Harish Chandra, J.
1. In this case a decree for arrears of rent and ejectment was passed against the respondent with respect to a house before the U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947, (U.P. Act in  of 1917) came into force. The date on which this Act came into force was according to Sub-section (3) of Section 1 of that Act 1-10-1946. The suit was decreed by the trial Court and a conditional decree for ejectment was passed, the condition being that if the defendant did not deposit in Court a certain sum of money within two weeks, the ejectment was to take effect. The plaintiff-appellant went up in appeal and the Civil Judge allowed the appeal and decreed the suit for ejectment. He, however, attached a condition that it was open to the execution Court to consider the question of default on the part of the defendant and the applicability of the District Magistrate's order in the light of a ruling reported in Makhanlal v. Shankerlal, 1944 ALL. L.W. 591. It appears that an Ordinance relating to the control of rent and ejectment was in force at that time. After that the appellant made an application to the execution Court for the execution of the decree for ejectment against the respondent. That Court, however, took the view that the respondent could only be ejected if it appeared that the rent was still in arrears on the date on which the execution application was made. He, however, found that the respondent had in fact deposited a sum of Rs. 456-13-0 in Court and that no rent was in arrears and accordingly dismissed the execution application. The appellant went up in appeal from this order of the execution Court. The order of the execution Court was passed on 30-3-1946 and when the matter came up before the learned Civil Judge for disposal, the D. P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947, was already in force. The learned Civil Judge accordingly relying upon Section 14 of the Act dismissed the appeal; It is, however, argued that Section 14 will have no application to the present case and that the matter should be decided in accordance with the law as it existed on the date on which the orders were passed by the execution Court. I do not agree with this contention. Section 14 of the Act is reproduced below :
'No decree for the eviction of a tenant from any accommodation passed before the date of commencement of this Act shall, in so far as it relates to the eviction of such tenant, be executed against him, as long as this Act remains in force, except on any of the grounds mentioned in Section 3.'
It will be noted that there is nothing in the section to suggest that if the execution application had been made before the coming into force of the U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act the case would not be governed by that section. In my view the section would cover the case of a decree for ejectment passed before the date of commencement of the Act in which an application for the execution of that decree was pending on that date. This is, no doubt, a hard case as the appellant is apparently not responsible for the fact that the decree which he sought; to execute remained unexecuted until after the commencement of the Act. But as Section 14 stands, I do not think it is possible for the applicant to execute his decree against the respondent unless he can show that it is baaed on any of the grounds mentioned in Section 3. The only ground mentioned in Section 3 which could be applied to the present case is the one mentioned in Clause (a) of that section, namely,
'that the tenant has wilfully failed to make payment to the landlord of any arrears of rent within one month, of the service upon him of a notice of demand from the landlord'.
In the present case, no doubt, according to the finding of the lower appellate Court the whole amount of arrears of rent due from the respondent was not paid within one month of the service upon him of the notice of demand from the appellant, but the amount in arrears was only Re. 1 and the finding of the learned Civil Judge is that there is nothing to indicate that the respondent had wilfully failed to make payment to the appellant of that amount. His view is that the difference of Re. 1 was due to accidental or unavoidable reasons. The appellant cannot therefore base his case upon any of the grounds mentioned in Section 3 of the Act, and cannot, in view of Section 14, execute his decree against the respondent by ejecting him from the house.
2. I accordingly dismiss the appeal under Order 41, Rule 11, Civil P. C.