1. We have come to the conclusion that this appeal must be dismissed. There is nothing in the question of public policy raised. No doubt, it is the law in India as in England that a contract to provide a child in marriage in consideration of a money payment will not be enforced in a Court of law. That is a very different thing from saying that when a marriage has been arranged and performed, a payment by the parent of either the boy or the girl who is a party to the marriage is a contract which is void ab initio as being against public policy. No authority has been quoted which goes to this length and which would involve condemning a large proportion of marriage contracts in this country. Secondly, we cannot find anything in Section 92 of the Evidence Act against which this case, as found by the Courts below, offends. In substanse the document in question stipulated for consideration divided into three classes, Rs. 500 for pilgrimage to Gya, Rs. 500 for debts in connection with the lady's daughter's marriage and Rs. 200 for the repairs of her house. Each of these classes of liability would be sufficient, if established in fact, to support legal necessity. On the facts found Re. 1,200 of the Rs. 2,000 was money retained by the mortgagee to be used as and when it suited the mortgagor's purpose for the repairs of the house. Circumstances, however, becoming too strong for her and involving a change of intention, Rs. 1,003 of this Rs. 1,200, in the events which happened, was utilised to discharge a liability which she had incurred to the father of her daughter's husband in respect of her daughter's marriage. Whether or not owing to the fact that her daughter had already been betrothed and had reached the somewhat advanced age of eighteen exceptional pressure was exercised upon her does not really matter in our opinion. The long and short of it is this that whereas the money was advanced for legal necessity which included amongst other things liabilities in respect of the daughter's marriage, in the event, after it was advanced, it was used or diverted to some other purpose equally valid, which would have been sufficient to support the transaction if it had been the original object and stated consideration for which the advance was made. We do not think that this circumstance is sufficient in itself to invalidate the transaction. We, therefore, agreeing with the lower Appellate Court, dismiss this appeal with costs, including in this Court fees on the higher scale.