1. This is a defendants' appeal arising out of a suit for recovery of possession of certain properties. The plaintiffs are the sons and grandson of one Nakchhed Singh and claimed to have inherited these properties through Nakchhed Singh by virtue of a deed of settlement dated the 5th December 1888, executed by Gopal Singh. It appears that in that year Gopal Singh was the sole surviving male member of his family, and had dependent on him his deceased brother's widow Mt. Rahsa, a daughter's son, Nakchhed Singh and the widows of two predeceased sons of his own. He wanted to make provision in his lifetime for these people and executed the deed in question under which he made grants of various items of property to these people in succession. The plaintiffs' interpretation of this document is that the grants made to the three ladies were grants to them for their lifetime and the remainder belonged to Gopal Singh which was inherited on his death by his daughter's son Nakchhed Singh from whom it has devolved on the present plaintiffs. On the other hand, the defendants contended, that the deed had the effect of creating Hindu female's estates in favour of these ladies and that no undisposed of interest remained with Gopal Singh so that when the last of these ladies died and Gopal Singh also was dead the estate devolved not on Gopal Singh's daughter's son Nakchhed Singh but on his collaterals whom the defendants represented.
2. A translation of the deed of settlement is fully set forth in the judgment of the Court below and it is not necessary to repeat it. Briefly speaking, Gopal Singh made a grant of a share in one village to Nakchhed Singh and shares in two other villages to his deceased brother's widow. He then granted the shares in all the other villages together with a house to his sons' wives in the following words:
The rest of the shares and the house I have given to my sons' wives oh this condition that the said widows should remain in possession of the properties given to them and should maintain themselves with the profit thereof. None of my heirs or reversioners shall, in my lifetime or after my death, have any right to the property which I have given to my daughter's son. My sons' wives and my younger brother's wife should remain in possession of their shares which I have given them for their whole life. After the death of my younger brother's wife her share also shall go to my both the sons' wives; and on the death of one of the sons' wives the other shall get her share also. In short, so long as the three Musammats are, or any of them is, alive, none of my reversioners shall have a claim to their shares.
3. After this he provided that when all the three ladies were deal the house, grove and a plot in village Mandra Par should pass to his daughter's son Nakchhed Singh and neither he nor his heirs would have a right or claim to it. The question before us is whether the grant to the widows of his sons was a grant of a life-estate only with remainder to Gopal Singh or whether it amounted to a creation of a Hindu female's estate as recognized by the Hindu Law.
4. For the purposes of this appeal we may assume in favour of the appellants that a Hindu widow's estate can be created by a grant. This has been held to be so by the Madras High Court in Meda Vengamma v. Mitta Chelamiah  36 Mad. 484 which we may assume to be correct without actually deciding it. The burden, however, lies upon the defendants to satisfy the Court that it was the intention of Gopal Singh to create a Hindu widow's estate with all its necessary incidents. One of the necessary incidents of a Hindu widow's estate is to give to the female power to transfer the property absolutely in case of legal necessity. The whole intention of Gopal Singh appears to have been to make sure that the property would remain in the possession of his relations for their maintenance and should pass on from one female to another in succession. There is no power given to any of the females to dispose of the property in case of legal necessity. Indeed if they had been given such power very little would have been left for being inherited by the surviving ladies.
5. The next point is that in the case of a Hindu widow's estate succession to the estate after the death of the female goes to the collaterals of the deceased husband of the lady. There is nothing to show in the deed that Gopal Singh intended that succession should open to the heirs of the husband of the various ladies. On the other hand that would be inconsistent with the right of survivorship given to them in case of their respective deaths. It is strongly contended on behalf of the appellants that Gopal Singh did not reserve in himself any special right or interest in these properties in express terms. But if the interest created by him amounted to no more than a life-interest then the remainder remained undisposed of and must be deemed to have remained vested in him, as it cannot remain in abeyance.
6. The strongest point in favour of the view of the Court below appears to be that the grant of the entire-property to the sons' widows, is contained in one operative portion of the deed which we have quoted above. It is natural to suppose that the intention of Gopal Singh was to create an estate of the same character in respect of all the property covered by that disposing clause. Later on, he made a special condition that out of these properties three items would devolve on Nakchhed Singh after the death of all the three widows. With regard to these three items it cannot be disputed that only limited life-estates could have been created in favour of the ladies with a vested remainder in Nakchhed Singh, which neither Gopal Singh nor his legal heirs could claim. It is, therefore, clear that out of the properties covered by the disposing clause three items were, undoubtedly, given away as life interests to the ladies. There is, therefore, an irresistible presumption that the remainder of the property which was governed by the same clause had the same character.
7. We may mention that the document was not of the nature of a bequest in which case the testator would have contemplated a state of things after his death. It was really a transfer inter vivos with a possibility of Gopal Singh himself getting back the property after the termination of the life-estates of the three females. There is, therefore, no reason to suppose that he intended that he and his own heirs should not be entitled to the estate as soon as the life estates of these ladies terminated.
8. Having regard to these circumstances we are of opinion that the view taken by the Court below as regards the interpretation of this document was correct.
9. We dismiss the appeal with costs.