1. The decision of tire learned Judge of this Court appears to us to be perfectly correct. The plaintiffs instituted the suit out of which this appeal has arisen to recover possession of a house situate in the abadi of the village of which they are the zamindars. The defendants set up the defence that they obtained permission from the plaintiffs to occupy the house in question and that they repaired the house and erected new buildings on the site. Then they say that the plaintifls had no right to dispossess them inasmuch as they lived in the house with the consent of the plaintiffs as tenants and ryots. The Court of first instance dismissed the plaintiff s claim and on appeal this decision was confirmed. The learned Additional Judge in his judgment says: 'it is an admitted fact that the defendants are licensees' and then towards the end of the judgment observes when once the plaintiff gave the land to the defendant and he began to live on it, he cannot in the absence of any contract be ejected' This appears to us to be an extraordinary proposition of law. On this finding the learned Judge of tins Court has held that the defendants were mere licensees liable to be ejected from the property at the will of the licensors: that the statement of the law to which we have referred could not be supported. He accordingly reversing the decision of the Courts below decreed the plaintiff's claim and we think rightly.
2. Before us it has been contended that in view of the provision of Section 60 of the Indian Easements Act, the plaintiffs are not entitled to succeed inasmuch as they gave a license to the defendants to occupy the house in question and he defendants erected upon the site certain buildings. Sub-section (b) of Section 60 of that Act provides that a license may be revoked by the grantor unless amongst others the licensee acting upon the license has executed work of a permanent character and incurred expenses in the execution of such work. This sub-section patently applies to a case in which the licensor gives permission to a party to execute works of a permanent character and to expend money in the execution of such works but not to a case where a licensor merely gives a license to a party to occupy a house already existing. The defendants so far as they did build were not acting upon any license. For these reasons we think the learned Judge of this Court was correct and dismiss the appeal with costs.