for one of the purposes mentioned in C. 3, U. P. Industrial Disputes Act and in view of the fact that no such assertion had been made during the proceedings in this case in this court, fell back upon an argument that the Court should presume that such an opinion had been formed by the State Government.
The learned Advocate-General relied on the provisions of Section 114, Indian Evidence Act for the proposition that such a presumption should be raised by the court. He took us through the provisions of the Government order of 15-3-1951 in an attempt to show that the scheme promulgated in that G.O. could only be for one or more of the purposes mentioned in Section 3, Industrial Disputes Act.
We have, however, not been convinced that this is correct. Section 3, U. P. Industrial Disputes Act permits the government to pass general or special orders to constitute industrial Courts and to provide for settlement of industrial disputes only if it is of the opinion that it is necessary or expedient to do so for securing public safety or supplies and services essential to the life of the community or for maintaining employment and not when it was not necessary orexpedient to do so for one or more of these purposes, even though the preamble to the Act indicates that it was enacted because it was considered necessary to provide for preventing strikes and lock-outs and for the settlement of industrial disputes and 'other incidental matters. This makes it clear that, though one of the principal purposes of the Act was to provide for the settlement of industrial disputes the Legislature thought it fit to confer power on the State Government to make provision by general or special orders only for settlement of that limited class of industrial disputes, the settlement of which was considered by the State Government to be necessary on expedient for one of the purposes mentioned in Section 3.
The G.O. of 15-3-1951 would, therefore, be within the scope of Section 3 and in conformity with it only if it made provision for settlement of industrial disputes and appointment of industrial Courts, in the circumstances in which the Government considered it necessary or experiment to make the provision for one of the purposes mentioned in Section 3. A reading of that G.O. as a whole does not indicate that the scheme brought into effect by the Government in that order was limited to only that class of industrial disputes.
The provisions of that order can be applied for the purpose of settlement of all kinds of industrial disputes irrespective of the question whether the settlement is or is not necessary for one of the purposes mentioned in Section 3. The contents and language of that order do not, therefore, indicate that that order was limited in its purposes to those mentioned in Section 3 and consequently it is not possible to hold that under the general provision made under Section 114, Indian Evidence Act a presumption can be drawn that, before that order was passed, the State Government had formed an opinion about the necessity or expediency of making it for one of the purposes mentioned in Section 3.
The learned Advocate-General, when urging that a presumption should be taken under Section 114, Indian Evidence Act, relied on a Pull Bench decision of this Court in Debi Prasad v. Empero AIR 1947 All 191 (R). In that case the U. P. Government had passed an order, known as the U. P. Cotton Cloth and Yarn Control Order 1943, in exercise of the powers conferred by Sub-rule (2) of Rule 81 of the rules framed under Section 2, Defence of India Act.
Under Rule 119 of the Rules made, an authority passing such an order was required to publish notice of such an order in such manner as may, in the opinion of such authority, be best adapted for informing parties whom the order concerns. The order was published in the U. P. Gazette but there was nothing to show that the authority which had passed the order had itself arrived at the opinion that the manner of publication was best adapted for informing the persons whom the order concerned.
The Full Bench held that, in view of Illus. (e) of Section 114, Indian Evidence Act, a presumption could be drawn that, when the order was published in the official Gazette, the authority directing the publication was alive to the provisions of Rule 119 and must have exercised its mind and must have directed publication in the Official Gazette on the opinion that that was the method best adapted for informing all persons concerned.
It was urged by the learned Advocate-General that, since it was held in that case that a presumption could be drawn under Illus. (e) to Section 114, Indian Evidence Act, a similar presumption should be drawn in the present case that, before the G. O. of 15-3-1951 was passed and notified by the State Government, the State Government musthave formed the opinion that it was necessary or expedient to pass that order for one of the purposes mentioned in Section 3. There is, however, one vital difference between the two cases which must not be lost sight of. In that case, the Pull Bench was not considering the validity of the order which had been passed in exercise of the powers under Rule 81 Sub-rule (2) of the defence of India Rules.
The question before the Full Bench related to the manner of publication of that order, so that it was a Question not of the validity of the order, but a question relating to the procedure by which the notice of that order had to be given to the persons concerned. Illustration (e) to Section 114, Indian Evidence Act permits a presumption to be drawn in matters of procedure. That provision in our opinion, does not permit a presumption to be drawn where the question does not relate to the manner of doing an official act but goes to the root of the validity of that order.
This view of ours finds support from a decision of a Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court in Walvekar v. Emperor, S3 Cal 718: (AIR 1926 Cal 966) (S) where the question that arose related to the validity of a warrant issued under Section 46, Calcutta Police Act (Bengal Act 4 of 1863).
Section 46, Calcutta Police Act authorised the issue of a warrant when after certain preliminaries had been complied with the issuing officer had reason to believe that any house, room or place used as a common gaming house. In that particular case, the Officer issuing the Warrant had merely stated that it had appeared to him that there was cause, to suspect that the premises were being used and kept as and for a common gaming house.
The learned Magistrate who decided that caseat the trial stage felt that Section 114, Illus. (e), Indian Evidence Act covered that case and that it would be presumed that the act necessary before issue of the warrant had been properly performed.
Ghosh J. who delivered the first judgment, repelled this contention and held:
'This argument as I understand, it, has been employed for the purpose of doing away with the necessity for proof of compliance of the preliminaries referred to above, namely, information on oath and of due 'enquiry' before issue of warrant. Having regard, however, to what I have already held about the validity of the warrant, Section 114, Illus. (e), Indian Evidence Act cannot in my opinion be relied upon in this case. The meaning of that provision is that, if an official act is proved to have been done, it will be presumed to have been regularly done.'
Chotzner, J. concurred in this view expressed by Ghosh J. That principle applied to the case before us would mean that, if it had been shown that the State Government had formed an opinion that it was necessary to make provisions to the effect covered by the G.O. of 15-3-1951 for one or more of the purposes mentioned in Section 3, it could be presumed that that opinion had been arrived at properly and regularly.
Illustration (e) to Section 114, Indian Evidence Act does not justify any presumption being raised that an opinion, which it is not said was formed, had really been formed and that it had beenformed properly and after going through regular procedure. The preliminary requisite of the State Government arriving at an opinion that it is necessary to make an order for one of the purposes mentioned in Section 3 goes to the root of the jurisdiction of the State Government to make the order.
It is only when such a subjective opinion has been formed that the State Government becomesvested with the power to make the order. The mere exercise of the power which becomes vested only if a certain condition is satisfied cannot raise a presumption that that preliminary condition must have been satisfied before the power was exercised. It has not even been shown to us that, as a general practice, whenever any general order has to be passed by the Government of the State of Uttar Pradesh that Government has been exercising the power without expressing in the order itself that that subjective determination had already been arrived at by the Government.
In fact the position is just the reverse. From the material that has been brought to our notice regarding the power of making orders by the Government of Uttar Pradesh it would appear that the general practice of the State Government has been to recite in the order itself that fact that it had formed its subjective opinion on matters which were conditions precedent to the passing of the orders and it is only in a few rare cases that the order itself did not contain a recital that such a subjective opinion had been formed.
When there are only a few cases in which there is no recital, the absence of the recital is an indication that the subjective opinion had not been formed, rather than a fact raising a presumption that the subjective opinion must have been formed. In the connection reliance was placed on behalf of the State on a recent decision of the Supreme Court in the State of Bombay v. Bhanji Munji : 1SCR777 . That case related to an order passed for requisitioning certain premises under the Bombay Land Requisition Act, 1948 (Bombay Act 33 of 1948).
The order impugned merely stated that on enquiry it had been found that the premises had become vacant and therefore in exercise of the powers conferred by Clause (9) of Sub-section(4) of Section 6, Bombay Land Requisition Act, 1948 the Government of Bombay was pleased to requisition the said premises etc.
Under Sub-section (1) of Section 5 of the Bombay Act, the State Government was permitted by an order in writing to requisition any land for any purpose, if in the opinion of the State Government it was necessary or expedient so to do. After the requisitioning order mentioned above had been passed, the Government Issued another notification in continuation of it laying down that the Government of Bombay was pleased to declare that the premises mentioned in that 'earlier' order were requisitioned for a public purpose, namely for use by a person having no housing accommodation on the date of the order cited above.
It was held by the Supreme Court that the Bombay Government was entitled to satisfy the Court that the premises had been requisitioned for a public purpose, even though this fact had not been mentioned in the order requisitioning the premises, and the subsequent declaratory order issued by the Government was accepted as proof of that fact. This case, in our opinion, does not support the proposition put forward on behalf of the State.
On the other hand, it seems to negative the submission of the learned Advocate-General that a presumption of the type relied on by him must be raised in the present case by this Court. The first point to be noticed is that under Sub-section(1) of Section 5 of the Bombay Act', the question whether the land was needed for a public purpose was not to be a part of the subjective opinion of the State Government.
Under that provision of law, the opinion of the State Government had to be formed only about the necessity or expediency of requisitioningthe land. That opinion having been formed the land could be requisitioned for a public purpose. The question whether the land was requisitioned for a public purpose was therefore a matter which could be canvassed in Courts and was subject to the scrutiny of the Courts. If the statute lays down that any fact, which is relied upon, is to be a part of the subjective opinion to be formed by an executive authority the correctness of the opinion formed cannot be gone into by the Courts.
But where after an opinion on one matter has been formed, the statute further says, that the act to be done by the executive authority must be for a particular purpose the existence of that purpose can be investigated by the Courts. In that case, therefore, the question whether the land was requisitioned for a public purpose was a matter which was subject to judicial scrutiny.
In the case before us the question whether the order was passed for one of the purposes mentioned in Section 3 was to be settled by the subjective opinion of the State Government and its correctness cannot therefore be scrutinised by the Courts. The question of the land being requisitioned for a public purpose in that case being subject to judicial scrutiny the Court could be satisfied on that point by evidence adduced before the Court, and the subsequent order passed by the Government of Bombay was accepted as sufficient proof.
Where the Court cannot go into the question, whether the subjective opinion formed by the Government is or not correct, the only point that the Courts can go into is whether such a subjective opinion had at all been formed and the views expressed by the learned Judges of the Supreme Court do not indicate such a point can be proved by evidence in Court. In any case, even if we hold that it can be proved by evidence in Court, the case before us is one where as we have said earlier no material at all has been provided on behalf of the opposite parties to show that the Government had in fact formed an opinion that the making of the G.O, of 15-3-1951 was necessary or expedient for one of the purposes mentioned in Section 3.
Even in that case, the Supreme Court had placed the burden on the Government of Bombay to show that the land had been requisitioned for a public purpose. In the present case also, therefore, the burden of proving that the State Government had formed an opinion that it was necessary to make the Government order of 15-3-1951 for one of the purposes mentioned in Section 3 would be on the State Government. This clearly means that there is no presumption at all in favour of the State Government that such a subjective opinion had been formed.
We have already had occasion to mention the decisions of various Courts in India, from which it appears that if on the face of the order itself it appears that the subjective opinion required to be formed by law was formed, there is a presumption that the order was valid and regular, and the burden lay on the party challenging the order to show that the subjective opinion had not been formed.
In a case where it does not appear on the face of the order that the opinion had been formed, the burden would be on the person relying on the validity of the order to show that the subjective opinion, which had to be formed as a condition precedent to the exercise of the power of making the order, had really been formed before the order was made. The Government order of 15-3-1951 is, in these circumstances, an order which was not passed after complying with the condition precedent laid down under Section 3, Industrial Disputes Act and consequently we must hold that the order had no legal force and was not binding as a piece of subordinate legislation on the persons affected by it.
The learned Advocate-General in support of his argument, that a presumption be taken that the required subjective opinion had been formed by the State Government also relied upon the provisions of Sub-section(3) of Section 21, U. P. Industrial Disputes Act which is as follows:
When any order purports to have been made and signed by any authority in exercise of any power conferred by or under this Act or the said Ordinances, a Court shall, within the meaning of Indian Evidence Act, 1872 presume that such order was so made by that authority'. The learned Advocate-General's submission was that the Government order of 15-3-1951 purports to have been made by the Government of U. P. in exercise of the powers conferred by Section 3, and it should therefore be presumed, under Sub-section(3) of Section 21, that, that order had been passed in conformity with the requirements of Section 3. It appears, to us that the fallacy in this argument is brought out if the ingredients of Section 3 are separately enumerated. Under Section 3 the questions that can arise are:
1. Whether the order was passed by the appropriate authority?
2. Whether the order was passed in exercise of the power conferred by Section 3? and
3. Whether the order was passed by the appropriate authority in exercise of that power alter forming the subjective opinion that it was necessary or expedient to pass the order for one or more of the purposes mentioned in Section 3?
Sub-section (3) of Section 21 appears to cover the first two questions mentioned above. Under this provision of law the Court is bound to presume that the order was passed by that very authority which purported to pass the order under Section 3. The Court must also presume that that authority passed the order in exercise of that very power under which the order purports to have been passed. It does not, however, say that there should be any presumption that the order was made after satisfying the condition precedent required by Section 3 that the subjective opinion by the State Government that it was necessary or expedient to do so for one of the purposes mentioned in that section, was formed before passing the order.
The words 'so made' in Sub-section(3) of Section 21 have to be interpreted by referring back to the words used earlier in the same sub-section. In the earlier part of the sub-section, the words used are 'when any order purports to have been made and signed by any authority in exercise of any power conferred by or under this Act 'and they govern the words 'so made' used later so that the power conferred by or under this Act, under which this order purported to be made, must be presumed to be the power actually exercised.
There is no presumption under this provision of law that the exercise of the power was necessarily after complying with the condition precedent to the exercise of the power laid down in the Act. In support of the proposition that a presumption should be taken under Sub-section(3) of Section 21, the learned Advocate-General referred us to a decision of the Privy Council in Emperor v. Sibnath Banerji .
That decision was given by the Privy Council in an appeal which was filed against a judgment of the Federal Court in the case of which case has already been mentioned by us above. It is not necessary to discuss views expressed by their Lordships of the Privy Council, because the question of making a presumption under Section 16(2), Defence of India Act, which a one in that case, related to the identity of the authority which had passed the order impugned and not to the question whether that authority when passing the order had or had not complied with the condition precedent to the making of the order.
Sub-section (3) of Section 21 also does not therefore in any way support the proposition urged by the learned Advocate-General, and our conclusion expressed above, that the G.O. of 15-3-1951 did not have the force of law, remains unaltered.
11. This brings us to the last ground urged by Mr. Pathak on behalf of the petitioner company. The G.O. of 15-3-1951 having no legal validity, his submission that the Industrial Tribunal constituted by another notification of that very date, in accordance with the provision of this G.O. cannot be held to be an Industrial Court constituted under the provisions of the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act, must be accepted.
Further even G. O. No. 671 (LL/XVIII-7 (LL)-51 by which Sri Radha Mohan, I. A. S. was appointed as the President of the Industrial Tribunal and Sarvari Bijaipal and Sheobaran Singh were appointed as members of the Industrial Tribunal must be held to be an order without any legal force, inasmuch as that order also purported to be made in exercise of power conferred by Section 3, U. P. Industrial Disputes Act without reciting in the order that the State Government had formed the opinion that it was necessary or expedient to make that order for one or more of the purposes mentioned in Section 3 and in the proceedings before us, no assertion was made to the effect and no material was supplied from which it could be inferred that such an opinion had been formed.
This is another ground why we must accept Mr. Pathak's contention that there was no Industrial Tribunal validly constituted having powers to act under law as an Industrial Court under Section 3, U. P., Industrial Disputes Act.
12. The next question that arises is whether in view of our findings in respect of the two Government orders of 15-3-1951, mentioned above the petitioner-company is entitled to the reliefs claimed by it. The relief actually claimed arises out of the reference which was made to the Industrial Tribunal by the Government of Uttar Pradesh by its order dated 25-2-1953, and we have to consider the effect of that order. It is necessary to consider the wordings of that order in detail and hence it is reproduced below: --
'Whereas an Industrial Dispute in respect of the matters hereinafter specified exists between the concern known as M/s Swadeshi Cotton Mills Co. Ltd., Kanpur and its workmen and whereas in the opinion of the Governor it is necessary so to do for the maintenance of public order, the maintenance of supplies or services essential to the life of the community and for maintaining employment;
Now, therefore in exercise of the powers conferred by Sections3, 4, and 8, U. P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (U. P. Act No. 28 of 1947), and in pursuance of the provisions of Clause 10 of G.O. 615(LL)/51 dated 15-3-1951 the Governor is pleased to refer the said dispute to the Industrial Tribunal U. P. Allahabad constituted by G.O. No. 671 (LL)/XVIII-7(LL)/51, dated 15-3-1951 which shall adjudicate on the following issues in accordance with the provisions of the aforesaid G.O. No, 615 (LD/XVIII-7(LL)/51 dated 15-3-1951, and also to direct, with reference to Section 19 of the said Act, that notice of this order be given by publication in the official Gazette.
MATTTER OF DISPUTE.
'Whether the play off of workmen resorted toby M/s Swedeshi Cotton Mills Co., Ltd., Kanpuras noted below was wrongful and/or unjustified?
i. Workmen in shift 'C' from 27-10-52 to 8-11-52
ii. Workmen in shift 'B' from 10-11-52 to 22-11-52
iii. Workmen in shift 'A' from 24-1.1-52 to 0-12-52
If so, to what relief are these workmen entitled.' This order contains the recitation that in the opinion of the Governor it was necessary to make that order for the maintenance of public order, the maintenance of supplies and services essential to the life of community and for mainstaining employment. This would show that, when this order under Section 3, Industrial Disputes Act was passed, the State Government had formed its subjective opinion that it was necessary to pass it for the purposes mentioned in Section 3, Industrial Disputes Act. The objection which was raised in respect of the two Government orders of 15-3-1951 does not apply to this order.
The petitioner-company has not contended or shown that the recitation that the Governor had formed such opinion is incorrect or that in fact the Governor had formed no such opinion at all. This order is, therefore, a valid order and binding on the persons concerned under Section 3, U. P. Industrial Disputes Act. When referring the dispute to the Industrial Tribunal the order recites that the Governor was making the order in exercise of the powers conferred by Sections3, 4, and 8, U. P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
13. The reference of the dispute to the Industrial Tribunal was therefore in exercise of those powers. The order also says that it was being made in pursuance of the provisions of the G.O dated 15-3-1951. Whether the reference could be made independently of that G.O. under Section 3, U. P. Industrial Disputes Act, and since it purports to be a reference under this Section it must be held to be a reference under that section. The order goes on to lay down that the dispute is referred to the Industrial Tribunal U. P. Allahabad constituted by the second G.O. of 15-3-1951 mentioned above which has been held by us not to have any legal force.
The question is whether the fact, that the G.O. had no legal force and there did not already exist an Industrial Tribunal exercising jurisdiction of a Industrial Court under Section 3, Industrial Disputes Act, makes this reference incompetent. In our opinion, this order should be read as a self-contained order making provision for settlement of the particular disputes to which the order related
That dispute according to this order, was referred to the Industrial Tribunal constituted by the second G.O. of 15-3-1951. The second G.O. of 15-3-1951 had no legal force but it did in fact exist. It had been published in the Official Gazette and consequently the Courts can presume that it had been brought to the' notice of all persons concerned in the State of Uttar Pradesh. The reference to that G. O. in his order makes that G. O. a part of this order.
The State Government could easily have said in this order of 25-2-1953 itself that the dispute was being referred to an Industrial Tribunal consisting of Sri Radha Mohan IAS as President and Sarvari Bijaipal Singh and Sheobaran Singh as members. If instead of saying so, the State Government made a reference to an earlier order passed and published by it, even though that order hadno legal force behind it, It must be held that for the purpose of the decision of this particular industrial dispute that Tribunal was constituted by this order of 25-2-1953.
When this order of 25-2-1953 was being passed by the State Government under Section 3, U. P. Industrial Disputes Act after complying with the condition precendent, it was not necessary that this order should contain within itself all the necessary ingredients, provided the remaining ingredients were included in it by referring to other previous orders in which those ingredients had been laid down, and those orders had also been brought to the notice of the persons concerned by proper publication in the same manner in which this order of 25-2-1953 had to be published.
It is true that normally when an order is passed, the whole of the order must be contained in one single document. But if there happens to be an occasion where parts of the ingredients of that order have already been notified it would be wrong to hold that the order becomes invalid because these parts are not reproduced in the subsequent order and the persons concerned are informed of the parts of the order by making a reference to the earlier notification.
It may also be pointed out that under Section 3, U. P. Industrial Disputes Act, the provisions in Clause (d) for referring any industrial disputes for conciliation or adjudication is not necessarily governed by and is not subject to the appointment of an Industrial Court under Clause (c) of that section. This power for referring the industrial dispute for conciliation and adjudication can be exercised even without appointing Industrial Courts under Clause (e).
Consequently when this order referring the dispute was made on 25-2-1953 it was not very material that no validly constituted Industrial Courts or Tribunal had yet come into existence. The effect of the order of 25-2-1953 was that the dispute was referred to a body which was described as an Industrial Tribunal is that order and parties were informed of the constitution of that Industrial Tribunal by being referred to the second G.O. of 15-3-1951. This, therefore, has to be considered as a case where an ad hoc Industrial Tribunal was constituted by the order of 15-3-1951 for the settlement of the particular dispute referred by that order.
The manner in which this dispute, referred to the Industrial Tribunal had to be adjudicated was also laid down in that order of 25-2-1952. It laid down that the issue was to be adjudicated in accordance with the provisions of the first G.O. of 15-3-1951 mentioned above. Once again the fact that the G.O. of 15-3-1951 had no legal force is immaterial. The order of 25-2-1953 is as we have said above a contained order and it makes provisions for the manner of adjudication of the issue referred.
In making that provisions instead of reproducing the entire procedure to be adopted by the Industrial Tribunal reference has been made to the G.O. of 15-3-1951 which had already been notified. That G.O. of 15-3-1951 by itself did not bind the parties to the dispute but the procedure laid down in it for settlement of the industrial disputes became binding on the parties by the G.O. of 25-2-1953 because this G.O. which was valid and had full legal force, itself laid down that the issue was to be adjudicated in accordance with the provisions of that G.O. of 15-3-1951.
This G.O. in laying down the manner in which the dispute had to be decided by the Industrial Tribunal constituted under that another G.O. permitted the Tribunal to constitute Benches. At the discretion of the President, a matter referredto the Tribunal could be heard by a member of the Tribunal sitting alone. The tribunal could also at the discretion of the President constitute a Bench to hear and determine any matter referred to it. In the G.O. of 15-3-1951, there were provisions laying down the manner in which the tribunal was to deal with an Industrial dispute referred to it. When this particular dispute was referred by the G.O. of 25-2-1953 the procedure which could be adopted by a Tribunal constituted under the G.O. of 15-3-1951 had also be adopted by the ad hoc Tribunal constituted for the settlement of this dispute by the G.O. of 25-2-1953.
In this particular case, it appears that the award was given by two members of the Industrial Tribunal viz. the Bench consisting of Sarvari Bijaipal Singh and Sheobaran Singh. The award given by them has been given by adopting the procedure which was laid down in the G.O. of 15-3-1951, and this was precisely in accordance with the direction given to the tribunal in the G.O. of 25-2-1953.
It cannot therefore be held that the award in this particular case is void and has no legal force in the eye of law. The award is valid in spite of the fact that the two G.Os. of 15-3-1951 had no legal force. The petitioner company is not entitled to any of the reliefs claimed by it. The award cannot be vacated as it is a valid award. The appeal before the Labour Tribunal of India is a competent appeal.
The proceedings before that Tribunal cannot be quashed and no writ of prohibition can issue restraining the tribunal from hearing the appeal. Further no writ of Mandamus can be issued to the Regional Conciliation Officer, Kanpur for the State of Uttar Pradesh restraining them from enforcing that valid award of June 1953 or from taking action against the petitioner company and, its officers for not implementing the: award.
14. The result is that the petition fails and isdismissed with costs to the contesting oppositeparties 2 and 4 whose costs are jointly assessed byus at Rs. 500/-.