George Knox, J.
1. A copy of the decree appealed against has now been put upon the record. It was filed before this Court on the 30th of July 1915, and I understand that when it was filed there was no explanation supported by an affidavit or otherwise as to the reason why it was filed so long after the time granted in the Indian Limitation Act. The ordinary time for the filing of this appeal expired a few days after the 1st of November 1914. As I have shown in my order of the 25th July 1915, the memorandum of appeal was not accompanied by a copy of the decree appealed against. It was accompanied by the copy of a decree passed in a case with which apparently it was intimately connected, and the fact that the decree, with one exception to which I shall presently refer, was the same as the decree which was passed in this case allows the inference that though there must have been negligence on the part of those who filed the memorandum of appeal, yet that negligence was one which might easily have occurred. But when one turns to the final words of the decree it will be found that the decree in the present case, namely No. 65/78, differs toto cselo from the decree which was passed in case No. 78/65. Whoever is responsible for the preparation of the papers constituting the memorandum of appeal must have done so in such a perfunctory manner that the Court is unable to hold that the appellants had sufficient cause for not presenting the appeal within the period of limitation prescribed therefore. This view of the case is strengthened when it appears that on the 3rd of November 1914, the appellants applied to the Court below for a copy of the decree and the copy of the decree was given on the same day. Even if the mistake had not been noticed before, it is difficult to understand how it was that when this copy was procured the mistake was not discovered. The learned Vakil for the respondents in support of his preliminary objection refers me to the case of Gulab Devi v. Shanker Lal A.W.N. (1892) 47 in which an appeal was admitted by a District Judge acting on a mistaken report of his office. The learned Judges in connection with this observe that the Judge did not admit the appeal under Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act of 1877 and could not have done, so as there were no materials before him by which the appellant could have satisfied him that the appellant had sufficient cause for not presenting the appeal within the period of limitation. While it is true that the words sufficient cause in Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act should receive liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice when no negligence or inaction or want of bona fides is imputable to the appellant, see Rakhal Chandra Ghosh v. Ashutosh Ghosh 19 Ind. Cas. 931 : 17 C.W.N. 807 at p. 809. I find it quite impossible in the present case to hold that there has been no negligence, nor inaction, nor want of bona fides on the part of the appellants. The whole procedure in the case so far as the appellants are concerned was slack to the utmost extent. They now propose to tile an affidavit. If I give them permission to do that I should be encouraging slackness. The ' preliminary objection must fee allowed and is allowed. This appeal is dismissed with costs.