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Sarasti Prasad Vs. the People's Industrial Bank, Ltd. (04.04.1917 - ALLHC) - Court Judgment

LegalCrystal Citation
CourtAllahabad
Decided On
Judge
Reported inAIR1917All129; 39Ind.Cas.729
AppellantSarasti Prasad
RespondentThe People's Industrial Bank, Ltd.
Cases ReferredMaharajah of Bobbili v. Narasaraju Peda Baliara
Excerpt:
civil procedure code (act v of 1908), section 39 - transfer of decree--execution--concurrent execution, whether permissible. - .....application dated the 30th march 1914 already referred to was not and could not be treated as a step in execution. the argument in support of this is that the application is signed not by the decree-holder i.e. the people's industrial bank, limited, nor by the liquidator. the company had, so it was said, by 1914 gone into liquidation, it is signed by some one else and i was asked to infer that the some one else was not acquainted with the facts of the case. on my asking for authority for this i was referred to no authority either in fact or in law. then it was further urged that the application should have been by the liquidator and that the words in liquidation' should have been added, the absence of these words removed the step from being a step in execution. no authority was given.....
Judgment:

George Knox, J.

1. This revision arises out of a decree passed by the Judge of Small Cause Court, Allahadad, dated the 20th July 1916. The decree was passed against one Sarasti Prasad on the 28th of May 1911. The first application for execution was marie on the 5th of September 1911. The second application for execution was made on the 30th of March 1914, and this was an application for transmission of the decree for execution to Gaya. The third application was made on the 28th of March 1916. Sarasti Prasad, the judgment-debtor, raised two objections. The first was that the decree having been transmitted to Gaya for execution, execution in the Allahabad Court was illegal and the second was that the present application for execution is time-barred.

2. The learned Vakil who appears for Sarasti Prasad contended that the present application, i.e., the third application was time-barred. The ground on which he based his contention was that the second application, dated the 30th March 1914, was not an application in accordance with law. According to him concurrent execution of the decree was not justified by the Code. There is abundant authority to shew that concurrent execution of decrees was recoginsed by the previous Codes or at any rate was legal, and the only authority cited to me is the case of Maharajah of Bobbili v. Narasaraju Peda Baliara 36 Ind. Cas. 682 ; 31 M.L.J 300 ; 18 Bom. L.R. 909 ; 39 M. 640 ; 14 A.L.J. 1129 ; 20 M.L.T. 472 ; 24 C.W.N. 478 ; 4 L.W. 558 ; (1916) 2 M.W.N. 541 ; 21 C.W.N. 162 ; 1 P.L.W. 26 (P.C.). That case deals with a totally different question and has nothing to do with the question whether concurrent execution of decrees is or is not allowed by the present Code or on the further question as to whether, when the decree has been transferred for execution to another Court, no further action can be taken in the Court which passed the decree or which transferred the decree until the certificate comes from the Court to which the decree has been transferred, reciting satisfaction or nap-satisfaction. At one time I held the view that concurrent jurisdiction was not intended by law, but I was overruled by the other Judges of the Court sitting with me who held that concurrent execution of decrees was permitted by law. The learned Vakil does not seem to nave taken the trouble to look up the rulings of this Court and to exhaust them. However, this Court is in harmony with the other Courts and holds that concurrent execution of decrees is permissible.

3. The next plea taken is that the application dated the 30th March 1914 already referred to was not and could not be treated as a step in execution. The argument in support of this is that the application is signed not by the decree-holder i.e. The People's Industrial Bank, Limited, nor by the Liquidator. The Company had, so it was said, by 1914 gone into liquidation, it is signed by some one else and I was asked to infer that the some one else was not acquainted with the facts of the case. On my asking for authority for this I was referred to no authority either in fact or in law. Then it was further urged that the application should have been by the Liquidator and that the words in liquidation' should have been added, the absence of these words removed the step from being a step in execution. No authority was given me for this proposition. The step was intended to be undoubtedly a step in execution and the lower Court held that though there had been a mistake it was a bona fide mistake. I notice that when this application for revision was admitted and the file sent for, the question upon which the Judge did admit it was, whether execution can proceed in the Court from which the decree has been transferred. This point has been set at rest. I see no cause to interfere and dismiss the application with costs.


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