Skip to content


Bhatiby Chunni Lal Vs. Emperor - Court Judgment

LegalCrystal Citation
SubjectCivil
CourtAllahabad
Decided On
Judge
Reported inAIR1920All279(1); 58Ind.Cas.944
AppellantBhatiby Chunni Lal
RespondentEmperor
Excerpt:
u.p. municipalities act (ii of 1916), section 265 - obstruction in street--prosecution, duty of. - .....seems to me to show that it did not lie on the prosecution to prove affirmatively that the scaffolding caused actual obstruction, except in so far as that fast could be inferred from its existence. the other two pleas taken in the petition to this court have not been argued. i have, however, been pressed with one point, not taken in 'the petition, namely, that the municipal board, before it ordered this prosecution, had realised from chunni lal the ordinary tax or charge for erecting a scaffolding. i do not say that a receipt formally issued by the municipal board for due payment of such a tax or charge might not amount to a written permission for the erection of the scaffolding. something might depend upon the wording of the particular receipt. in this case the receipt was not.....
Judgment:

Piggott, J.

1. This is an application in revision against an order of the District Magistrate of Etawah, affirming a conviction and sentence of fine of Rs. 5 imposed upon the applicant, Chunni Lal, for having created a scaffolding in a street in contravention of the provisions of Section 265 of the local Municipalities Act (Act No. II of 1916).

2. The first ground taken is that it is not proved affirmatively that the scaffolding erected by the applicant caused any observation. A comparison of the wording of Sub-clauses (d) and (e) of Section 265, Clause 1, of the Act with the Sub-clause which precedes and the Sub clause which follows, seems to me to show that it did not lie on the prosecution to prove affirmatively that the scaffolding caused actual obstruction, except in so far as that fast could be inferred from its existence. The other two pleas taken in the petition to this Court have not been argued. I have, however, been pressed with one point, not taken in 'the petition, namely, that the Municipal Board, before it ordered this prosecution, had realised from Chunni Lal the ordinary tax or charge for erecting a scaffolding. I do not say that a receipt formally issued by the Municipal Board for due payment of such a tax or charge might not amount to a written permission for the erection of the scaffolding. Something might depend upon the wording of the particular receipt. In this case the receipt was not produced by the accused in his defence or put in evidence in the Magistrate's Court. It very possibly relates to a charge levied on the previous erection of a scaffolding which had been subsequently demolished. The record shows that the presents prosecution was instituted in respect of a second or subsequent erection of the scaffolding. I do not think any case is made out for interference.

3. I reject the application.


Save Judgments// Add Notes // Store Search Result sets // Organizer Client Files //