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P.C. Gupta Vs. State and anr. - Court Judgment

LegalCrystal Citation
SubjectCriminal
CourtAllahabad High Court
Decided On
Judge
Reported in1974CriLJ945
AppellantP.C. Gupta
RespondentState and anr.
Excerpt:
- - bipen kumar tewari 1970crilj764 the division bench decision of this court in 1963 all lj 334 :1963 (2) cri lj 64 was no longer good law. the first submission made by the learned counsel appearing for amar singh is clearly untenable in view of the decision of the supreme court in 1967crilj528 (supra). this decision of the supreme court may be usefully considered and analysed in some detail. the complaint filed by the respondent against the appellant as well as the proceedings instituted by the police against him on the basis of the first information report lodged by the appellant were transferred under orders of the supreme court to the court of the learned additional district magistrate, saharanpur. this provision in clause (b) of sub-section (1) of section 195 is thus clearly a.....yashoda nandan, j.1. this criminal reference has come up before us in the circumstances set out below:on the 14th september, 1969, p.c. gupta, principal of a college at khurja forwarded a report against amar singh alleging commission by him of an offence-under section 380 of the indian penal code. the report was lodged by p.c. gupta as a result of information furnished to him by m. l. mittal, accountant of the college. consequent on the first information report, a case was registered against amar singh at police station khuria and he was taken into custody by the police. on the 19th september, 1969, amar singh was produced before the judicial officer khurja and on that date the officer passed an order under section 167 of the code of criminal procedure -- hereinafter referred to as the.....
Judgment:

Yashoda Nandan, J.

1. This criminal reference has come up before us in the circumstances set out below:

On the 14th September, 1969, P.C. Gupta, Principal of a college at Khurja forwarded a report against Amar Singh alleging commission by him of an offence-under Section 380 of the Indian Penal Code. The report was lodged by P.C. Gupta as a result of information furnished to him by M. L. Mittal, Accountant of the college. Consequent on the first information report, a case was registered against Amar Singh at Police Station Khuria and he was taken into custody by the police. On the 19th September, 1969, Amar Singh was produced before the Judicial Officer Khurja and on that date the Officer passed an order under Section 167 of the Code of Criminal Procedure -- hereinafter referred to as the Code -- remanding him to custody upto the 2nd October. 1969. On the-20th September, 1969, Amar Singh applied for bail under Section 497 of the Code and was ordered to be released on bail. On the 30th January, 1970 Amar Singh filed a complaint before the learned Judicial Officer, Khuria, accusing P. C Gupta and M. L. Mittal of offences under Section 211 of the Indian Penal Code. The complaint filed by Amar Singh was transferred to the Court of the learned Munsif Magistrate, Khurja, who, after recording the statement of Amar Singh and examining one Jagdish Prasad produced in support of the complaint and P. N. Tewari the Sub-Inspector attached to Police Station Khurja, framed charges against P.C. Gupta and M. L. Mittal under Sections 211 and 109/211 of the Indian Penal Code respectively. P.C. Gupta applied for stay of proceedings before the learned Magistrate but he refused to do so. Against the order of the learned Munsif Magistrate framing charges against them. P. C Gupta filed a revision before the learned Sessions Judge, Bulandshahr. It was urged on behalf of the revisionist that Section 195(1)(b) acted as a bar to the learned Munsif Magistrate taking cognizance of the offence alleged to have been committed by him under Section 211 of the Indian Penal Code, except on the basis of a complaint filed by the Judicial Officer, Khuria, before whom proceedings for remand and bail had taken place, because those proceedings were in relation to the offence alleged to have been committed by P.C. Gupta and M. L. Mittal. Reliance in support of that contention was placed on a Division Bench decision of this Court in Badri v. State 1963 All LJ 334 : 1963 (2) Cri LJ 64. On behalf of the complainant Amar Singh, it was urged on the basis of the decision of the Supreme Court in M. L. Sethi v. R. P. Kapur : 1967CriLJ528 that the decision of this Court in 1963 All LJ 334 : 1963 (2) Cri LJ 64 (supra) has been by implication overruled. The learned Sessions Judge held that the authority of this Court in 1963 All LJ 334 : 1963 (2) Cri LJ 64 had not been shaken by the Supreme Court decision in : 1967CriLJ528 . He held that he was bound by the view taken in 1963 All LJ 334 : 1963 (2) Cri LJ 64 and consequently made a reference to this Court recommending that the charges framed by the learned Munsif Magistrate. Khurja be quashed and the proceedings before him be dropped.

2. When the reference came up before one of us (Hon'ble C. D. Parekh. J.) for hearing, it appears to have been urged that in view of certain observations made by the Supreme Court in R R. Chari v. State of U. P. : 1951CriLJ775 : Narayan Das v. State of West Bengal : 1959CriLJ1368 : Gopal Das Sindhi v State of Assam AIR 1961 SC 986 : 1961' (2) Cri LJ 39 and S.N. Sharma v. Bipen Kumar Tewari : 1970CriLJ764 the Division Bench decision of this Court in 1963 All LJ 334 : 1963 (2) Cri LJ 64 was no longer good law. The learned single Judge being of the opinion that the point raised 'before him was one of importance and likely to be raised in various cases which may be pending or may come up for decision to this Court referred the reference to a larger Bench. By the order of the Hon'ble the Chief Justice, the reference has consequently come up before this Full Bench.

3. During the hearing of the reference before us, learned Counselappearing for Amar Singh urged firstly that on a proper constructionof Section 195(1)(b) of the Code, in order to attract the bar of that provision it was necessary that the offence under Section 211 of the Indian Penal Code alleged to have been committed by P.C. Gupta and M. L, Mittal should have been committed in relation to a proceeding in Court which necessarily meant that at the time when the offence was committed there should have been some proceeding pending in Court. It was further contended that the proceeding contemplated by Section 195(1)(b) of the Code must be proceedings in which the truthfulness or otherwise of the report lodged by P.C. Gupta and M. L. Mittal was under consideration before a Court. The submission was that since during remand proceedings and in proceedings for grant of bail the authenticity of the allegations made in the first information report lodged by P.C. Gupta and M. L. Mittal was not under enquiry before the learned Judicial Officer. Khurja, the alleged offence under Section 211 of the Indian Penal Code could not be said to have been committed in relation to those proceedings. The first submission made by the learned Counsel appearing for Amar Singh is clearly untenable in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in : 1967CriLJ528 (supra). This decision of the Supreme Court may be usefully considered and analysed in some detail. The facts giving rise to the appeal before the Supreme Court were that on the 10th December, 1958, the appellant M. L. Sethi lodged a report with the Inspector General of Police. Chandigarh, alleging commission of offences under Sections 420, 109. 114 and 120B of the Indian Penal Code by resnondent R. P. Kapur and his mother-in-law. On the 18th July, 1959, R. P. Kapur. respondent, was taken in custody by the police following investigation in consequence of the report dated 10th December. 1958 lodged by M. L. Sethi. On the 25th July, 1959 the Police submitted a charge-sheet against the respondent for his trial for various offences. There was no material before the Court showing that at any stage between the 10th December, 1958 and 25th July, 1959 any orders had been passed by the Court in connection with the investigation of the offence alleged to have been committed by the respondent. In the meanwhile on the 11th April, 1959 the respondent filed a complaint in the Court of a learned Judicial Magistrate, First Class, at Chandigarh, against the appellant for offences under Sections 204, 211' and 385 of the Indian Penal Code. The complaint filed by the respondent against the appellant as well as the proceedings instituted by the police against him on the basis of the first information report lodged by the appellant were transferred under orders of the Supreme Court to the Court of the learned Additional District Magistrate, Saharanpur. On the 10th December, 1962 this Court quashed the proceedings against the respondent. On the 6th August, 1963 and 5th October, 1963 two applications made by the appellant for dismissing the complaint filed against him under Section 211, I.P. C. and for other offences were rejected by the learned Additional District Magistrate, Saharanpur. A revision filed by the appellant against the orders of the learned Additional District Magistrate, Saharanpur, dated 6th August, 1963 and 5th October, 1963 was dismissed by the learned Sessions Judge. The appellant came up in revision to this Court but it was dismissed by C B. Capoor. J. (See M. L. Sethi v. R. P. Kapur 1965 All WR (HC) 1711. Again the decision of this Court, M. L. Sethi appealed to the Supreme Court under a certificate granted to him. In the circumstances of the case set out above, the Supreme Court was called upon to decide whether the Magistrate at Chandigarh was competent to take cognizance of the complaint filed against the appellant on the 11th April, 1959, in view of the provisions of Section 195 of the Code.

4. After quoting Section 195 of the Code, the Supreme Court went on to observe:

In the case of an offence punishable under Section 211. the mandatory direction is that no Court shall take cognizance of any offence punishable under this section, when such offence is alleged to have been committed, in. or in relation to, any proceeding in any Court, except on the complaint in writing of such Court or of some other Court to which such Court is subordinate. This provision in Clause (b) of Sub-section (1) of Section 195 is thus clearly a limitation on the power of the Court to take cognizance under Section 190. Consequently, it is at the stage when a Magistrate is taking cognizance under Section 190 that he must examine the facts of the complaint before him and determine whether his power of taking cognizance under

Section 190 has or has not been taken away by Clause (b) of Sub-section (1) of Section 195, Criminal P.C. In the present case, therefore at the time when this complaint was filed by the respondent in the Court of the Judicial Magistrate at Chandigarh, it was necessary and incumbent on the Magistrate to examine whether his power of taking cognizance of the offence was limited by the provisions of Section 195(1)(b). He had, therefore, to determine whether cognizance of this complaint charging the appellant with commission of an offence under Section 211, I.P.C. could not be taken by him because that offence was alleged to have been committed in, or in relation to. any proceeding in any Court, and if he found that it was so, whether a complaint in writing by such Court or some other Court to which such Court was subordinate was necessary before he could take cognizance. Consequently, in deciding this appeal, this Court has to examine whether on the date when cognizance was taken by the Judicial Magistrate at Chandigarh such cognizance was barred under Section 195(1)(b). Criminal P.C. because the offence punishable under Section 211, I.P.C. included in the complaint was alleged to have been committed in, or in relation to, any proceeding in any Court.

In the interpretation of this Clause (b) of Sub-section (1) of Section 195, considerable emphasis has been laid before us on the expression 'in, or in relation to', and it has been urged that the use of the expression 'in relation to' very considerably widens the scope of this section and makes it applicable to cases where there can even in future be a proceeding in any Court in relation to which the offence under Section 211, I.P.C. may be alleged to have been committed. A proper interpretation of this provision requires that each ingredient in it be separately examined. This provision bars taking of cognizance, if all the following circumstances exist, viz. (1) that the offence in respect of which the case is brought falls under Section 211, I.P.C. (2) that there should be a proceeding in any Court; and (31 that the allegation should be that the offence under Section 211 was committed in. or in relation to such a proceeding. Unless all the three ingredients exist, the bar under Section 195(1)(b) against taking cognizance by the Magistrate, except on a complaint in writing of a Court, will not come into operation. In the present case also, therefore, we have to see whether all these three ingredients were in existence at the time when the Judicial Magistrate at Chandigarh proceeded to take cognizance of the charge under Section 211.

I. P.C. against the appellant. There is, of course, no doubt that in the complaint before the Magistrate a charge under Section 211, I.P.C. against the appellant was included, so that the first ingredient clearly existed. The Question on which the decision in the present case hinges is whether it can be held that any Proceeding in any Court existed when that Magistrate took cognizance. If any proceeding in any Court existed and the offence under Section 211, I.P.C. in the complaint filed before him was alleged to have been committed in such a proceeding or in relation to any such proceeding, the Magistrate would have been barred from taking cognizance of the offence. On the other hand, if there was no proceeding in any Court at all in which, or in relation to which the offence under Section 211 could have been alleged to have been committed, this provision barring cognizance would not be attracted at all.

In this case, as we have already indicated when enumerating the facts, the complaint of which cognizance was taken by the Judicial Magistrate at Chandigarh was filed on April 11, 1959, and at that stage, the only proceeding that was going on was investigation by the Police on the basis of the First Information Report lodged by the appellant before the Inspector General of Police on Dec. 10. 1958. There is no mention at all that there was at that stage, any proceeding in any Court in respect of that F. I. R. When examining the question whether there is any proceeding in any Court there are three situations that can be envisaged. One is that there may be no proceeding in any Court at all The second is that a proceeding in a Court may actually be pending at the point of time when cognizance is sought to be taken of the offence under Section 211, I.P.C. The third is that though there may be no proceeding pending in any Court in which or in relation to which the offence under Section 211, I.P.C. could have been committed there may have been a proceeding which had already concluded and the offence under Section 211 may be alleged to have been committed in, or in relation to, that proceeding. It seems to us that in both the latter two circumstances envisaged above, the bar to taking cognizance under Section 195(1)(b) would come into operation. If there be a proceeding actually pending in any Court and the offence under Section 211, I.P.C. is alleged to have been committed in relation to that proceeding. Section 195(1)(b) would clearly apply. Even if there be a case where there was, at one stage, a proceeding in any Court which may have concluded by the time the question of applying the provisions of Section 195(1)(b) arises, the bar under that provision would apply if it is alleged that the offence under Section 211, I.P.C. was committed in or in relation to, that proceeding. The fact that the proceeding had concluded would be immaterial because Section 195(1)(b) does not require that the proceeding in any Court must actually be pending at the time when the question of applying this bar arises.

In view of the decision of the Supreme Court mentioned above, it is clear that the proceedings contemplated by Section 195(1)(b) need not have been in existence on the date when P.C. Gupta and M. L. Mittal are alleged to have committed an offence under Section 211, I.P.C. This is a case in which remand proceedings and proceeding for bail of Amar Singh had taken place and concluded on the date when the learned Munsif-Magistrate took cognizance of the offence alleged to have been committed by P.C. Gupta and M. L. Mittal under Sections 211 and 109/211. I. P. C respectively. If the offences allegedly committed by the two can be held to have been in relation to the bail and remand proceedings it will be a case falling under the third category of situations as enumerated by the Supreme Court in M. L. Sethi v. R. P. Kapoor (Supra).

5. Section 195 of the Code with the construction of which we are concerned runs as follows:

195(1). No Court shall take cognizance--

(a) ...

(b) of any offence punishable under any of the following sections of the same Code, namely. Sections 193, 194, 195 196, 199, 200, 205. 206, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211 and 228 when such offence is alleged to have been committed in, or in relation to any proceeding in any Court except on the complaint in writing of such Court or of some other Court to which such Court is subordinate:

(c) ... ... ...

In the instant case there is no allegation and there could be none on the facts of the case that P.C. Gupta and M. L. Mittal committed an offence under Section 211, I.P.C. in any proceeding in any Court.

6. The only question consequently for consideration is as to whether as a result of filing of a false report against Amar Singh, P.C. Gupta and M. L Mittal could be considered to have committed the offence 'in relation to any proceeding in any Court.' The material date for considering as to whether the bar of Section 195(1)(b) applied or not to the learned Munsif Magistrate taking cognizance of the offence alleged to have been committed by P.C. Gupta and M. L. Mittal is the date on which he took cognizance of the complaint. Before that date, a Court had dealt with Amar Singh on two separate occasions in consequence of the first information report lodged by P.C. Gupta and M. L. Mittal firstly on the 19th September, 1969 when the learned Judicial Officer, Khurja passed an order remanding him to custody upto the 2nd October, 1969 and secondly when on the 20th September, 1969 he directed his release on bail under Section 497 of the Code. If the proceedings on the 19th September. 1969 and the 20th September. 1969 can be considered to be proceedings in Court within the meaning of Section 195(1)(b) of the Code and the offence alleged to have been committed by P.C. Gupta and M. L. Mittal can be held to be in relation to those proceedings, it is clear that the learned Munsif Magistrate had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the complaint filed by Amar Singh. To my mind remand proceedings and the bail proceedings which took place before the learned Judicial Officer, Khuria on the 19th September and 20th September. 1969 respectively were clearly proceedings for the purposes of Section 195(1)(b) of the Code in the Court of the learned Judicial Officer, Khuria. In both these proceedings the learned Judicial Officer was required to apply his judicial mind before he could either remand Amar Singh to custody or grant bail to him. The words 'any proceeding' used in Section 195(1)(b) of the Code are words of amplitude and have no limitations, except that the proceedings should be before a Court. While granting bail, in any case, the learned Judicial Officer was conducting Judicial proceedings and acting in the capacity of a Court. The word 'any' which precedes the expression 'proceeding' is inter changeable with the words 'every' or 'all'. A Full Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court presided over by Hidyatullah, C. J. in Kishan Singh v. The State : AIR1957MP67 held that 'the phrase 'any local authority' must be given the meaning 'each and every local authority' and not 'any individual local authority with special rules of its own'.' A Full Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in B. Veeraswamy v. State of Andhra Pradesh : AIR1959AP413 was considering and interpreting the phrase 'any officer subordinate' occurring in Section 44-A of the Motor Vehicles Act introduced therein by Motor Vehicles (Madras) Amendment Act (XX of 1948) It was held that 'as has been already stated, the word 'any' excludes limitation or qualification and connotes wide generality. It comprehends not only the officers whose subordination to the Transport Commissioner is statutorily determined, but all eligible subordinate officers'. A Full Bench of the Mysore High Court in V.S. Virupathi v. State of Mysore AIR 1965 Mys. 227 held that:

The word 'any' is a word which excludes limitation or qualification. It connotes wide generality. Its use points to distributive construction. (Vide Stroud's Judicial Dictionary) -- See also Veera-swami v State of Andhra Pradesh : AIR1959AP413 . In Pershad Singh v. Ram Pertab Roy (1895) ILR 22 Cal 77 the expression 'in any case' was interpreted as being qualified to 'in every case'. In Mooler v. North Eastern Breweries (1910) 1 KB 247 the expression 'any agreement to the contrary' was held to apply to any agreement whether made before or after the Act. In Keshav v. Jairam (1912) ILR 36 Bom 123 the Bombay High Court refused to apply the ejusdem generis principle in interpreting the word 'any'. From these decisions, it is clear that the word 'any' should be given a meaning as wide as possible in the context. Hence in the case before us. the words, 'any ward of the Municipal Borouah' should be understood to mean 'every ward of the Municipal Borouah.' A Division Bench of the Patna High Court in Chandi Prasad v. Rameshwar Prasad Agarwal : AIR1967Pat41 observed that.

It is no doubt, true that the word ''any' may, in certain context, imply 'all'. I consequently find no difficulty in holding that the remand proceedings and the bail proceedings before the learned Judicial Officer, Khurja, on the 19th and 20th September, 1969 were proceedings before a Court within the meaning of Section 195(1)(b) of the Code. In this view of the matter, the contention that the words 'any proceedings' must be read as limited to proceeding in which the truthfulness or otherwise of the report filed by P.C. Gupta and M. L. Mittal arises for consideration fails.

7. The only Question now remaining for consideration is as to whether the offence said to have been committed by P.C. Gupta and M. L. Mittal under Sections 211, 109/211. I. P. C., by their allegedly filing a false report against Amar Singh can be considered to have been in relation to the bail and remand proceedings. Section 195(1)(b) with which we are concerned does not provide for any particular type of relationship existing between the offences enumerated therein and the proceedings in Court. All that is necessary, to my mind, is that the relationship between the alleged offences and the proceedings must be effective and proximate and not remote, artificial, unnatural and unrealistic. Such a relationship obviously there was between the alleged false report said to have been lodged by P.C. Gupta and M. L. Mittal and the remand and bail proceedings before the Judicial Officer, Khurja. The remand and bail proceedings were the direct consequence of the report lodged by the revisionist before the learned Sessions Judge. In the absence of the re port, there would have been no occasion either for the Judicial Officer passing an order of remand or for Amar Singh having applied for his release on bail and the learned Magistrate directing his release on bail. It was held in 1963 All LJ 334 : 1963 (2) Cri LJ 64 (supra) that:

Section 195(1)(b) simply requires (that there should be some relationship between the offence alleged to have been committed and the proceeding; no particular kind of relationship is required. The words 'in relation to' do not mean 'that the offence must have been committed after the proceeding had started. Even if the offence was committed prior to the proceeding it can be said to be in relation to the proceeding if the proceeding was undertaken in consequence of it. If a proceeding is related to an offence the offence itself is related to the proceeding because if A is related to B it means that B is related to A. What we find in the instant case is that the applicant made a false report to the Police against the complainant and others resulting in their being arrested and being remanded to custody and leading to the applications for bail being made by them: the remand proceeding and the bail Proceeding were connected with the report made by the applicant and the offence committed by him by making it must be held to be an offence committed in relation to those proceedings. As the proceedings were related to the offence in the manner stated above, the offence must be held to have been committed in relation to them. Section 195(1)(b) was, therefore, applicable and no cognizance of the offence could be taken without a complaint by the Magistrate.' In support of the view taken in 1963 All LJ 334 : (1963) (2) Cri LJ 64 reliance was placed on J. D. Boywalla v. Sorab Rustomji Engineer AIR 1941 Bom 294 : 42 Cri LJ 814: Bajaji Appaji Kote v. Emperor AIR 1946 Bom 7 : 47 Cri LJ 321 and State v. Vipra Khimji Ganga ram AIR 1952 Sau 67 : 1952 Cri LJ 1084. The decision in Badri v. State was followed with approval in Hrishikesh Nag Iswar Chandra Nag v. State AIR 1965 Tri 13 : 1965 (1) Cri LJ 344 and E. Pedda Subba Reddy v. State : AIR1969AP281 . I am in respectful agreement with the decision in 1963 All LJ 334 : 1963 (2) Cri LJ 64 and the other decisions which have followed it and endorse the views expressed.

8. I have carefully gone through the decisions of the Supreme Court in : 1951CriLJ775 AIR 1961 SC 986 : 1961 Cri LJ 39 and : 1970CriLJ764 (supra) and have found nothing therein which can be considered as having shaken the authority of 1963 All LJ 334 : 1963 (2) Cri LJ 641.

9. For the reasons given above, I conclude that the learned Munsif Magistrate had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of offence under Sections 211 and 109/211, I.P.C. against P.C. Gupta and M. L. Mittal respectively on the basis of Amar Singh's complaint. I would consequently accept the reference and auash the proceedings pending against them.

Mohd. Hamid Hussain, J.

10. For the reasons given by my brother Yashoda Nandan. J. I agree that the reference must be accepted and the proceedings under Sections 211 and 109/211. I.P.C. pending in the Court of the Munsif Magistrate, Khurja against Sri P.C. Gupta and Sri M. L. Mittal be quashed.

C.D. Parekh, J.

11. I have gone through the judgment of Hon'ble Y. Nandan, J. and agreeing with the result which he has arrived at I would like to add few more reasons.

12. The admitted case of the parties was that on 19th September, 1969 Amar Singh was produced before the Judicial Magistrate, Khurja, and he remanded him to the custody till 2nd October. 1969. On 20th September, 1969, Amar Singh, on his own application, was directed to be released on bail by the Judicial Magistrate. On 30th January. 1970, Amar Singh filed the complaint involved in the present proceedings before the Judicial Magistrate, Khurja, against P.C. Gupta and M. L. Mittal the informants at whose instance the criminal case was initiated against Amar Singh. In my opinion Section 195(1)(b), Criminal P.C. acted as a bar to the taking cognizance of the alleged offence in the complaint being an offence under Section 211, I. P. C said to have been committed by P.C. Gupta and M. L. Mittal.

13. The object of Section 195(1)(b), Criminal P.C. is to protect persons from being needlessly harassed by vexatious prosecutions in retaliation. A person after having come to know that he is likely to be prosecuted on any information relating to commission of an offence may invariably file a complaint stating that a false report has been made against him. The situation thus created may result in confusion. The legislature has, therefore, put a brake on such unscrupulous actions being taken by persons against whom the police or private persons may proceed by an information or complaint. It is a check to protect innocent persons from criminal prosecution which may be actuated by malice or ill-will.

14. For the safety of the persons against whom any wrong information relating to the purported commission of an offence is lodged is found incorrect, the informant may be prosecuted under Section 182, I.P.C. In case of false and frivolous complaint the Court may be moved under Section 476, Criminal P.C. to file the requisite complaint for the false and frivolous information or complaint by unscrupulous persons. Section 195, Criminal P, C creates a bar and Section 476, Criminal P.C. confers jurisdiction on the Court to proceed for the offences mentioned in Section 195(1)(b) or (c), Criminal P.C. The two sections, i. e., Section 195 and Section 476, Criminal P. C., are supplementary to each other. The one creates a bar on the filing of the complaint by all and sundry and the other removes the bar and confers exclusive jurisdiction on the Court to file the complaint after satisfying itself prima facie about the correctness of the offences said to have been committed and covered by Section 195(1)(b) or (c), Criminal P.C. In my opinion, therefore, both the sections must be read together.

15. In the instant case the bar created under Section 195(1)(b), Criminal P.C. was pleaded by P.C. Gupta and M, L. Mittal on whose information, it was urged that action by the police was taken against Amar Singh. It was Tightly submitted before us that the remand taken by the police and the bail granted to Amar Sinsh by the Court were in relation to the proceedings in the Court.

16. Section 61, Criminal P.C. limits the power of the police officer to detain a person arrested without a warrant for a period longer than 24 hours unless by a special order of a magistrate under Section 167. Criminal P.C. he is authorised to detain a person be-yond that period. In cases where it, appears to the competent police officer that the investigation is not possible to be completed within 24 hrs. and he is satisfied that the accusation or information is well-founded, the person accused of on the basis of the information is required to be forwarded to the nearest magistrate alone with the entries of the police diary and the magistrate may, after satisfying himself, authorise the detention of the accused in such custody as the magistrte may think fit. The magistrate authorising the detention must record reasons for the same. The magistrate is, therefore, expected to exercise-his mind on the materials before him. Under Section 497, Criminal P. C whem any person said to be an accused of or suspected of the commission of any nonbailable offence is arrested or detained without warrant by an officer incharge of a police station or appears or is brought before a Court, he may be released by the Court if there are reasonable grounds. The power to grant bail is vested in a Court and while exercising that power the Court is required to exercise its mind on the facts of the case and thereafter to grant or refuse the bail.

17. For the reasons given above I am therefore, of the opinion, agreeing with Hon'ble Y. Nandan, J. that Section 195(1)(b), Criminal P.C. acts as a bar and the magistrate in this case could not have taken the cognizance of the offence alleged to have been committed under Section 211, I.P.C. by P.C. Gupta and M. L. 'Mittal.

ORDER BY THE COURT

The reference made by the learned Sessions Judge, Bulandshahr is accepted and the proceedings for trial of Sri P.C. Gupta and Sri M. L. Mittal for offences under Sections 211 and 109/211, I. P. d pending in the Court of the learned Munsif Magistrate, Khuria are quashed.


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