1. This is an application in revision against an order superseding an arbitration and directing the trial of the suit to proceed in the ordinary course. It is based upon a finding that there had been misconduct on the part of the arbitrator and so far complies with the provisions of paragraph 15 of the Second Schedule to the Code of Civil Procedure. The misconduct attributed to the arbitrator is, that he had made 'private enquiries' behind the backs of the parties. There is authority of this Court for the proposition that the making of such enquiries, where the arbitrator is not empowered to do go by the terms of the reference, amounts to legal 'misconduct' on his part. The whole controversy in this case is, whether the arbitrator was or was not empowered to act as he did. For the applicants it is contended that the parties had agreed that the arbitrator might decide the case on his personal knowledge of the facts, and that this necessarily implies a right to supplement his knowledge in respect of any relevant circumstances by any kind of enquiries which he might see fit to make. To this it is replied that, while the parties were quite willing that the arbitrator should make use of such knowledge of the facts as he possessed on the date of the agreement of reference, they never agreed that he might supplement his knowledge by listening to ex parte statements behind the backs of either or both of the parties to the reference. The learned Subordinate Judge has applied his mind to this point and has held that the terms of the agreement did not empower the arbitrator to act as he did. I am not sure that I should have arrived at this conclusion if I had been called upon to decide the matter in his place; but the point is at least an arguable one, and the most that could be said in support of the case for the applicants, even if the matter were before us as an appeal on a point of law, would be that the Court below had misinterpreted the terms of the agreement of reference. As the Legislature has not seen fit to allow an appeal from an order of this nature, even on the grounds specified in Section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code, I do not think we ought to interfere in revision. It does not seem to me possible to hold that the Court below has acted in the exercise of its jurisdiction either illegally or with material irregularity.
2. I would, therefore, dismiss this application with costs,
3. I agree.
4. The application is dismissed with costs.