1. In this case the District Magistrate of Etawah has ordered further enquiry to be made into a complaint against one Hira Lal who had been discharged, after having been brought before the Court on a warrant, that Court behind one of competent jurisdiction to take cognizance of the offence, The District Magistrate's order appears, on the face of it, to show fairly strong cause against the procedure followed in the trial Court; but it has to be remembered that it was an ex parte order, the District Magistrate having taken it upon himself to dispose of the matter without issuing notice to the accused person. I have always consistently maintained that, where an accused person has once been brought before a Court of Justice under process, whether by means of a summons or by arrest under a warrant, if he is discharged by the Court, that order of discharge should not be interfered with except after notice to show cause issued to the said accused. I believe this is in as ordnance with what may be called the settled practice of this Court. I think that the regular practice of this Court must be upheld in this matter; but I bars, upon suitable occasions, dealt with applications of this sort on the basis that the accused person challenging an order of further enquiry, solely on the ground that it has been made without notice to him, may reasonably be required in this Court, On his application doming up for hearing, to show cause why further enquiry should not be ordered. After this has been done, the order of the Magistrate can either be affirmed or set aside on the merits, without any technical question of law arising. I have asked the applicant to argue his case upon this basis also. The complaint was one of offenses punishable under Section 405 or under Section 417, Indian Penal Code. On the facts alleged by the complainant, it is not quite easy to see why the provisions of Section 420 of the same Code were not invoked. In any are, a question of territorial jurisdiction was raised, and it was seriously open to argument whether, on the facts stated by the complainant, the alleged offence or offences could lawfully be taken cognizance of by a Court exercising jurisdiction in the Etawah District. The conclusion I have come to, after hearing the parties is, that the alleged offence punish-able under Section 403, Indian Penal Code, was one over which the Courts in Etawah could have exercised no jurisdiction. The ordinary place of enquiry or trial for that offence would be within the limits of the Lucknow District and, on the record as it stands at present, no facts are disclosed which would render this offence cognizable by the Etawah Courts, either under Section 179, or under Section 181(2), of the Code of Criminal Procedure. As regards the offence of cheating, the complainant's allegation was that he was deceived within the jurisdiction of the Etawah Court, but induced to deliver property and otherwise caused to suffer loss within the territorial jurisdiction of the Lucknow Courts. This offence would, therefore, be covered by the provisions of Section 179 of the Criminal Procedure Code, in view more particularly of the manner in which the principle of that section is explained by illustration (e). The net result is that, whereas a Court exercising jurisdiction in the Lucknow District could lawfully take cognizance of the entire complaint, the Court in Etawah before which the complaint was laid could only take cognizance of a part of the said complaint, In view of this consideration and of others which have occurred to me, but which I prefer not to enter into as they might involve expressing up inadequate materials a provisional opinion as to the merits of the complain. I am not prepared to say that the order directing further enquiry ought to be affirmed, in spite of the irregular manner in which it was passed. I allow this application and set aside the order of the District Magistrate.