1. This is an application in. revision directed against the decree passed by the Judge, Small Cause Court, Caunpore, dismissing the plaintiff-applicant's suit for recovery of Rs. 153 against the three defendants. The case was fixed for the 31st March 1932. It was stated on behalf of the plaintiff by his Vakil that if the defendant Sheo Charan stated on oath with 'ganga jali' in his hand, the suit might be disposed of in accordance with his 'evidence. The defendants' Vakil accepted the offer stating that the defendants (including Sheo Charan) agreed to abide by the evidence of Sheo Charan. The defendants' Vakil prayed for one day's adjournment to enable him to produce Sheo Charan. Accordingly the case was adjourned to 1st April 1932, when the plaintiff made an application attempting to resile from the offer to abide by the oath of Sheo Charan. The lower Court however administered the particular kind of oath which the plaintiff had proposed on the previous day, and Sheo Charan's evidence being against the truth of the plaintiff's allegation, his suit was dismissed.
2. It is argued on behalf of the plaintiff that the learned Judge was in error in administering the special oath to Sheo Charan and deciding the suit in accordance with his evidence in view of the revocation of his offer by the plaintiff. It is contended that there is nothing in law to prevent a party from revoking an offer to abide by the oath of another before the oath is actually taken. No authority has been quoted in support of this contention, which is not, in my opinion sound. Section 8, Oaths Act (Act 10 of 1873), empowers a Court to administer an oath of a special kind to a person willing to take it. Section 9 provides that if any party offers to be bound by any such oath, as is mentioned in Section 8, if such oath is made by the other party, the Court may ask such party whether or not he will make the oath. Section 10 empowers the Court to administer such oath if the party to whom the offer is made signifies his willingness to make the oath. Section 11 declares that the evidence so given shall be conclusive proof of the matter stated. There can be no doubt that the offer of the plaintiff, made on 31st March 1932, was forthwith accepted on behalf of the defendants, including the defendant Sheo Charan who was to take an oath with the Ganges water in his hand. No question was raised in the Court below as regards the authority of the vakil on both sides to bind their respective clients, nor has any i such question been raised before me passed by the Judge of 'the Small
3. I have therefore to decide the case on the assumption that the plaintiff's vakil had the authority to offer to abide by the evidence of Sheo Charan, in case he made a statement with Ganges water in his hand, and that Sheo Charan's vakil had an authority to accept that offer on his behalf. There was thus a completed agreement on 31st March 1932, under which the controversy in the suit was to be settled in accordance with the evidence of Sheo Charan.
4. It was argued by the learned Counsel for the applicant that the suit could not be deemed to have been adjusted till the oath was actually made. The agreement between the parties arrived at on 31st March 1932 has to be considered like any other agreement in which an offer is made on one side and acceptance on the other. Both the parties being represented by duly authorized agents, the offer made on behalf of the plaintiff was accepted there and then on behalf of the defendants, and the acceptance was complete immediately after the offer was made. It was forthwith communicated to the plaintiff's agent. The plaintiff could not therefore revoke his offer on the next day. Section 5, Contract Act, clearly provides that a proposal may be revoked at any time before the communication of its acceptance is complete as against the proposer, but not afterwards. The communication of an acceptance is complete as against the proposer when it is put in a course of transmission to him so as to be out of the power of the acceptor (Section 4, ibid.). In the case before me, communication of the acceptance was complete on 31st March 1932, as already mentioned, and the plaintiff's revocation next day could not affect the binding character of the agreement to have the suit decided in accordance with the evidence of the defendant, Sheo Charan. In this view the learned Judge of the Court below was right in holding the plaintiff to his offer to abide by the oath of the defendant, Sheo Charan. The latter swore in the manner proposed that the plaintiff's claim was false. Such evidence was rightly treated by the lower Court as conclusive. This revision fails and is dismissed with costs.