1. This is a plaintiff's appeal and arises out of a suit for enforcement of a mortgage-deed dated 4th June 1917, executed by one Ali Bakhsh, who has since died and is now represented by his son, Sheikh Tasadduq Husain, and his two daughters, Mt. Piari and Rashidan, defendants 1 to 3. Defendants 4 and 5 are transferees from the heirs of the mortgagor. The suit has been dismissed by the lower Court on the ground that the mortgage-deed is invalid, not having been registered in the manner required by the Registration Act. Ali Bakhsh was an old man residing n Rampur and suffering from illness, which prevented his appearance before the State registering officer. The property to which the mortgage-deed relates is village Bhikaripur, Tahsil Baheri, District Bareilly, in British India. The mortgage-deed had to be registered by the Sub-Registrar of Baheri. Ali Bakhsh executed the mortgage-deed in Rampur, and in order to have it registered at Baheri he executed a power-of-attorney in favour of his son Tasadduq Husain. The power-of-attorney in terms authorises Tasadduq Hasain to present the deed on behalf of Ali Bakhsh before the Sub-Registrar of Baheri. Ali Bakhsh however did not personally go to the State Registrar but applied to him that the document may be registered at his house. The Sadar Registrar of Rampur State did not go to the the place of Ali Bakhsh but deputed a commissioner to obtain acknowledgment of execution from him. Accordingly the commissioner went to the house of Ali Bakhsh, who 'admitted the execution and completion' of the power-of-attorney. On receipt of the document with the commissioner's endorsement, the Sadar Registrar of Rampur registered it. The question of law which emerges from the manner of registration of the power-of-attorney described above is whether the power-of-attorney was properly 'authenticated' within the mailing of Section 33, Registration Act. Section 32 of that Act makes it imperative that a document to be registered, shall be presented at the proper registration office by some person executing or claiming under the sale, or by the representative or assign of such person, or by the agent of such person, representative or assign, duly authorized by power-of-attorney executed and authenticated in the manner provided by Section 33 of the same Act. The latter section provides that if the principal does not reside in British India at the time of executing the power-of-attorney, only an agent possessing a power-of-attorney
executed before and authenticated by a notary public, or any Court, Judge, Magistrate, British Consul or Vice-Consul, or representative of His Majesty of the Government of India
can present the document for registration under Section 32, Registration Act. It is not disputed that Ali Bakhsh did not execute the power-of-attorney in favour of Tasadduq Husain before any of the authorities above mentioned. It is however argued that it was authenticated by the Sadar Registrar of Rampur State, who should be considered to be a 'Court or Judge' within the meaning of Section 33, Registration Act. We do not think that the Sadar Registrar of Rampur State can be considered to be a Judge or a Court in the sense in which those words have been used in Section 33. It was contended before us that in so far as the Sadar Registrar of Rampur State is deemed to be a Court or a Judge according to the law of Rampur State, authentication by him is a sufficient compliance with the requirements of Section 33. There is nothing to show that such is the case. Reliance is placed on the Registration Manual of Rampur State, Rule 107 of which empowers the Registrar to punish persons guilty of contempt in certain cases. We do not think a power of this kind will make a registering officer a Court or Judge. There is nothing to show that he is invested with judicial powers to decide civil or criminal cases. It was held in Queen-Empress v. Ram Lal (1893) 15 All 141 that a registrar acting under Section 73, Registration Act, is not a Court within the meaning of Section 195, Civil P.C. We have to construe the words 'Court' and 'Judge' occurring in Section 33, Registration Act, as they were understood by the framers of that Act, and nothing has been shown to us to justify the assumption that the Sadar Registrar of Rampur State is a Court or Judge within the meaning of Section 33, Registration Act. The case already referred to was followed by a Bench of this Court in Sat Narain v. Sarju AIR 1924 All 265 and we agree with the view taken in both the aforesaid cases.
2. The appellant is confronted with another difficulty. Section 33 makes it imperative that the power-of-attorney authorizing an agent to present a document for registration on behalf of his principal should be 'executed before and authenticated' by a Court or Judge, among other authorities named in the section. The proviso to Section 33, and the Sub-sections 2 and 3 apply only to cases mentioned in Clauses (a) and (b) of that section, which deal with power-of-attorney to be executed and authenticated in British India, and do not apply to Clause (c), which provides for the manner in which a power-of-attorney is to be authenticated in a place outside British India. It is clear that, in such cases, the power-of-attorney must be executed before and authenticated by the officers named in Section 33(c) personally and execution and authentication before a commissioner is not a sufficient compliance with that section. From what has been said above it is clear that Tasadduq Husain was not duly authorized to present the mortgage-deed in suit before the Sub-Registrar of Baheri for registration on behalf of Ali Bakhsh. As held by their Lordships of the Privy Council in Jambhu Prasad v. Muhammad Aftab Ali AIR 1914 P.C. 16 Sections 32 and 33, Registration Act, relating to the presentation of documents for registration are imperative, and their provisions must be strictly followed; and where the agent who presented a mortgage-deed for registration has not been authorized in the manner prescribed by the Act, the deed is invalid and cannot affect the immovable property to which it relates. The suit has been rightly dismissed by the learned Subordinate judge. This appeal is accordingly dismissed with costs.