R.N. Misra, J.
1. Heard learned counsel for the petitioner and perused the impugned' order passed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation condoning the delay in filing the objection under Section 9-A (2) of the U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act by opposite parties Nos. 2 to 5.
2. Learned counsel for the petitioner contended that the Deputy Director of Consolidation has erred in condoning the delay in filing the objection of opposite parties Nos. 2 to 5 merely on the ground that opposite parties Nos. 4 and 5 are minors. He contended that minority is no ground for condonation of delay when two of the other objectors were majors. The Deputy Director of Consolidation has, after taking into consideration all the facts and circumstances of the case, found it to be a fit case to condone the delay and permit the parties to contest the objection under Section 9-A (2) of the Act with regard to title in respect of the land in dispute. He also found that there had been a litigation in respect of the land in dispute between the father of the petitioner and the father of the opposite parties and the father of the opposite parties was held to be tenure holder and the claim of the father of the petitioner with regard to the land in dispute was repelled and his appeal was dismissed. In that view of the matter he found it to be a fit case to condone the delay exercising his jurisdiction. I do not find any infirmity in the said finding.
3. Learned counsel, however, argued that being a revisional court the Deputy Director of Consolidation should not have condoned the delay and interfered with the order passed by the Consolidation Officer by which he rejected the objection of the petitioner being time barred. The Deputy Director of Consolidation in exercise of powers under Section 48 (1) of the Act can pass orders on question of facts as well as on law. The Deputy Director of Consolidation could, therefore, very well pass the order condoning the delay although the Consolidation Officer has rejected the application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act filed by opposite parties NOS. 2 to 5. Whether delay should be condoned or not is in the discretion of the concerned authority. The Deputy Director of Consolidation has passed the impugned order condoning the delay in exercise of powers under Section 48 (1) and the order cannot be said to be illegal or without jurisdiction. In Richhpal Singh v. State of U. P., 1980 All WC (SN) 40 : (1980 All LJ 781), it has been held by this Court that :
'The determination of sufficiency of cause under Section 5 of the Limitation Act is a matter which rests in the domain of the authorities below. A finding recorded about such sufficiency or insufficiencydoes not raise any question of jurisdiction. Therefore no interference is calledfor within the limited jurisdiction of apetition under Article 226 of the Constitution.'
4. It has been repeatedly held by the Supreme Court that the words 'sufficient cause' should receive liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice. (See Sandhya Rani v. Sudha Rani, AIR 1978 SC 537), No lack of bona fides or inaction can be imputed to the opposite parties Nos. 2 to 5 who have indicated that they were not aware earlier of the wrong entries in favour of the petitioner.
5. In view of the above I do not find any substance in the writ petition filed by the petitioner. The impugned order does not call for any interference by this Court in exercise of powers under Article 226 of the Constitution. The writ petition, being devoid of the merit, is dismissed in limine.