1. I do not agree with the view of the lower Courts in this appeal that the ownership of the patent was a matter exclusively to be dealt with by the Court appointed under the Patent Act. The ownership in this patent arises in a dispute in the winding-up of the partnership. The provisions of the Patent Act are a guide, both to the Special Court, and to all Courts where a controversy arises in regard to the ownership of a patent, the beneficial interest of which belongs to one person although the registered name is that of another. It might be, independently of anything appearing in this case, that the owner of a patent without transferring his interest in it, agreed with a partner to share the; expenses and the profits of running it together in partnership, and it might, as a master of convenience in the course of business result in the, name of the patentee being either the two of them or even the one who had not invented it. In my opinion, in such circumstances, the Court which is bound to determine and to determine finally and to dispose of questions arising in the partnership suit, cannot shirk its duty in deciding how the partners intended the patent rights to be dealt with, merely because special powers have been given to litigants to apply to another Court. The Special Court under the Patent Act would be bound, in deciding any matter in relation to a patent in accordance, with the sections of the Patent Apt, to decide the controversy with reference to what had been established by the findings of the Court in the dissolution of the partnership, which would be binding upon the parties, in my opinion, in any controversy under the Patent Act. It is, therefore, my duty, I think, to decide that question, but after my explaining his position to Mr. Raghubir Prasad, the owner of this patent, and the surviving partner, and obviously the working head of the business, he has relieved me of the duty of coming to any decision of my own upon the point. This part of the appeal arises out of the decision of the lower Appellate Court in reversing the decision of the First Court with regard to the locks known as 'Kartoos' and 'Impervis.' Raghubir Prasad is of opinion',that.they are of no commercial value. As the owner of a Lock Factory, hi says they are not worth, making. The minor, when he comes to the age of discretion, may take another view, but Mr. Raghubir Prasad, the respondent, has consented to abandoning any claim to patent rights in the locks known, as the 'Kartoos' and 'Impervis.' In that respect he has relieved me of the responsibility of deciding the proper decree, to pass in this part of the appeal. In regard to the other question raised in the appeal, I have no doubt that it is a question of contract. It is quite true as Mr. Panna Lal says, that death determinates a partnership, but the parties may agree to anything; and if they agree to carry on beyond the date automatically fixed by operation of law, there is nothing in the world to prevent them from doing so. It has been found as a fact that they did so in this case. Mr. Panna Lal says that the contracting party is a minor. But he was represented by a guardian, and if the point had been properly taken the Court would have decided that it was a contract clearly for the benefit of the minor. It was made at the request of the guardian for the convenience and benefit of the minor's interest. I cannot interfere with a finding of that kind in which both Courts are agreed and upon which no sort of misdirection in law is suggested. The result is that the appeal must be dismissed with costs including fees on the higher scale. I make no order as to costs in the lower Court.