1. On 15th March 1925, one Jairaj Singh made a report at the police-station Bachraun, district Moradabad, that Bansi and three others had stolen 8 bundles of sugarcane seeds belonging to him. The report ends up by saying 'Mere dawa in charon par hai; tahqiqat chahta hun.' After an inquiry by the police the accused came up before a Magistrate of the First Class at Moradabad, who on 23rd April 1925, held that the case was a false and frivolous one and being of opinion that the complainant should pay compensation to the accused, immediately asked Jairaj Singh, who was present in Court, why he should not pay compensation to the accused for having brought a false and frivolous case. Jairaj not being able to show cause, he directed Jairaj to pay Rs. 50 as compensation to Bansi. Jairaj went up in revision before the learned Sessions Judge of Moradabad. He has referred the case to this Court with a recommendation that the order directing compensation should be set aside, as it is illegal and as no compensation can be given in cases instituted on a police report.
2. The learned Vakil for Jairaj has put forward two contentions in support of the recommendation. I will deal with the second first, namely that, as the Magistrate did not in the same order, by which he acquitted the accused, order compensation to be paid, that order was illegal. In support of his contention he has cited two cases, namely, (1) complaint of Sadur Hussain (1903) 25 All 315 and Ram Singh v. Muthura (1912) 34 All 354. I am of opinion that neither of these cases has any application to the facts of this case. On 23rd April, the learned Magistrate in continuation of his order directing the acquittal of the accused asked the complainant if he had any cause to show, and immediately thereafter passed the order. This was a continuation of the same order. To my mind if instead of signing his order at two places he had signed his order at the very end, there could have been nothing to say, but in the cases cited the proceeding which was taken by the Magistrate was quite a separate proceeding from that which terminated the criminal case. No objection can, to my mind be taken; really the proceeding taken by the Magistrate to award compensation is a continuation of the original proceeding against the accused, who was tried for the offence. I am therefore of opinion that there is no force in this contention.
3. The other point taken is that, when a man goes and makes a report to the police, however false, frivolous, mischievous and malicious that report may be, no compensation can be awarded to the accused. Now, as the law stands, compensation can be awarded for false, frivolous or vexatious accusations in any case which is instituted upon complaint or 'upon information given to a police-officer.' I am unable to follow the argument that making a report to the police is not giving an information to a police-officer. In the present case I have given the actual words of the complainant, in which he asks the police to take action. The action was taken and I cannot say why, when the legislature used the words 'upon information given to a police officer' and when a report, which was false, frivolous or vexatious, was made to the police with the intent that action should be taken against the accused persons, the Court is incompetent to award compensation. Mr. Malaviya has referred to 7 Mad. 563, 1901 A.W.N. 142, and 1 P.L.J. 106. I have examined all these cases. The first two cases were decided when the words 'upon information given to a police-officer' formed no part of the corresponding section of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The facts of the other two cases are clearly different, and I am of opinion that neither of those cases have any application, upon the facts. In the case of Sarjan Prasad Singh v. Emperor (1913) 1 PLJ 106 the following sentence in the judgment of the Court supports my view namely, that if a person makes a report to the police which is found by a Magistrate to be false, frivolous or vexatious, a Magistrate can direct compensation to be paid. The sentence I refer to is 'there is nothing before us to justify the conclusion that the institution of the proceedings against the accused persons was due to any action taken by the petitioner.'
4. The result is that I am not prepared, for the reasons given above, to accept the recommendation of the Court below.