Sunder Lal, J.
1. This, is a suit by the husband: to eject his wile from the possession of, a portion of the house in which she is living now, on the allegations that she had become unchaste and left her husband's home and protection long ago and had been leading the life of a prostitute. She has now come back suddenly and taken, possession of a portion of the house. The defendant denies these charges and by way of counter charge alleges that the husband: is keeping another woman as his mistress and it is under her influence that he has instituted these proceeding. The Court of. first instance found that the defendant had become unchaste and had left her husband long ago. It decreed the claim. The learned Judge in appeal; is inclined to doubt the evidence as to unchastity. He is of opinion that Me defendant does not at present lead an immoral' life' and upon that ground has dismissed the suit.
2. Apart from that question of unchastity and immorality, whether a Hindu wife can insist upon living in a particular part of the house belonging to her husband so as to be able to resist successfully a claim on his part for her removal from the portion so occupied by her, is a question by no means free from doubt. In the case of Baldeo Das v. Sham Lal 1 A. 77 a Division, Bench of this Court made a decree for the dispossession, of a Hindu son at the suit of the father. They held that even a Hindu son, 'who has proprietary rights in the ancestral dwelling house has no independent domimion over it,, so long as the property is joint, as against his father. In this case the wife has no proprietary rights in the house. She has no doubt a, right, to maintenance against the husband and to be provided, with a suitable place for her residence, unless for any reasons she has; forfeited her rights as a wife by reason of misconduct on her part. She can also claim a restitution of her conjugal rights against the husband who, in the absence of circumstances justifying his refusal to accede to the claim, is bound to receive her in his house and resume conjugal relations with her. The wife, however, has no proprietary interest in the house. The plaintiff in this case is asserting his proprietary rights in the house; whether the wife has a claim for maintenance and a right of residence in a house to-be provided by the husband are questions foreign to this suit. The husband has full ownership and dominion over the house and the wife cannot resist the claim on the ground of any right in her in the house. The questions of unchastity and immorality tried by the Court below are, in my opinion, irrelevant for the purposes of this case, in which the husband is seeking to enforce his rights of property in the house. That the wife is the defendant in the case is a mere accident. The true issue for trial is, who is the owner of the house?
3. Any claims that the wife has for maintenance or restitution of conjugal rights do not afford a defence to this suit. They create no right of property in her in the house. The house being admittedly the property of the plaintiff he is entitled to a decree for possession of the house and for the ejectment of the defendant. I, therefore, decree the appeal, set aside the decree of the Court below and restore that of the Court of first instance.
4. This decree will not affect the right of the defendant to sue her husband for maintenance or for providing her with a suitable residence or for the restitution of her conjugal rights. All that I decide in this case is the right to the property in the house. The parties will bear their Own casts of the litigation throughout.