1. This is a plaintiff's appeal arising out of a suit for malicious prosecution. Mr. Mehdi has said everything that could possibly be said on behalf of the appellants, but when I find that the Privy Council have laid down in four very clear propositions what a plaintiff must prove before he can be successful in a suit for damages for malicious prosecution, I decline to accept the position that I have power to whittle away the force of those propositions by holding that I am entitled to add to them other considerations-those conditions being quoted to me as having been approved by this or the other Judge in some particular set of circumstances. Here the first two propositions laid down by their Lordships of the Privy Council at p. 457 of Balbhaddar Singh v. Budri Sah A.I.R. 1926 P.C. 46 are admitted to exist. The third thing which the plaintiff has to prove is:
That the prosecution was instituted against him without any reasonable and probable cause.
2. The circumstances of every case and the conditions of the judgment by which the plaintiff was acquitted must vary infinitely in every case. The burden was on the plaintiffs to prove that the prosecution was without any reasonable and probable cause. Both Courts have found that the plaintiffs have failed to establish the absence of such cause. That is in my view a finding of fact and I could not possibly disturb it without a detailed examination and weighing of all the evidence from the time the report was made to the time the original case was decided, and presumably also all the other evidence that was led in this case.
3. Mr. Mehdi contends that it is a mixed question of law and fact. That is a contention which in one sense may be raised in almost every case. I am unable to hold that there is any question of law or a hint of any question of law arising in the decision of the simple issue:
Had the defendants reasonable cause or not for bringing the case.
4. I am unable to allow that there is anything but the question of fact. The only other question that arises is:
Did the lower Courts exercise their discretion judicially.
5. It is suggested to me that if the lower Court had held that the addition of two and two make five, though it is on the face of it a question of fact this Court would not refuse to interfere, I entirely agree, though I have met with the contrary experience when I was at the Bar. But the proper answer there is that for a Court to hold that two and two make five means that it has not exercised a judicial discretion. I have read the judgment and I am unable to hold that the Court did not pay a judicial attention to the evidence.
6. I am referred to the cases Shubrati v. Shamsuddin : AIR1928All337 , Hira Lal v. Bandhu Bhagat  A.W.N. 189 and Radha Lal v. Munnoo  11 A.L.J. 125, in support of a request that I should certify this judgment as a fit case for appeal under the Letters Patent. In Shubrati v. Shamsuddin : AIR1928All337 it was held that the Court cannot find its judgment solely on the result of the criminal case in the trial Court and on appeal but must go into the evidence. In the present case both Courts have gone into the evidence. In Hira Lal v. Bandhu Bhagat  A.W.N. 189 and Radha Lal v. Munnoo  11 A.L.J. 125 it was held that where the charge must have been false to the knowledge of the defendant there could be no question of reasonable and probable cause. In the present case the complaint has not been found to be false to the knowledge of the defendant. All the three cases are irrelevant. The plaintiff tried to prove that no quarrel at all took place, that the complaint was false. They have been disbelieved, or in other words they failed to prove the facts from which the plaintiff was asking the Court to find absence of reasonable and probable cause. The appeal is dismissed with costs, and for the reasons I have given I decline to certify it as a fit case for appeal under the Letters Patent.