1. It is admitted here by counsel on both sides that the only point for decision in this and the three connected appeals, Nos. 1147 and 1148 of 1924 and 10 of 1925, is whether the lower appellate Court was right in dismissing the plaintiff's suits only on the ground that the compromise on which his suit was founded was not registered. That compromise was embodied in a decree. But part of the matters compromised were extraneous to the matter in dispute in the suits. It was contended before the lower appellate Court on behalf of the respondent here that the omission of registration was a bar to the plaintiff's suit, in that he was debarred from relying on the compromise. That plea was accepted in the Court below. In view of the terms of Section 17(2)(6) of the Registration Act, we are unable to accede to this view. It is therein clearly laid down that nothing in the previous Sub-clauses (b) and (c) of Sub-section (1) applies to any decree or order of a Court It is impossible to contend here that the document in which the compromise was embodied was not a decree of the Court. In fact it is not so contended. We are further referred to the decision of their Lordships of the Privy Council referred to in Hemanta Kumari Debi v. Midnapore Zemindari Co.  47 Cal. 485. We hold, therefore, that the plaintiff's suit was not barred merely by reason of the compromise not having been registered. We accordingly allow the appeal with costs in this Court to the appellant, and setting aside the decree of the lower appellate Court remand the case to that Court for determination of the remaining issues. Costs will abide the result.